Commissioners of Cambria Park v. Board of County Commissioners of Weston County

• Decision Date: 19 November 1946
• Docket Number: 2340
• Parties: COMMISSIONERS OF CAMBRIA PARK, A CORPORATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF WESTON COUNTY, AND YVONNE SEDGWICK AS COUNTY TREASURER OF WESTON COUNTY, Defendants and Respondents
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

174 P.2d 402

62 Wyo. 446

COMMISSIONERS OF CAMBRIA PARK, A CORPORATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF WESTON COUNTY, AND YVONNE SEDGWICK AS COUNTY TREASURER OF WESTON COUNTY, Defendants and Respondents

No. 2340

Supreme Court of Wyoming

November 19, 1946

APPEAL from District Court, Weston County; HARRY P. ILSLEY, Judge.

Action by Commissioners of Cambria Park, a corporation, against the Board of County Comissioners of Weston County and another to have realty owned by plaintiff declared exempt from taxation during the time of its use for religious or school purposes and to enjoin collection taxes assessed thereon. From an adverse judgment, plaintiff appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

Affirmed.

For the plaintiff and appellant the cause was submitted upon the brief of Raymond & Guthrie of Newcastle, Wyoming.

POINTS OF COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT

Under the Constitution and Statutes of the State of Wyoming this property is exempt from taxation, as all of it is being used exclusively for religious and school purposes without profit. That by reason of such use the property is exempt from taxation. The use is the only matter to be considered. There is nothing in either the constitution or the statutes exempting property from taxation that mentions ownership. It is the use exclusively that creates the exemption. Const Art. 12, Sec. 15. Sec. 115-102 and 115-104 W. R. S. 1931.

The cases in which it has been held that the use of the property was such as to subject it to taxation are those where the property or some part of it was rented or leased for business purposes, such as stores, offices, etc., and was so occupied. It was such use or occupation as would interfere with the use, by the society or organization, of the building for the purposes for which the society was organized, and not merely its occasional use for other purposes when not so required by it. Hardin v. Lodge, 23 Wyo. 522.

There is exempt from taxation all property used exclusively for religious purposes. It is the exclusive use for the purpose named which determines whether the property is subject to the burden of taxation or not. To hold that a religious society must be the absolute owner of the property occupied or used by it exclusively for church purposes, to create the exemption, would be to inject words into the constitution and statute which are not therein written. Scott v. Society of Russian Israelites, et al., 81 N.W. 624.

It is not essential to an exemption that the title to the property shall be in the society. Neither the statute nor the constitution in any way recognizes that the exemption depends upon title or ownership. If the private owner of the land allows his land to be used for such purposes, and charges no rent and derives no personal benefit from the land, the land is exempt from taxation, because the land is then devoted exclusively to such a use. Kappa Kappa Gamma House Ass'n. v. C. E. Pearcy, County Treasurer, 52 L. R A. N. S. 995.

To exempt property from taxation it must be used exclusively for literary and educational purposes. This involves three things: First, that the property is used; second, that it is used for educational purposes; and, third, that it is used for no other purpose. Nor is ownership evidence of use. This is too plain to need either argument or illustration. If the framers of the Constitution had intended to exempt all property belonging to literary and charitable institutions from taxation, the language employed would have been very different. Washburn College v. Shawnee County, 8 Kan. 344, St. Mary's College v. Crowl, 10 Kan. 442; Gerke v. Purcell, 25 Ohio St. 229.

If the constitution or statute provides that property "used" for certain purposes shall be exempt it is the use and not the ownership which determines the right to the exemption, and the owner of the property may claim the exemption although the use is by another, such as a lessee. 61 C. J. 401, Section 402 (b).

For the defendants and respondents the cause was submitted upon the brief and also oral argument of E. E. Wakeman of Newcastle, Wyoming.

POINTS OF COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS

It is the general policy of the law to make all taxable property share the common burden of taxation, and any claim for exemptions asserted by the owner, other than a public governmental body, must rest upon some definite provision of law granting him a tax exemption, and must be made in the advancement of the interests of the whole people. The presumption is against any grant of tax exemption, and any grant, whether by contract or by statute, is to be strictly construed against the taxpayer; the burden is upon him to point out a valid provision of the law supporting his claim. The law does not imply the tax exemption in favor of a private owner. 51 A. J. 503.

Tax exemption is never presumed and must be clearly conferred in plain terms and should be strictly construed. 51 A. J. page 526, 51 A. J. page 530; State, ex rel. v. Hunt, 49 Wyo. 497.

When the owner leases his land to the public for a public use, or to a quasi-public body for a charitable or religious use, and applies the rents derived from the land to his own personal advantage, he contributes nothing to the public or to charity, he loses nothing by the use, he is not a benefactor to any one, but he stands before the law in exactly the same light as any one else who leases his land for any other purpose, and uses the rents for his own advantage, and, therefore he is not entitled to any special consideration at the hands of the law or the government, and his property is not exempt. State ex rel Hammer v. McGurn, et al., 187 Mo. 238, 2 Ann. Cas. 808.

When one lets his property for rent the use, which he is making of it, as the owner cannot be said to be a use for religious worship. Commonwealth v. Starks, 109 Ky. 410, 183 S.W. 943, Ann. Cas. 1918 B. 525.

RINER, Justice. BLUME, C. J., and KIMBALL, J., concur.

OPINION

RINER, Justice.

The Commissioners of Cambria Park, a Wyoming Corporation, brought an action in the District Court of Weston County, against the Board of The County Commissioners of that county and the County Treasurer thereof, seeking to have certain real property owned by it and leased to the International Pentecostal Assemblies, a corporation existing under the laws of the State of Georgia, and admitted to transact business in Wyoming, usually subsequently referred to as the "lessee," declared exempt from taxation during the time said property has been or will be "used for religious or school purposes" as pleaded in plaintiff's petition. The action sought also to restrain the Weston County Treasurer "from collecting or attempting to collect any taxes assessed against the said property" during that time. The plaintiff corporation may be conveniently hereinafter so mentioned or as the "lessor," and the defendant, the Board of The County Commissioners, simply as the "Board". The judgment, after trial to the court, was adverse to the plaintiff and in consequence it brings the record here for review by direct appeal.

Succinctly the question to be resolved is whether the district court was in error in declining to grant the relief asked under the facts shown by this record. There was an agreed statement of facts filed and presented to the court by the parties supplemented by oral and documentary proofs, and a deposition given by one of the witnesses for the plaintiff. The facts, as we view them and which we regard as material and necessary to be considered to reach a proper disposition of the case, are substantially as follows:

The certificate of incorporation of the lessor was filed in the office of the County Clerk of Weston County about June 12, 1929. It recites that "the purpose for which the association is formed is that set forth in subdivision Twelfth of § 5396, Wyoming Compiled Statutes, 1920". That subdivision reads, "To establish and maintain parks, boulevards, and other pleasure and sanitary resorts". The paragraph of this certificate, numbered "Third", provides that "The stock and property of the association shall be divided into One Thousand (1,000) shares of the par value of One Hundred dollars ($ 100) each; and the terms upon which such shares of stock shall be held by the members, and the manner in which the same shall be sold and transferred, may be determined by the by-laws". Its paragraph denominated "Seventh" declares that "No dividend shall be declared or paid upon the stock of the Corporation, until final dissolution thereof".

The original cost of erection of the buildings and improvements upon the real estate of the lessor was something over $ 250,000.00. It seems that the real property on which these improvements were placed was at first owned by the Cambria Fuel Company and its subsequent development by the lessor was with the idea of providing "an attractive place" largely for the residents of the vicinity. The lessor operated the property for four or five years, approximately, and it appears to have paid expenses. Since that time it has never made enough to pay for the taxes and cost of repairs. The amount of the taxes charged against this property "for the year 1941 was $ 563.24; for the year 1942, $ 510.12; for the year 1943, $ 505.32; for the year 1944, $ 491.82, these amounts being the original amount of taxes without addition of penalty or interest". The property was sold by the county of Weston for the delinquent taxes of the years 1942, 1943 and 1944.

On or about December, 1942, apparently under a lease, the lessee was put in possession of the premises aforesaid, and under date of April 1, 1943, the lessor and lessee executed a written lease. Thereafter and on July 6, 1944, they executed another written instrument of...