Commissioners of Yancey County v. Road Com'rs of Yancey County

• Decision Date: 26 May 1914
• Docket Number: 576.
• Citation: 81 S.E. 1001,165 N.C. 632
• Parties: COMMISSIONERS OF YANCEY COUNTY v. ROAD COM'RS OF YANCEY COUNTY.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

81 S.E. 1001

165 N.C. 632

COMMISSIONERS OF YANCEY COUNTY v. ROAD COM'RS OF YANCEY COUNTY.

No. 576.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

May 26, 1914

Appeal from Superior Court, Yancey County; Cline, Judge.

Action by the Commissioners of Yancey County against the Road Commissioners of Yancey County. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

The court will not interfere with the powers conferred by statute on road commissioners of a county to construct roads and bridges and issue bonds therefor, so long as they act in accordance with the statute, and are not dishonest, or so reckless as to amount to an abuse of the power conferred.

J. W Pless, of Marion, and R. W. Wilson, of Burnsville, for appellants.

J. Bis Ray, of Burnsville, A. Hall Johnston, of Asheville, Chas Hutchins, of Burnsville, and Hudgins, Watson & Watson, of Marion, for appellees.

CLARK C.J.

This is an action to declare chapter 603, Public Local Laws 1913 unconstitutional and void. That statute provides for the appointment of three commissioners, named in the act, who shall be road commissioners for Yancey county, and who shall be vested with the supervision of the roads, which was formerly exercised by the county commissioners, with authority to issue bonds in the sum of $150,000 to build roads. The routes for the roads and their character are expressed in the act. Under authority of the statute the commissioners organized as the board of road commissioners for Yancey county, and have sold to a firm in Ohio $125,000 of the road bonds of Yancey county issued in pursuance of the statute, and had in their possession at the time this action was begun $83,000 of the proceeds. In pursuance of the act of the General Assembly the defendant board has contracted for about 11 1/2 miles of road through the center of the county, over which the defendant claims that at least 90 per cent. of the citizens of the county travel, and this road is now being constructed.

The complaint prays that the act be declared unconstitutional; that the defendant be restrained from expending any further part of said money or incurring any obligation; and that the fund now in hand be delivered to the treasurer of the county, with instructions to restore the same to the holders of said bonds, which shall be taken up and canceled, and that the county commissioners of Yancey be restored to their rights as road supervisors of Yancey county.

The state Constitution, art. 7, § 7, provides:

"No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall contract any debt, pledge its faith or loan its credit nor shall any tax be levied or collected by any officers of the same except for the necessary expenses thereof, unless by a vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein."

Chapter 603, Pub. Loc. Laws 1913, vests the road commissioners of Yancey county with the same authority for the issuing of bonds for public roads that the county commissioners formerly had, and this court held, in Vaughn v. Com'rs, 117 N.C. 434, 23 S.E. 355, that the building of bridges and construction of public roads are necessary expenses of the county. This decision was approved in Burgin v. Smith, 151 N.C. 567, 66 S.E. 607.

In Vaughn v. Commissioners, supra, the court held that building bridges and constructing public roads is one of the necessary expenses of the county, and the courts have no authority to control the exercise of the discretionary power vested in the commissioners as to the nature of the work, or to determine "what would be a reasonable limit to the cost." In the same case it is said:

"Chief Justice Pearson, speaking for the court, says: 'The people must rely upon the honesty of the members of the General Assembly, and of the persons elected to fill places of trust in the several counties. The court has no power, and is not capable if it had the power, of controlling the exercise of power conferred by the Constitution upon the legislative department of the government, or upon the county authorities.' "

In Hightower v. Raleigh, 150 N.C. 571, 65 S.E. 281, Brown, J., says:

"While it is within the province of the courts to determine what are necessary public buildings, and what classes of expenditures fall within the definition of the necessary expenses of a municipal corporation, the authority for determining the kind of building that is needed, or what would be a reasonable cost for it, is not within the purview of the judicial authority. It is vested in the legislative and municipal...