Commonwealth v. Altenhaus
| Citation | 317 Mass. 270,57 N.E.2d 921 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. PHILIP ALTENHAUS. SAME v. SAME. |
| Decision Date | 29 November 1944 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
October 25, 1944.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., LUMMUS, QUA RONAN, & SPALDING, JJ.
Innholder. Evidence, Presumptions and burden of proof.
Words "Knowingly.
" A finding that one in charge of a hotel was guilty of violation of G L.
(Ter. Ed.) c. 140 Sections 26, 29, by "knowingly" allowing it to be used for certain immoral purposes and by "knowingly" permitting guests to register under false names was not warranted by evidence which, although showing that on several occasions rooms in the hotel were used for immoral purposes and guests registered under false names, was, on the issue of the defendant's knowledge of the immoral purposes of such use and of the falsity of the registrations, as consistent with his innocence as with his guilt.
TWO COMPLAINTS, received and sworn to in the First District Court of Bristol on August 7, 1943.
On appeal to the Superior Court, the cases were tried before R. M. Walsh, J., a District Court judge sitting under statutory authority.
In this court the cases were submitted on briefs. V. J. Deponte, for the defendant.
B. Horvitz, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
The defendant, a hotel proprietor, was found guilty by a jury on two complaints. In one he was charged with having knowingly permitted, as a licensed innholder, the premises under his control to be used for immoral conduct, in violation of G. L (Ter. Ed.) c. 140, Section 26. The other complaint alleged that while in charge of a hotel register he knowingly permitted "to be written in said register another or different name . . . than the true name or name in ordinary use of the persons registering," in violation of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 140, Section 29.
At the close of the evidence the defendant moved for a directed verdict on each complaint and excepted to the judge's denial of the motion. Exceptions were also saved to the denial of a motion to quash the complaints, and to the denial of a motion for a new trial.
The motion for directed verdicts raises the question whether there was sufficient evidence of the defendant's guilt to warrant the submission of the cases to a jury. The statutes involved are G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 140, Sections 26, 29, the pertinent portions of which are as follows:
The following is a summary of the pertinent evidence. The defendant and his brother as partners own and operate a hotel of twenty-six rooms in the city of Taunton. Sometimes the defendant works at the desk where guests are registered and at other times his brother performs this duty. On July 8, 1943, at about 10 P.M. a police officer observed two girls at the window of a room on the second floor of the defendant's hotel. One of the girls was whistling to attract the attention of some soldiers who were passing. There was no evidence tending to show that the defendant had knowledge of this. Later that evening the officer observed some soldiers in the room, one of whom was
"kissing and hugging" one of the girls. On the following night, July 9, at midnight the officer (accompanied by his captain) called at the hotel and told the defendant what he had observed. The defendant and the two officers then proceeded to the room, which was occupied by two women. Upon questioning by the police officers, the women admitted that since registering on July 8 they had engaged another room and that each had entertained a soldier in her room the night before. Both denied having participated in any immoral conduct...
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