Common School Dist. No. 13 v. Oak Grove Sp. School Dist.

• Decision Date: 19 February 1912
• Citation: 144 S.W. 224
• Parties: COMMON SCHOOL DIST. NO. 13, GREENE COUNTY, v. OAK GROVE SPECIAL SCHOOL DIST. et al.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

144 S.W. 224

COMMON SCHOOL DIST. NO. 13, GREENE COUNTY, v. OAK GROVE SPECIAL SCHOOL DIST. et al.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

February 19, 1912.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Greene County; Frank Smith, Judge.

Suits between Common School District No. 13, Greene County, and Oak Grove Special School District and Directors. From adverse judgments, the Common School District appeals. Affirmed.

Huddleston & Taylor, for appellant. Johnson & Burr, for appellees.

WOOD, J.

1. Act 321 of the General Assembly, approved May 31, 1909, is as follows:

"An act to create special or single school districts in any county in the state of Arkansas, with same powers as are now granted to incorporated cities and towns for such purposes, and empowering the county judge to call said election.

"Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the state of Arkansas:

"Section 1. That when the people of any given territory in any county in this state, other than incorporated cities and towns, desire to avail themselves of the benefits of all laws of this state for the regulation of public schools in incorporated cities and towns, they may be organized into and establish as a single school district in the manner and with powers therein provided, with such modifications of said laws as are herein provided.

"Sec. 2. That the petitions provided for in section 7669 of Kirby's Digest of the laws of Arkansas shall be accompanied by a map showing the territory asked to be made into the special district and shall be presented to the county judge of the county containing such territory, who shall perform the duties imposed upon the mayor of cities and towns in said original act, and with like force and effect, and said county judge shall designate the time and place for holding the election provided for therein, and shall appoint three qualified electors of the proposed territory to hold said election.

"Sec. 3. That all school districts created under this act shall have the power to borrow money as any other special or single district, in cities or incorporated towns, when a majority of the legal electors vote for the same, at any annual school meeting.

"Sec. 4. All laws and parts of laws in conflict with this act are hereby repealed and this act be in force and effect from and after its passage."

These appeals challenge the validity of the act under section 22, art. 5, of the Constitution, which provides: "No law shall be revived, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred by reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended or conferred shall be re-enacted and published at length."

In Watkins v. Eureka Springs, 49 Ark. 131, 4 S. W. 384, the court had under consideration a similar question. There the act (Mansf. Dig. § 1150 et seq.) provided:

"Section 1. That once during the year 1875, and every succeeding year thereafter, the county court of any county or the municipal authority of any city or incorporated town in this state, may call in the outstanding scrip or warrants of said county, or floating evidence of indebtedness of said city or incorporated town, for the purpose of canceling and reissuing the same.

"Sec. 2. That the law governing such proceedings in a county shall apply with equal force to cities and incorporated towns. The council, recorder and marshal shall perform the duties laid down for the county court, the clerk and sheriff respectively."

Chief Justice Cockrill, speaking for the court, said: "The second section adopts the method of procedure provided for like cases where counties are concerned without re-enacting the governing provisions. We are not, however, prepared to assert that, when a new right is conferred or cause of action given, the provisions of the Constitution quoted require the whole law governing the remedy to be re-enacted in order to enable the court to effect its enforcement. And we see no reason for refusing to apply the same rule to special proceedings like this. To prevent that kind of legislation could not have been the mischief the provision was intended to remedy. It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution to put unreasonable restraints upon the power of legislation, and thus unnecessarily embarrass the Legislature in its work." In Scales v. State, 47 Ark. 476, 1 S. W. 769, 58 Am. Rep. 768, the same learned judge, speaking of this provision of the Constitution, said: "It is well settled that this provision does not make it necessary when a new statute is passed that all prior laws modified, affected, or repealed by implication by it shall be re-enacted." The act in question does not revive or amend any prior law or extend or confer the provisions of any law in existence to the inhabitants of rural districts in any county in this state. On the contrary, it confers a new right upon the people in such territory, one that they never enjoyed before, of organizing themselves into single school districts in the same manner that such districts are organized in cities and incorporated towns, and confers upon them, when so organized, the same powers as are given these special school districts under...