Commissioners of Civil Service v. Municipal Court of City of Boston

• Decision Date: 07 April 1971
• Citation: 268 N.E.2d 346,359 Mass. 211
• Parties: . Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 346

268 N.E.2d 346

359 Mass. 211

COMMISSIONERS OF CIVIL SERVICE et al. v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF the CITY OF BOSTON et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Feb. 4, 1971.

Decided April 7, 1971.

Walter H. Mayo, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Commissioners of Civil service.

Henry N. Frenette, Jr., Brockton, for Mayor of Brockton.

David C. Hawkins, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., for Municipal Court of the City of Boston.

Herbert D. Lewis, Boston (Michael D. Zibel, Boston, with him), for Robert E. Raynard.

Before TAURO, C.J., and SPALDING, CUTTER, SPIEGEL and BRAUCHER, JJ.

CUTTER, Justice.

This petition in the county court for a writ of certiorari seeks to quash a decision of a judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Boston reviewing action of the Civil Service Commission (the commission). The commission, after hearing, had affirmed action of the appointing authority, the mayor of Brockton, discharging Robert E. Raynard, a police officer. The Municipal Court judge concluded that the commission's action was not 'justified.'

A single justice reserved and reported the case, without decision, for the determination of the full court upon the pleadings and exhibits in the Municipal Court. These include the record before the commission, and certified copies of Raynard's acquittal on two criminal charges of assault and battery upon another officer. It was stipulated that the Municipal Court judge (in addition to receiving the record before the commission) heard testimony from Robert Raynard and two other witnesses (called by him before the commission), and that their testimony 'did not differ from the testimony given by them before the (h)earing (o)fficer of the (c)ommission.'

The evidence (some of it conflicting) before the commission showed at least the following general facts about which there was little or no dispute. About 3:30 P.M. on April 21, 1966, Officer Robert Raynard, off duty, was operating a motor vehicle through a street intersection at which Officer John L. Clark was on duty directing traffic. The vehicle either made contact with Clark or came very close to doing so. Clark directed Raynard to pull his vehicle to the side of the street. He did so, left his vehicle, and approached Clark. A struggle between the two officers ensued 'in full view of the public.' Several other officers intervened to restore order. A further altercation between the two officers occurred at the police station, where other officers again intervened. Clark was injured. There had been ill feeling between the two officers. Raynard was booked on charges of assault and battery. ¹

On April 22, 1966, Raynard was notified of his suspension from the police force for conduct unbecoming a police officer and violation of regulations. On April 29, 1966, after hearing, the mayor (the appointing officer) found there was 'just cause' for the suspension. On May 20, 1966, Raynard was discharged. After hearing before a hearing officer of the commission (of which a 274 page transcript is before us), the commission on August 17, 1966, adopted the hearing officer's findings, and, as has been noted, affirmed the action of the mayor in suspending and discharging Raynard.

1. Review of the commission's decision took place in the Municipal Court under G.L. c. 31, § 45, as amended through St.1955, c. 407, § 2, which reads: 'Within thirty days after action by the commission on a hearing provided for in section forty-three, the person who was discharged * * * may, if said action was affirmed by the commission, bring a petition in the municipal court of the city of Boston * * * praying that the action of the appointing authority and of the commission in discharging * * * him * * * may be reviewed by the court, and, after * * * notice * * * the court * * * shall hear witnesses, review such action, and determine whether * * * upon all the evidence such action was justified. If the court finds that such action was justified the action of the appointing authority and of the commission shall be affirmed; otherwise they shall be reversed and the petitioner shall be reinstated * * * without loss of compensation. The decision of the court shall be final and conclusive upon the parties * * *' (emphasis supplied).

The section had been considerably revised by St.1945, c. 667, § 2, which inserted the italicized language, quoted above from the 1955 version of the statute, in place of earlier language in St.1934, c. 249, § 2, which read 'the court * * * shall review such action, hear the witnesses, and shall affirm the decision of the * * * board unless it shall appear that it was made without proper cause or in bad faith, in which case said decision shall be reversed.' ²

The scope of review open to the Municipal Court judge is defined in Sullivan v. Municipal Court of the Roxbury Dist., 322 Mass. 566, 572--573, 78 N.E.2d 618, 620, where it was said by Chief Justice Qua: 'The scope under a statute of this type of a judicial review to determine whether the action of an administrative officer in discharging * * * an * * * employee in the classified service was 'justified' has been settled by a series of decisions. The difference between a review and 'a retrial of the case * * *' (has been) pointed out * * * (citing Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of First Dist. Court of E. Middlesex, 262 Mass. 477, 482, 160 N.E.2d 427). 'Review' indicates 'a re-examination of a proceeding * * * for the purpose of preventing a result which appears not to be based upon the exercise of an unbiased and reasonable judgment. It does not import a reversal of the earlier decision honestly made upon evidence which appears to an unprejudiced mind sufficient to warrant the decision made although of a character respecting the weight of which two impartial minds might well reach different conclusions, and upon which the reviewing magistrate, if trying the whole issue afresh, might make a different finding.' * * * (citing cases). 'Justified' in connection with 'review' means 'done upon adequate reasons sufficiently supported by credible evidence, when weighed by an unprejudiced mind guided by common sense and by correct rules of law.' (citing the Selectmen of Wakefield case, 262 Mass. 477, 482, 160 N.E.2d 427, supra).'

This statement of the law has continued to prevail under § 45 as amended in 1955. ³ See Mayor of Beverly v. First Dist. Court of Essex, 327 Mass. 56, 60--61, 97 N.E.2d 181. See also McCormack v. Municipal Court of Brookline, 355 Mass. 786, 243 N.E.2d 924. The review, in accordance with the Sullivan case is more limited than the de novo hearing before the commission. See Luacaw v. Fire Commr. of Boston, 350 Mass. 326, 330, 214 N.E.2d 734.

2. The commission's hearing officer, in addition to finding the essentially undisputed facts already outlined, made the following specific findings. Robert Raynard's vehicle 'made contact with * * * (Clark's) right leg and hand.' Raynard 'approached * * * Clark with the * * * intent to assault him.' He did assault Clark at the street intersection 'and caused a breach of the peace,' as a consequence of which members of the public ...