Commonwealth Ex Rel. Attorney Gen. v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co

• Decision Date: 22 November 1906
• Citation: 55 S.E. 572,106 Va. 61
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH ex rel. ATTORNEY GENERAL, v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

55 S.E. 572

106 Va. 61

COMMONWEALTH ex rel. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

v.ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Nov. 22, 1906.

1. Constitutional Law — Constitutional Questions — Determination—Corporation Commission—Jurisdiction.

The State Corporation Commission, organized under Const. § 156 (c) TVa. Code 1904, p. ccliii], providing that in all matters pertaining to the public visitation, regulation, or control of corporations, within the jurisdiction of the commission, it shall have the powers and authority of a court of record, etc., has jurisdiction in a proceeding before it, by the state, to compel a carrier to issue mileage books at a reduced rate, as required by Act March 15, 1900 (Acts 1900, p. 541, c. 256), to pass on an issue raised as to the constitutionality of such act.

2. Same—Carriers—Regulation op Rates-Due Process op Law.

Act March 15, 1900 (Acts 1900, p. 451, c. 250), requiring all railroads operating in the state to keep on sale at all times mileage books of 500 miles and over to be sold at not more than 2 cents a mile, and good for the use of any dependent household member of the family of the parry to whom it is issued, dwelling under the same roof, within one year from the date of the same, was unconstitutional, as depriving railroad companies of their property without due process of law.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 10, Constitutional Law, §§ 832, 847.]

3. Courts—Federal Courts—Rules of Decision.

A decision of the United States Supreme Court holding a state statute regulating railroads unconstitutional, as a deprivation of property without due process of law, is conclusive on the courts of another state in determining the validity of a similar statute of that state.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 13, Courts, §§ 329-334.]

Appeal from State Corporation Commission.

Petition by the commonwealth on relation of the Attorney General against Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company. From a judgment of the State Corporation Commission, dismissing the petition, the commonwealth appeals. Affirmed.

William A. Anderson, Arty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.

William B. Mcllwalne, for appellee.

CARDWELL, J. This is an appeal from a judgment of the State Corporation Commission denying the prayer of a petition filed on behalf of the commonwealth by the Attorney General against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, the object of which was to compel the defendant railroad company to comply with the act of the General Assembly, approved March 15, 1906 (Acts 1906, p. 451, c. 256), requiring all railroads operating in this state to keep on sale at all timesmileage books of 500 miles and over at a charge of not more than 2 cents a mile.

The State Corporation Commission has, in a written opinion made a part of the record, after stating how the case arose, set forth in a very satisfactory manner the reasons why the relief asked on behalf of the commonwealth could not be granted, and we therefore adopt its opinion as a part of the opinion of this court.

"The petition states that the regular maximum rate of the defendant company Is 3 cents per mile. The company was summoned by the commission to show cause why it should not be required to comply with the said statute, and have penalties imposed upon it for its failure to perform its public duty in this respect. In its defense the company alleges that the act in question is unconstitutional. Several grounds are assigned by the defendant upon which its assertion of the unconstitutionality of the law is based. The two main contentions are:

"(1) That the statute in question is in contravention of the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in that it deprives the defendant of its property without due process of law, and without just compensation, and also denies to the defendant the equal protection of the laws.

"(2) That the General Assembly of the state, under the provisions of the organic law of the state, has no authority by legislation to prescribe or fix rates for transportation, but that authority to exercise the legislative functions of the state in that respect is conferred exclusively upon the State Corporation Commission.

"The learned Attorney General, as the highest law officer of the commonwealth, urged upon the commission that, in this proceeding, it was invested with all the powers, and had imposed upon it all the responsibility of a court of record. He earnestly contended that the commission not only had the judicial authority to pass upon these constitutional questions, but that it was its manifest duty to do so, in so far as it was necessary to reach a final conclusion. This position of the Attorney General was not combatted by the learned counsel for the defendant company, but was conceded to be correct. Indeed, It is no longer open to question. 'In this commonwealth the State Corporation Commission, created by constitutional authority, is the Instrumentality through which the state exercises its governmental powers for the regulation and control of public service corporations. For these purposes, it has been clothed with legislative, judicial, and executive powers'— was held by the Court of Appeals of this state in the case of Norfolk & P. R. R. Co. v. Com., 103 Va. 289, 49 S. E. 39, which went up to that court on appeal from the commission. The Constitution of Virginia, in section 150 (c) [Va. Code 1904, p. ccliii] provides, as to the commission, that 'In all matters pertaining to the public visitation, regulation or control of corporations, and within the jurisdiction of the commission, it shall have the powers and authority of a court of record, ' etc. This section gives the commission, in the exercise of its judicial functions, authority to administer oaths, compel the attendance of witnesses, enter up and enforce its judgments, and confers upon it other ordinary attributes of a court of general jurisdiction. In all matters, 'within the jurisdiction of the commission, ' says the Constitution, employing the word 'jurisdiction' which is appropriately used with reference to a judicial tribunal as distinguished from legislative or administrative authority. The commission, by section 156 (b), has conferred upon it the legislative authority to fix and prescribe rates and classifications, and to make regulations for transportation and transmission companies to the full extent to which that power exists in the state goverament. But, in the exercise of this legislative power, it cannot make its rates effective or put its regulations into force until It has summoned the company or companies to be affected before It. This is done by a notice which affords due process of law to the company. The hearing or investigation upon that notice gives to the final action of the commission the force and effect of a judgment of a judicial tribunal.

"Passing upon the reasonableness of rates and classifications to be prescribed by it. and of regulations, orders, and requirements to be promulgated by it—In the exercise of its legislative authority—constitute the principal matters 'within the jurisdiction' of the commission (as a judicial tribunal) as outlined in the Constitution. The General Assembly has brought many additional matters within the jurisdiction of the commission.

"In this proceeding the Attorney General Invokes the jurisdiction of the commission under sections 16 and 19 of the act approved April 15, 1903, (Laws 1902-04, pp. 141, 142), and carried into the Code of 1904, at page 714, as section 1313 (a). By that statute the commission Is authorized to compel all corporations to perform any public duty or requirement, and to impose fines upon them for failing to do so. This brings within the judicial jurisdiction of the commission the enforcement of all statues imposing public duties upon public service corporations. The commission cannot impose a fine upon a corporation without summoning the company before it hearing what It has to say in its defense, and passing judgment thereon judicially; in other words, giving the company a fair trial as in any other court. To proceed otherwise under this statute would be repugnant to fundamental principles, and would make the statute itself in violation of the Constitution, both of the state and the United States. The jurisdiction of the commission is further enlarged by clause 19 of section 1294 (b) of the Code of 1887 [Va. Code 1904, p. 600] being section 19, chapter 2, page 974, of the act concerning public service corporations. The commission is there given jurisdiction to entertain a petition filed before it complaining of violation of any of the provisions of that act. 'If the grievance complained of be established, ' says the Legislature in this act, 'the State Corporation Commission, sitting as a court of record, shall have jurisdiction by Injunction, etc' The commission awarded an injunction under this statute against the Virginia Passenger & Power Company restraining it from increasing its rates by discontinuing transfers. See report of State Corporation Commission of 1904, part 1, page 94.

"The commission having summoned the defendant company before it to show cause why a penalty should not be imposed upon it, the commission must hear fairly and pass judicially upon any issues properly raised. It matters not that one of the issues is the unconstitutionality of the act which the commission seeks to enforce. If the act Is void, it is a just reason why the company cannot be compelled to comply with it, or be fined for violating it

"In support of Its argument that the act in question here contravenes the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, the company relies chiefly upon the authority of the case of Railway Company v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684, 19 Sup. Ct. 565, 43 L. Ed. 858. The Supreme Court of the United States, in that case, held unconstitutional a statute of Michigan requiring railroad...