Commonwealth v. Anderl
| Decision Date | 18 May 1984 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Steven John ANDERL. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Submitted Feb. 24, 1983. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Robert L. Eberhardt, Deputy Dist. Atty Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth, appellant.
Leonard Sharon, Pittsburgh, for appellee.
Before SPAETH, BROSKY and MONTEMURO, JJ.
This is a Commonwealth appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County granting in part and denying in part appellee's pre-trial motion to suppress evidence. The appellee, Steven Anderl, was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, [1] carrying an unlicensed firearm [2] possession of a controlled substance [3] (cocaine), possession of a controlled substance [4] (methaqualone), and possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance [5] (methaqualone).
Prior to trial, the appellee filed a motion to suppress statements and physical evidence, including: (1) a valise containing a plastic bag in which were found 892 Methaqualone tablets; (2) a .38 caliber Chartiers Arms revolver; (3) a metal tube in which was found a residence of white powder, found to be cocaine; (4) the results of a breathalyzer test; and (5) statements made by the appellee. The hearing court ordered that the "gun, the contents of the valise and all confession statements, together with the breathalyzer test, be suppressed." We agree that the gun and two of the confession statements were properly suppressed; however, we find the court erroneously suppressed the appellee's initial statement, the contents of the valise and the results of the breathalyzer test. Consequently, with respect to the initial statement made by the appellee, the contents of the satchel and the results of the breathalyzer, we reverse the order of the hearing court. [6]
Initially, we note the standard of review for appeals from suppression orders. An appellate court is bound by the factual findings of the suppression court if they have support in the record. Commonwealth v. Hall, 475 Pa. 482, 380 A.2d 1238 (1977); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 467 Pa. 146, 354 A.2d 886 (1976); Commonwealth v. Iannaccio, 304 Pa.Super. 307, 450 A.2d 694 (1982). However, the suppression court's order may be reversed if the legal conclusions drawn from the factual findings are in error, Commonwealth v. Jackson, 497 Pa. 591, 442 A.2d 1098 (1982); Commonwealth v. Hall, supra.
The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows. On October 2, 1980, at approximately 2:20 a.m., Officer Timothy Logue received a radio call to proceed to the scene of an accident at 260 McMonagle Road, Greentree Borough. He proceeded to the scene and there encountered a red Cadillac El Dorado in the driveway of a private residence, where it had come to rest after striking a wall adjacent to the driveway. A resident of McMonagle Road, Ronald Ambrosick, who had come out to investigate the crash, pointed out the appellee as the driver of the vehicle. Mr. Ambrosick was the one who had phoned the police and was also the one who found the appellee slumped over the steering wheel.
Officer Logue asked the appellee if he was injured or if he needed an ambulance; to which the appellee replied in the negative. At this time, more police began to arrive from Mt. Lebanon and Scott Township (The scene of the accident was close to the boundary line). Officer Logue then asked the appellee to produce his driver's license, owner's card and No-Fault insurance card. While the appellee was getting the cards out, Mr. Ambrosick told the officer that he [Ambrosick] had seen the appellee remove a dark colored satchel from the trunk of the vehicle and place it behind a hedge nearby. The officer walked over to the spot indicated and observed the satchel. He then asked the appellee if the satchel was his. The appellee answered no. Officer Logue looked into the unzipped satchel and saw an open brown paper bag containing a plastic bag in which there were a number of white tablets. Officer Logue showed the contents to Officer Ronald Dziezgowski of the Scott Township Police who had arrived on the scene in the interim.
At that time, Supervisor Frank Brown of the Mt. Lebanon Police approached the other two officers and informed them that they believed the appellee to be the perpetrator of a hit and run accident which had occurred nearby in Mt. Lebanon a short time before. The victim in the previous accident had stated that her vehicle was struck by a large red car. Supervisor Brown followed a trail of water or oil to a location close to the second accident scene. Supervisor Brown was informed by the two officers of the contents of the satchel. He inspected the Cadillac and ascertained that there was damage inconsistent with the present accident, yet consistent with the earlier one. Based on his observations, he put the appellee under arrest for driving under the influence and administered Miranda warnings. [7] He also took possession of the satchel.
The Cadillac was towed to the Mt. Lebanon police station where an inventory search was conducted by Officer Donald DeMore. The inventory search uncovered a silver tube containing cocaine residue and a .38 caliber revolver. The revolver was found behind the cushion in the back seat. The appellee was asked by Officer McGall if the revolver belonged to him. He replied that it did.
The appellee was also questioned by Officer David DeMore at the Mt. Lebanon police station. Officer DeMore read the appellee the Miranda warnings and the appellee indicated that he understood them. Officer DeMore then questioned the appellee concerning the satchel. The appellee initially stated that he knew nothing about it, but when confronted with Mr. Ambrosick's statement, he admitted seeing the case. He stated that he removed it from the vehicle and placed it on the wall so it would not be stolen.
Finally, at some point while the appellee was at the Mt. Lebanon police station, a breathalyzer test was administered to the appellee--who registered a .10% blood alcohol content.
Because of the diverse factual contexts in which each item was seized and the concomitant rules of law applicable to each, we shall address each item separately.
The lower court found that the gun was seized pursuant to a search that exceeded the permissible scope of an inventory.
In Commonwealth v. Brandt, 244 Pa.Super. 154, 162-163, 366 A.2d 1238, 1242 (1976), our court, in conformity with South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976), outlined the range of a proper inventory:
[T]he Commonwealth must show that the search was in fact an inventory search pursuant to the objectives laid down in Opperman, supra, and noted earlier in this opinion. The hearing judge must be convinced that the police intrusion into the automobile was for the purpose of taking an inventory of the car and not for the purpose of gathering incriminating evidence. Those facts and circumstances which the hearing judge must consider include the scope of the search, whether any items of value were in plain view, State v. Tully, 348 A.2d 603 (Conn.1975); the reasons for and nature of the custody, Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967); the anticipated length of the custody, and any other facts which the court deems important in its determination. If, after weighing all the facts and circumstances, the court is of the opinion that it was an inventory search of an automobile lawfully in police custody, then any evidence seized as a result of this "reasonable" inventory search is admissible.7 If, on the other hand, the hearing judge determines that the Commonwealth has not shown that the search was part of the police caretaking function rather than their investigative function, the probable cause-warrant standard must be used for determining reasonableness.
The lower court determined that the officer's search behind the back seat cushions clearly exceeded the "police caretaking function" and, similar to the example given in Commonwealth v. Brandt, supra, 244 Pa.Super. at 163, 366 A.2d at 1242, n. 7, was a search to uncover "incriminating evidence." We agree with that analysis, and hold that the evidence regarding the gun was properly suppressed.
The hearing court suppressed three statements made by the appellee; to wit: (1) the appellee's reply to Officer Logue's initial inquiry concerning ownership of the satchel; (2) the appellee's replies to Officer DeMore's interrogation at the Mt. Lebanon Police Station; and (3) the appellee's reply to Officer McGall's inquiry about the .38 calibre revolver. The court's rationale for suppressing these statements was that the appellee was so intoxicated that he could not validly consent to a waiver of his Miranda rights. Miranda v. Arizona, supra. Our own inquiry in reviewing this ruling focuses on the point at which the appellee's Miranda rights attached.
It is axiomatic that Miranda warnings must be given to a criminal suspect prior to custodial interrogation. The warnings are procedural safeguards designed to protect a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Commonwealth v Smith, 313 Pa.Super. 138, 459 A.2d 777 (1983).
The Miranda warnings and concomitant determinations whether a defendant has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights are now prerequisites to the admission of a confession only if an individual is "taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in an significant way and is subjected to questioning." (Citation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Bracey, 501 Pa. 356 461 A.2d 775 (1983). The appellee's Miranda rights...
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