Commonwealth v. Adams

Decision Date15 April 2004
Docket Number74652
Citation2004 MBAR 264
PartiesCommonwealth v. Laurence Adams
CourtMassachusetts Superior Court
File Date: May 20, 2004

Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh):Mulligan, J.

Opinion Title: MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
I. INTRODUCTION

The defendant, Laurence Adams, filed a Renewed And Revised Motion For Postconviction Relief. Related discovery motions, and several memoranda and appendixes in support of that motion were also filed and incorporated therein. In the course of postconviction proceedings this Court ordered disclosure of criminal records of Commonwealth witnesses as well as discovery of other documents in the possession of the Commonwealth and the Boston Police Department. At a hearing on May 29, 2002, transcripts of trial and post-trial proceedings, pleadings, memoranda, appendixes, affidavits and documentary exhibits were offered into evidence, and all such documents as submitted by the Defendant and the Commonwealth were accepted into evidence without objection. The findings of fact herein are based upon those documentary submissions the record in this case, and facts that are uncontested on the record.

While this is not the first Motion For New Trial filed by Mr Adams, he has for the first time presented newly discovered evidence in the form of the prior criminal records of Commonwealth witnesses, police notes and reports showing prior inconsistent statements of a key Commonwealth witness, and witness statements that were previously unavailable to the defendant, none of which were part of the original record in this case. A review of the full record leads this Court to conclude that the convictions for murder in the first degree and armed robbery must be vacated, and a new trial must be ordered.

II. FINDINGS AND RULINGS
A. Threshold Issues on Postconviction Relief

Rule 30(c) provides that any grounds for relief that are not raised in an original or amended motion pursuant to Rule 30 are deemed to be waived "unless the judge in the exercise of discretion permits them to be raised in a subsequent motion, or unless such grounds could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended motion." As in any case where postconviction relief is sought, ".á.á. interests of finality and the fair administration of justice must be weighed in addition to 'the ever-present concern that justice not miscarry for the defendant.'á" Commonwealth v. Curtis, 417 Mass. 619, 623 (1994); Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675-76 (2002)

The threshold question here is whether the grounds that Mr. Adams has raised are barred by the waiver doctrine. Claims that have been waived will not be reviewed except in "extraordinary cases where, upon sober reflection, it appears that a miscarriage of justice might otherwise result." Commonwealth v. Harrington, 379 Mass. 446, 449 (1980) See also Commonwealth v. LaFave, 430 Mass. 169, 169-73 (1999). Mr. Adams has raised a number of issues, some based upon newly discovered evidence, some based upon developments in the law, and some based upon the trial record. These claims have been considered in connection with the governing principles of the waiver doctrine, and this Court finds "upon sober reflection," that this is an "extraordinary case" where in the absence of postconviction relief, a "miscarriage of justice" will result. Id.

Certain grounds now raised by Mr. Adams, including grounds based upon newly discovered evidence, "could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended motion." See Rule 30(c) Mass.R.Crim.P. The newly discovered evidence in this case is of a significant character not only because of the direct bearing that such evidence would have had upon the trial proceedings, but also because it lends new perspective on issues that Mr. Adams sought to raise in previous proceedings.

Pursuant to Rule 30 Mass.R.Crim.P., further consideration of the issues in this case is warranted both in the exercise of discretion, and because certain grounds could not have been raised in the original or amended motion.

B. Rulings Regarding Newly Discovered Evidence

"A defendant seeking a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered evidence must establish both that the evidence is newly discovered and that it casts real doubt on the justice of the conviction." Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 305 (1986). The evidence said to be new not only must be material and credible, Commonwealth v. Brown, 378 Mass. 165, 172 (1979), ".á.á. but must also carry a measure of strength in support of the defendant's position." Grace, 397 Mass. 304. The issue is whether there is a substantial risk that the jury would have reached a different conclusion had the evidence been admitted at trial, Commonwealth v. Markham, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 651, 654 (1980), and whether the new evidence "would probably have been a real factor in the jury's deliberations." Grace, 397 Mass. at 306, citing Davis v. Boston Elevated Ry., 235 Mass. 482, 495-96 (1920).

Based upon this standard, the evidence to which the defendant points in this case is newly discovered. The defendant was deprived of access to the criminal records of Commonwealth witnesses, witness statements, police reports, and notes regarding the criminal investigation. Mr. Adams requested access to such evidence in advance of trial, but was denied such access by the Court and by the Commonwealth. Record Appendix at 252. In the course of trial proceedings counsel for Mr. Adams renewed his request for access to criminal records. TR. Vol 3, 273-74. The Commonwealth argued that while such evidence may "border on being exculpatory" the disclosure of such records would violate the newly-adopted CORI law. Record Appendix at 249.

This issue of being deprived access to criminal records was raised before the Supreme Judicial Court, but at that time the record did not show the actual nature of the criminal records., 374 Mass. 722, 732-33 & n.6 (1978). The Supreme Judicial Court noted that it could not find that the defendant was prejudiced by being deprived of such evidence, in part because the Court did not have that evidence in the record. Id. Now the evidence is in the record. This Court ordered the production of criminal records in these postconviction proceedings. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Mr. Adams had been provided with such records at the time of trial, at the first motion for new trial, or prior to the pending proceedings, or that Mr. Adams had actual access to such evidence at an earlier time.

Evidence which is not lawfully available to a defendant at the time of trial, if it later becomes available, is "newly discovered evidence." Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 422 Mass. 72 (1996); Commonwealth v. Dave, 411 Mass. 719, 734-35 (1992) (where a defendant had no right or access to a police report prior to trial, the report is treated as newly discovered evidence). Prior to trial the Commonwealth objected to producing criminal records of its witnesses, and witness statements, and the trial court denied the defendant's motion for such access. With regard to police reports, the record shows that the Commonwealth offered to produce only the "journal entry." Record Appendix at 255, Third Supplemental Record Appendix at 24. These documents which are at the foundation of trial preparation in the typical criminal case, were not provided to, and were not available to Mr. Adams in advance of trial.

With regard to criminal records, the Supreme Judicial Court suggested that there may have been another manner of obtaining this information., 374 Mass. 722, 732-33 (1978). The issue of access to the alphabetical index of records, organized by the names of the defendants, has resulted in litigation in the Courts of the Commonwealth, and later, in the Federal Courts. In 1979 the Supreme Judicial Court found that it was not unconstitutional to prohibit a newspaper access to an alphabetical index of the names of criminal defendants. New Bedford Standard-Times Publishing Company v. Clerk of the Third District Court of Bristol, 377 Mass. 404 (1979).[1] The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found that the CORI law was unconstitutional in certain respects. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Fenton, 819 F.Supp. 89 (D.Mass 1993). It was found that the trial courts of the Commonwealth ".á.á. acting pursuant to a relatively recent privacy regime, the Criminal Offender Records Information System, Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 6 Sec. 167-178B ('CORI').á.á. decline to permit unrestricted access to the alphabetical indices of parties, a convenientùformerly publicùrecord which the Commonwealth has required trial Courts to maintain since before ratification of the United States Constitution." Id. at 90. The Court went on to rule as follows: "I will allow the motion of the plaintiff by declaring unconstitutional that aspect of the Massachusetts scheme pursuant to which the defendants and their subordinates have acted to deny access to the alphabetical indices maintained by courts." Id. at 91. The Trial Court of the Commonwealth, which was the defendant in that case, did not appeal this finding that the CORI law was unconstitutional. As these cases illustrate, the CORI law did result in Court procedures which denied access to criminal case information. When the trial Court declined to order access to criminal record information in this case, Mr. Adams did not have access to such information.

After the decision in the Boston Globe case Mr. Adams' counsel did obtain access to some court records of criminal cases and convictions of Commonwealth witnesses. Upon review of discovery motions which were supported by...

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