Commonwealth of Kentucky, Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. Ivy

• Decision Date: 27 October 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2010–SC–000527–DGE.,2010–SC–000527–DGE.
• Citation: 353 S.W.3d 324
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, and Larry Barnes, Appellants, v. Renee IVY (Now Knighten), Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

353 S.W.3d 324

COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, and Larry Barnes, Appellants,

v.Renee IVY (Now Knighten), Appellee.

No. 2010–SC–000527–DGE.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

Oct. 27, 2011.

Lisa Frazier Osborne, Frankfort, KY, Deanna Wise Henschelm Assistant McCracken County Attorney, Paducah, KY, for appellant, Commonwealth Of Kentucky, Cabinet for Health and Family Services.

Karen Alderdice Paducah, KY, pro se.

Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt, Appeals Branch Manager, Frankfort, KY, for appellee.

Opinion of the Court by Justice ABRAMSON.

When Renee Ivy fell substantially behind in her child support payments, the Commonwealth's Cabinet for Health and Family Services (the Cabinet) moved the McCracken Family Court to hold her in contempt unless she could show cause for her failure to pay. At the hearing on the motion, Ivy presented evidence that her sole source of income is a federal benefit under the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI). That benefit, she argued, is not adequate to meet her own needs, much less her support obligation as well. The trial court reduced Ivy's support obligation from $106 to $60 per month, held her in contempt for having failed to pay the past due amount, and ordered that any future failure to pay the new amount plus $5 per month toward the arrears would result in her being placed in jail. Ivy appealed from that ruling and, in a split decision, a panel of the Court of Appeals reversed. The panel's majority held that neither the contempt finding nor the order to pay even reduced child support could stand in light of essentially uncontroverted evidence that Ivy does not have the ability to pay. We granted the Cabinet's motion for discretionary review to consider in what manner and to what extent SSI recipients may be held accountable for child support. We reverse the Court of Appeals' decision to the extent that it suggests that a SSI recipient-parent's present inability to pay precludes even the assessment of child support, but we vacate the existing order and remand for the family court to determine if the guidelines-based amount would be “unjust or inappropriate” pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 403.211(2). Finally, we affirm the Court of Appeals holding that a contempt finding was inappropriate here where there was insufficient evidence that Ivy's failure to provide child support stemmed from any reason but her inability to do so.

RELEVANT FACTS

Ivy's 2007 relationship with Larry Barnes, of Paducah, produced a child, D.G., who was born in February 2008. D.G. was the twenty-six-year-old Ivy's third child. Although the record on this point is not well-developed, it appears that Ivy suffers from a mental illness that impairs her ability to manage her affairs. For that reason, at least in part, custody of the two older children has been awarded to Ivy's sister and brother-in-law. For the same reason, again in part, Barnes was awarded sole custody of D.G., and Ivy was allowed only supervised visitation.

As noted, in May 2008, Ivy was ordered to pay $106 per month toward D.G.'s support. That amount was determined by applying the child-support table in KRS 403.212 to Ivy's and Barnes's combined monthly gross incomes, which included as Ivy's sole income her $637 per month SSI benefit. Ivy did not contest or appeal from that order. By virtue of assistance provided to D.G., in June 2008 the Cabinet became assignee for the support due him, and in February 2009 the Cabinet brought its motion for contempt. At that point, Ivy was some $850 in arrears, and by June of that year, when the motion was heard, the support arrearage had grown to almost $1125. By that time, Ivy had married and given birth to a fourth child.¹

At the show cause hearing, Ivy presented the testimony of Kenneth Anderson, an attorney who serves in thirteen counties of western Kentucky as guardian and/or payee for SSI beneficiaries deemed by the Social Security Administration incapable of managing their SSI benefits. Ivy is one of Anderson's clients. Anderson explained that SSI benefits are awarded on the basis of need to individuals who are incapable of substantial employment because of age, blindness, or disability, and whose assets and income are otherwise minimal. Anderson testified that Ivy's award is paid each month into a trust account over which he has control and from which, after deducting a $37 administration fee, he pays Ivy's rent and utilities. If any funds remain—usually, Anderson testified, in the neighborhood of $25 to $50—he gives them to Ivy for clothing, personal care items, and other necessities. He explained that under Social Security Administration regulations he is required to use Ivy's award for her shelter, maintenance, and support, and he is thus precluded, in his view, from using the award to pay Ivy's child support. The cash he gives to Ivy, Anderson testified, is hers to do with as she sees fit, and it is Ivy's decision where to live. He was aware of Ivy's marriage, which had not affected her award.

Ivy testified that since the birth of her fourth child she had applied for housing assistance, but had not received a decision. Her husband, who worked only about half-time, she claimed, did not contribute to the rent or utilities, but did provide some support for their child. SSI, she testified, was her only source of income. She was not asked about her work history, and there is nothing else in the record to suggest that Ivy has ever held a job.

Toward the end of the hearing the trial court indicated that it would hold Ivy in contempt and order a $5 per month payment on the arrearage. At that point, Ivy moved to have her support obligation reduced. Granting that motion from the bench and reducing Ivy's support obligation to $60 per month, the court explained that it would not have set Ivy's support obligation as high as it originally ordered had it been aware that Ivy, as a client of Mr. Anderson, only had access to a small portion of her SSI award. It is apparently this change in the court's understanding of Ivy's circumstances that it refers to in its written order when it cites “a change of circumstances” as justifying the reduction in Ivy's support obligation. Neither in open court nor in its written order did the court explain how it arrived at the $60 per month figure. ² In holding Ivy in contempt for having failed to pay the previously ordered child support, the family court found Ivy “to be an able-bodied person capable of providing financial support to her child.” Again, neither at the hearing nor in its written order did the court indicate what evidence it relied on to reach that conclusion.

As noted, the Court of Appeals held that the record supported neither a finding of contempt nor the imposition of a support obligation, even a reduced one. The Social Security Administration's determination that not only was Ivy mentally disabled but so disabled as to be incapable of managing her award, the unrefuted proof that Ivy's only discretionary income was the $25 to $50 per month left over from her SSI benefit, and the trial court's own finding that Ivy's mental impairment significantly contributed to her unfitness to be D.G.'s custodian was compelling evidence, the Court of Appeals believed, that Ivy had been and would continue to be incapable of paying any child support. In light of that evidence, the Court of Appeals held the family court's unsupported findings that Ivy was able-bodied and capable of providing support were clearly erroneous, and accordingly the family court had abused its discretion in both finding that Ivy's failure to pay her child support had been contemptuous and ordering her to pay support and arrears she did not have the ability to pay.

The Cabinet maintains that the Court of Appeals disregarded KRS 403.212, the child support guidelines; improperly presumed from Ivy's receipt of SSI benefits that she is incapable of working; and failed to defer to the family court as the finder of fact.³ There is some merit to the Cabinet's contentions, but before addressing them our analysis must begin with an attempt to clarify the trial court's order, which combined a contempt ruling with a ruling reducing Ivy's support obligation. Although related, the two rulings involve different standards, and those standards should be distinguished.

ANALYSIS

I. Ivy's Guidelines–Determined Support Obligation May Be Reduced If Properly Determined To Be Unjust or Inappropriate.

Turning first to that part of the family court's order reducing Ivy's support obligation, we note that under KRS 403.211 and 403.212, child support is to be determined by applying the guidelines to the parents' combined, adjusted gross incomes. The guidelines provide a statutory child support obligation—the “table amount,” not less than sixty dollars ($60) per month—and that obligation is then divided between the parents in proportion to their gross incomes. KRS 403.212(3). Under KRS 403.212(2)(b), “gross income” is defined to include Supplemental Security Income. Pursuant to these provisions, in April 2008, Ivy and Barnes were found to have a combined monthly income of $2489.50, including Ivy's SSI benefit of $637.00. That income yielded a guidelines support obligation of $411.74, which was apportioned $305.74 to Barnes and $106.00 to Ivy.

Under KRS 403.211(2), this guidelines-determined result enjoys a presumption of correctness. Given that presumption, there are only two ways in which Ivy's support obligation could deviate from the guidelines-determined $106 per month. First, under KRS 403.213, a “substantial and continuing change” in the parties' incomes, expenses, or other material circumstances could necessitate a recalculation of their support obligations under the guidelines. Alternatively, KRS 403.211(2) permits the court to deviate from the guidelines “where their application would be unjust or inappropriate.” The family court invoked neither of these...