Commonwealth Of Pa. v. Hansley
Decision Date | 05 May 2010 |
Citation | 994 A.2d 1150 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellantv.Frederick HANSLEY, Appellee. |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Nichole L. Eisenhart, Assistant District Attorney, Lebanon, for Commonwealth, appellant.
Bryan S. Walk, Hershey, for appellee.
¶ 1 In this appeal we consider whether a trial court is authorized by law to impose a conditional minimum sentence (RRRI minimum) pursuant to the Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive Act, 61 Pa.C.S. §§ 4501-4512 (RRRIA), upon a defendant convicted of Possession With Intent to Deliver, 35 P.S. § 780-113(A)(30) (PWID), and sentenced to mandatory minimum terms of incarceration pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6317 and 7508. We conclude that the court is so empowered by the RRRIA and must specify an RRRI minimum sentence upon determination that the defendant is statutorily eligible pursuant to 61 Pa.C.S. § 4503. In addition, we hold that a defendant who meets all other criteria for eligibility under the RRRIA is not rendered ineligible by the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence under 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508 unless that sentence was imposed under subsections (a)(1)(iii), (2)(iii), (3)(iii), (4)(iii), (7)(iii), or 8(iii). See 61 Pa.C.S. § 4503(1)-(6) ( ). Because the judgment of sentence imposed by the trial court is consistent with this holding, we affirm.
¶ 2 In this case, defendant Frederick Hansley pled guilty to one count of PWID at CP-38-CR-0001808 (No. 1808) for his sale of cocaine to an undercover officer on September 12, 2008. He pled guilty to a second count of PWID, at CP-38-CR-0001809 (No. 1809), for his sale of cocaine to the same officer during a transaction on October 15, 2008. Neither party disputes that the amount of cocaine seized at No. 1808 was less than ten grams and at No. 1809 greater than ten grams but less than one hundred grams and that the trial court imposed sentence pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(a)(3)(ii). The resulting convictions were subject to mandatory minimum sentences under 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(3)(i) and (ii), but not subsection (a)(3)(iii). Additionally, the conviction at No. 1808 was subject to a mandatory minimum for drug sales conducted within 1000 feet of a school. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6317 (Drug-free school zones).
¶ 3 Prior to sentencing, the Commonwealth gave notice of its intent to seek imposition of all mandatory minimum sentences and asserted that the applicable statutory provisions “trumped” any authority under the RRRIA to impose a conditional minimum sentence. Thereafter, Hansley accepted full responsibility for his actions and the court, following review of a pre-sentence investigation report, imposed a mandatory minimum prison term of one to two years at No. 1808 ( ) and three to six years at No. 1809, both sentences to be served concurrently. Additionally, however, the court found Hansley eligible for participation in a “program plan” under the RRRIA, 1 see 61 Pa.C.S. § 4505(c), and imposed an RRRI minimum sentence of eighteen months at No. 1808 and twenty-seven months at No. 1809 see id., § 4505(c)(1). Pursuant to those sentences, Hansley would be eligible for parole under the provisions of the RRRIA upon serving the RRRIA minimum and prior to expiration of the mandatory minimums otherwise imposed.
¶ 4 Commonwealth has now filed this appeal, raising the following question for our consideration:
A. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING MINIMUM SENTENCES PURSUANT TO THE RECIDIVISM RISK REDUCTION INCENTIVE (44 PA.C.S.A. § 5301 et seq.) WHEN DEFENDANT WAS SUBJECT TO MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES PURSUANT TO 18 PA.C.S.A. § 7508(a)(3)(ii) and 18 PA.C.S.A. § 6317?
¶ 5 The Commonwealth's claim challenges the trial court's imposition of sentence on the basis of a perceived conflict between the conditional minimum sentence the court imposed under the RRRIA and the mandatory minimums it applied under the respective sentencing statutes. The Commonwealth argues that the latter two statutes require imposition of the stated mandatory minimum sentence and that by their plain language they override any conflicting statute including the RRRIA, depriving the trial court of any authority to impose any sentence the sentencing statutes do not specially allow. Id. at 19. Further, the Commonwealth argues that to the extent the two sentencing statutes are more specific to the crime of PWID than is the RRRIA, their language must, as matter of statutory construction, supersede the RRRIA. Id. at 20.
¶ 6 Our analysis of the Commonwealth's claim proceeds from the premise that “when the legislature adopts a statute it does so with full knowledge of existing statutes relating to the same subject.” Hutskow v. Washowich, 156 Pa.Cmwlth. 655, 628 A.2d 1202, 1207 (1993) (citing Commonwealth v. Milano, 300 Pa.Super. 251, 446 A.2d 325 (1982)). Accordingly, “statutes or parts of statutes that relate to the same persons or things or to the same class of persons or things are to be construed together, if possible.” Casiano v. Casiano, 815 A.2d 638, 642 (Pa.Super.2002). In construing such kindred statutes, our objective is, first and foremost, to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General Assembly as reflected in the statutory language. See Commonwealth v. Ostrosky, 866 A.2d 423, 427 (Pa.Super.2005). “[W]hen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be given effect in accordance with its plain and common meaning.” Commonwealth v. Kelley, 569 Pa. 179, 801 A.2d 551, 554 (2002) . “Penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused.” 2Kelley, 801 A.2d at 554 (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1)).
¶ 7 In this case, the Commonwealth relies on the mandatory language of the two criminal sentencing statutes asserting that by their plain language they defeat application of the RRRIA. The first of those, pertaining to “Drug-free School Zones” mandates imposition of a two year prison term for any offender convicted of PWID within 1000 feet of a school and divests the court of authority to impose any contrary sentence. The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(2) for which The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act provides for a maximum term of imprisonment of less than four years.
18 Pa.C.S. § 6317 (emphasis added).
¶ 8 The second such statute, pertaining to “Drug Trafficking Sentencing and Penalties,” requires imposition of terms of imprisonment increasing in duration with the amount of a controlled substance in evidence and, like the statute prescribing drug-free school zones deprives the court of authority to impose any contrary sentence. That statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
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