Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court

• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Writing for the Court: NEWMAN; BIRD; MOSK; REYNOSO; RICHARDSON; KAUS
• Citation: 649 P.2d 912,185 Cal.Rptr. 270,32 Cal.3d 211
• Parties: , 649 P.2d 912, 31 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1058, 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,036 COMMODORE HOME SYSTEMS, INC., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, Respondent; Johnnie BROWN et al., Real Parties in Interest. L.A. 31512.
• Decision Date: 30 August 1982

Page 270

185 Cal.Rptr. 270 32 Cal.3d 211, 649 P.2d 912, 31 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1058, 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,036 COMMODORE HOME SYSTEMS, INC., Petitioner,
v.
The SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, Respondent;
Johnnie BROWN et al., Real Parties in Interest. L.A. 31512. Supreme Court of California,
In Bank. Aug. 30, 1982.

[32 Cal.3d 212] Munger, Tolles & Rickershauser and Ralph F. Hirschmann, Los Angeles, for petitioner.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, William F. Spalding, Pamela L. Hemminger, Los Angeles, Kenneth C. McGuiness, Robert E. Williams,

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Douglas S. McDowell, Barbara L. [649 P.2d 913] Neilson and McGuiness & Williams, Washington, D. C., as amici curiae on behalf of petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Hanson & Adams and Michael D. Hanson, San Bernardino, for real parties in interest.

Joseph Posner, Los Angeles, Marjorie Gelb, David Benjamin Oppenheimer, David A. Garcia A., Theresa L. Thomas, Joan M. Graff, Linda J. Krieger, Rebecca I. McKee, Judith E. Kurtz and Nancy L. Davis, San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of real parties in interest.

NEWMAN, Justice.

Petitioner Commodore Home Systems, Inc. (Commodore) seeks mandate after the San Bernardino Superior Court denied its[32 Cal.3d 213] motion to strike portions of a complaint alleging job discrimination. The question is whether punitive damages are available in a suit for job discrimination pursuant to the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov.Code, § 12900 et seq.). ¹

The California Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) was enacted in 1959 (former Lab.Code, § 1410 et seq.; see Stats.1959, ch. 121, § 1, p. 2000 et seq.). In 1980 it was recodified as part of the FEHA. (Stats.1980, ch. 992, § 4, p. 3140 et seq.) The law establishes that freedom from job discrimination on specified grounds, including race, is a civil right. (§ 12921.) It declares that such discrimination is against public policy (§ 12920) and an unlawful employment practice (§ 12940). ²

The statute creates a Department of Fair Employment and Housing (Department) (§ 12901), whose function is to investigate, conciliate, and seek redress of claimed discrimination (§ 12930). Aggrieved persons may file complaints with the Department (§ 12960), which must promptly investigate (§ 12963). If it deems a claim valid it seeks to resolve the matter--in confidence--by conference, conciliation, and persuasion. (§ 12963.7.) If that fails or seems inappropriate the Department may issue an accusation to be heard by the Fair Employment and Housing Commission (Commission). (§§ 12965, subd. (a), 12969; see too § 12903.)

The Commission determines whether an accused employer, union, or employment agency has violated the act. If it finds a violation it must "issue ... an order requiring the [violator] to cease and desist from such unlawful practice and to take such action, including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees, with or without back pay, restoration to membership in any respondent labor organization, as, in the judgment of the commission, will effectuate the purpose of this part...." (§ 12970, subd. (a).)

If no accusation is issued within 150 days after the filing of the complaint and the matter is not otherwise resolved, the Department must[32 Cal.3d 214] give complainant a right-to-sue letter. Only then may that person sue in the superior court "under this part" (§ 12965, subd. (b)).

FACTS

The complaint of Johnnie Brown and Bennie Butler (both of whom are black) alleges as follows: Brown was hired by Commodore in June 1979 as a quality-control inspector. He was fired in October 1979, ostensibly because of a work-force reduction. He filed a discrimination complaint with the Department (then the Fair Employment Practices Commission [FEPC] ) in November 1979. In February 1980 he was rehired and promoted. He alleges that the rehiring and promotion

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were solely to appease him and then demonstrate[649 P.2d 914] his incompetence so that he could be fired again. Commodore did fire him again in June 1980 for reasons "falsely and fraudulently contrived," he alleges.

Butler was hired in February 1979 as a quality-assurance manager. Like Brown, in October 1979 he was fired as part of the work-force reduction, and he too filed an FEPC complaint.

Both men received right-to-sue letters from the Department in April 1980. They sued and asserted that each was discharged solely because of race, under Commodore's policy of denying supervisory and management positions to blacks. They further alleged that Commodore employs no blacks as managers or supervisors, fires all blacks with aptitude for advancement to those positions, acted in "total disregard of plaintiff's rights and feelings," with "explicit intent" to jeopardize them, and proceeded "in an oppressive and malicious manner." The prayer seeks general and compensatory damages, as well as punitive damages of $500,000 for Butler and $750,000 for Brown.

Commodore moved to strike the punitive-damage words, asserting that monetary relief beyond back pay is not available under the FEHA. The court denied the motion. This petition followed.

THE LAW

Commodore and supporting amici ³ note that subdivision (a) of section 12970 does not mention punitive damages; hence, they argue,[32 Cal.3d 215] courts may not award them. Since that subdivision addresses only the remedies the Commission may impose, however, here we need not fix its scope. Instead we conclude that the FEHA does not limit the relief a court may grant in a statutory suit charging employment discrimination. Therefore, as in other actions "for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract," punitive damages may be recovered "where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice...." (Civ.Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)

When a statute recognizes a cause of action for violation of a right, all forms of relief granted to civil litigants generally, including appropriate punitive damages, are available unless a contrary legislative intent appears. (Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club (1947) 30 Cal.2d 110, 113, 180 P.2d 321; Greenberg v. Western Turf Assn. (1904) 140 Cal. 357, 363-364, 73 P. 1050.) Here we perceive no such intent.

Section 12965, subdivision (b), declaring the right to sue when the Department fails to act, was added in 1977. (Stats.1977, ch. 1188, § 34, p. 3911; former Lab.Code, § 1422.2, subd. (b).) ⁴ Except by providing for attorney fees and costs, the subdivision does not address the subject of judicial remedies. Moreover, neither the 1977 amendment nor the 1980 recodification altered the only FEHA language that deals with remedies for employment discrimination, and that language concerns only the remedial powers of the Commission. (Compare former Lab.Code, § 1426 with Gov.Code, § 12970, subd. (a).)

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Commodore suggests that, by providing for a civil action "under this part" (§ 12965, [649 P.2d 915] subd. (b)), the Legislature expressed its intent to limit[32 Cal.3d 216] court remedies to those otherwise specified in the FEHA. ⁵ We do not agree. "[T]his part" pronounces an independent right, previously unrecognized in the statute, to sue for redress in court. While it describes remedies available in an administrative setting (see discussion ante ), the statute is silent about court relief. There is no indication whatever that an award of punitive damages exceeds a court's powers "under this part."

The employers note that the statute allows recovery of "reasonable attorney fees and costs ..." which phrase, they assert, shows an intent to exclude other kinds of relief not available in Commission proceedings. Again we see no merit in the contention. The fee-cost provision was added in 1978 (Stats.1978, ch. 1254, § 10, p. 4073) as part of more extensive amendments. The Legislative Counsel's Digest states only that "[a]ttorney fees would be allowed to the prevailing party." (Dig. of Assem. Bill No. 1915, 4 Stats.1978 (Reg.Sess.) Summary Dig., p. 350.) The sole aim appears to have been to contravene the general rule in California that, absent contrary agreement, litigants are not entitled to fees. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1021.)

Commodore invokes the maxim that remedies in statutes creating new causes of action are deemed exclusive. (See Orloff, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 113, 180 P.2d 321; Gold v. Los Angeles Democratic League (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 365, 373, 122 Cal.Rptr. 732.) Any such rule is inapposite here because the FEHA identifies none of the remedies available in court pursuant to its provisions.

The employers stress that federal statutes with similar language have been held not to authorize awards of either general compensatory or punitive damages. They rely in particular on interpretations of section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (29 U.S.C.A. § 160(c) [unfair labor practices]; see Edison Co. v. Labor Board (1938) 305 U.S. 197, 235-236, 59 S.Ct. 206, 219-220, 83 L.Ed. 126; Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corporation (N.D.Cal.1973) 368 F.Supp. 829, 837) and section 706(g) of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) [employment discrimination]; see, e.g., Shah v. Mt. Zion Hospital & Medical Ctr. (9th Cir. 1981) 642 F.2d 268, 272; Richerson v. Jones (3d Cir. 1977) 551 F.2d 918, 926-927; see also Great American Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Novotny (1979) 442 U.S. 366, 374-375, and fn. 17, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 2350-2351, and fn. 17, 60 L.Ed.2d 957).

[32 Cal.3d 217] Yet differences between those laws and the FEHA diminish the weight of the federal precedents. The NLRA provides no right of civil action against "unfair labor practices"; the National Labor Relations Board is sole forum for resolution of those claims. Section 10(c) specifies remedies the Board may impose, and the cases hold merely that its language prevents that agency from assessing compensatory or punitive damages.

Contrastingly, Title VII provides for judicial handling of federal...