Commonwealth ex rel. Love v. Reynolds

• Decision Date: 20 December 1940
• Citation: 284 Ky. 809,146 S.W.2d 41
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH ex rel. LOVE v. REYNOLDS.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

146 S.W.2d 41

284 Ky. 809

COMMONWEALTH ex rel. LOVE v. REYNOLDS.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

December 20, 1940

Appeal from Circuit Court, Muhlenberg County; Clarence Bartlett Judge.

Proceeding by the Commonwealth of Kentucky, on relation of Charles L Love, against Laura L. Reynolds, wherein Charles L. Love entered a motion in the circuit court that an inquest respecting the mental condition of Laura L. Reynolds be set aside. From a judgment denying the motion, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, on relation of Charles L. Love, appeals.

Affirmed.

Herman Cohen and Lawrence S. Grauman, both of Louisville, for appellant.

Hubert Meredith and Sam T. Jarvis, both of Greenville, for appellee.

THOMAS Justice.

Some time in 1933 (the exact date not being shown by the record) John T. Reynolds, an outstanding citizen of Greenville Kentucky, died testate, but the contents of his will are not shown herein. Prior thereto and in 1929 his wife and the appellee, Laura L. Reynolds, began to exhibit symptoms of mental impairment, and by the time of the death of her husband her affliction had advanced to the point where she was completely mentally incapable. She was, therefore, disqualified from serving as executrix of her husband's will. Either on that hearing or one instituted about that time after an inquisition held for the purpose, her mental condition was adjudged as last indicated, and C. M. Martin--also a prominent citizen of the town--was appointed her committee. She owned--either in her right or through the will of her husband--property of a total valuation of about $200,000. Her committee took charge of her person and her property, looking after both with the utmost care and efficiency, which he continued to do up to April 17, 1936.

Mrs. Reynolds, it appears, left no issue--her nearest relative being the appellant, Charles L. Love, who is a brother. On April 17, 1936, he filed a petition in the Muhlenberg circuit court, in which the original inquisition was held, in which he set out the facts relative to his sister's mental condition and all others necessary under the law for the holding of an inquisition. He asked for the issuing of processes against his sister and Martin, her committee appointed under the 1933 proceedings, and all of which was based upon the theory that the latter proceedings were void because a jury was waived at its hearing and the facts by agreement were determined by the court. The later (1936) proceedings were inaugurated by appellant mainly, if not entirely, for the purpose of correcting that error. In such later proceedings two physicians were appointed, who examined Mrs. Reynolds and reported their findings to the effect that she was of unsound mind. Following that report a jury of twelve was impaneled, and after hearing the evidence they returned a verdict confirming the report of the two appointed physicians; whereupon judgment, based upon the verdict, was rendered, and the court again appointed the former committee, C. M. Martin, who executed bond, qualified and served in that capacity until his death occurring a few months thereafter.

Upon that fact being made known to the court, a settlement was made by Martin's personal representative, and M. L. Wickliffe, was appointed committee in his stead, who likewise qualified and he, as was also Mr. Martin, his predecessor, was given the management of the property of Mrs. Reynolds as well as custody of her person. Mr. Wickliffe likewise discharged his duty as committeeman, with uprightness and perfection, but he died shortly after his appointment, and his personal representative made a settlement of his fiduciary actions in the matter. The court then appointed the Fidelity and Columbia Trust Company of Louisville, Kentucky, as the committee succeeding Mr. Wickliffe, but limited its powers to looking after the management of her property, and placed her custody in the hands of P. R. Wickliffe, a citizen of Greenville, and each of them executed bond and qualified as such. The last inquisition above will be referred to as the "1936 inquisition." Following that inquisition both the estate of Mrs. Reynolds, as well as the care and attention given her by her custodian, were each conducted in such a manner as to justify no criticism, nor is any attempted to be made in the instant action or procedure.

On October 4, 1939, the same brother (appellant), as next friend to his sister, appeared in the Muhlenberg circuit court, and entered motion therein that the 1936 inquest (the one he instituted) be set aside and held for naught, and that the appointment of the various committeemen supra, in pursuance to that inquest--including the Fidelity and Columbia Trust Company the present one--be set aside for the same reason, and which reason was that neither Mrs. Reynolds, nor Martin, the person having her in charge, nor anyone for her, was summoned or in any manner notified of the proceedings resulting in the 1936 inquest, as is required by section 216aa-72 of Baldwin's 1936 Revision of Carroll's Kentucky Statutes. Response in the name of Mrs. Reynolds and her present committee, the Fidelity and Columbia Trust Company, was made to the petition, upon which that motion was based. The response denied the grounds of appellant's motion and pleaded his initiation of the 1936 inquest proceedings as an estoppel against his motion to set aside the order made therein. Affirmative matters not expressly denied by following pleadings were controverted of record, and upon trial the court overruled appellant's motion and adjudged that the 1936 inquisition was validly held, and that the statutory notice which appellant's motion denied was complied with at that hearing. From that judgment appellant prosecutes this appeal.

At the hearing of the instant motion considerable evidence was taken which was later transcribed by the court's stenographer and her transcription thereof is in the record brought here, but it was not approved by the court, nor was it ever filed in the record by any order of court, nor is there anything in the record showing that it was ever tendered to be filed, since no bill of exceptions of any character whatever appears in the case. The first argument, therefore, made by counsel for appellee, is that, since the record contains no bill of exceptions, nor any of the evidence heard at the trial, this appeal should be determined upon the sole issue made by the pleadings, and if they sustain the judgment appealed from it should be affirmed. That argument was and is a brick thrown by appellee's ...