Commonwealth v. Bailey
| Decision Date | 01 November 1882 |
| Citation | 4 Ky.L.Rptr. 384,81 Ky. 395 |
| Parties | The Commonwealth v. Bailey. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
1. Each section of the act, entitled " An act to regulate the fees and salaries of certain public offices," approved April 9, 1880, is in harmony with its title, and therefore no part of the act is within the provisions of section 37, article 2, of the constitution.
2. The act is not an act " for raising revenue," and is not in conflict with section 30, article 2 of the constitution.
3. Section 20, article 13, of the constitution, has no application to any public officer unless he is specially mentioned therein.
4. The act is constitutional.
APPEAL FROM LOUISVILLE CHANCERY COURT.
L. C WOOLFOLK AND JOHN MASON BROWN FOR APPELLANT.
No brief.
CHAS B. SEYMOUR, BYRON BACON, AND WM. LINDSAY FOR APPELLEE.
No brief.
This was a proceeding, in pursuance of an act of the general assembly, entitled " An act to regulate the fees and salaries of certain public officers," approved April 9, 1880, to compel the appellee, as marshal of the Louisville chancery court, to make a statement or report of all salaries, fees, emoluments, and perquisites received by him for services as marshal during that part of the year 1880 subsequent to the passage of the act.
The appellee's response to the rule against him contains the following statement:
" Respondent states that the act of April 9, 1880, upon which said rule is based, is unconstitutional, for reasons upon its face appearing; and not waiving the said objections, respondent further states that said act is a law for raising revenue, and that the said act originated in the Senate."
The court adjudged the response sufficient, and discharged the rule, from which this appeal is prosecuted by the State.
It appears from the opinion of the court below, and the arguments of counsel, that the appellee relied upon three grounds of objection to the constitutionality of the act.
We will state and dispose of these objections in the order made.
First, that it is in conflict with section 37 of article 2 of the constitution, which declares that " no law enacted by the general assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title."
The general provisions of the act require certain public officers, including the marshal of the Louisville chancery court, annually, on the first Monday in January, to make and file with the clerk of the county court of their several counties a statement, under oath, of all fees, emoluments, salaries, and perquisites received by them for services, and of all salaries paid to their deputies or assistants, and of all other expenses incident to their offices, and to pay to the trustee of the jury fund all balance in their hands in excess of $3,000, which they are authorized to retain as compensation for the year reported.
The subject of the act is the regulation of the fees and salaries of the public officers enumerated in the first section.
Each section of the act has a natural connection with the rest, and embraces consistent parts of the general mode of regulating the fees and salaries of the officers named. The terms of the act are all directed to the regulation of such fees and salaries, and nothing else.
The title expresses, in plain and comprehensive language, the subject of the act which embraces the particular manner of accomplishing its object.
It is impracticable to state in the title the details, or particularize the subjects and means, which may relate to the main subject necessary and proper to be embraced in the body of the act (11th Bush, 76), and these need not, and, indeed, cannot, be expressed without embracing in nearly every act more than one subject in the title.
It is not necessary to enter into a philological discussion of the meaning of the words " regulate," " fees" and " salaries," as it is clear that the legislature used them according to their every-day and popular sense, and by their use intended to describe a law, the purpose of which was to control, adjust, and limit the sums the officers named were thereafter to receive for their services as officials.
This construction is amply supported by the authorities Louisville and Oldham Turnpike Co. v. Ballard, 2 Met., p. 168; McReynolds, & c., v. Smallhouse, 8 Bush, p. 447, and other cases referred to in them. (Conna v. The Mayor of N. Y., 1 Selden, 292.)
No act of the legislature should be declared unconstitutional because of literal inaccuracy in the use of words composing the title if, according to their popular acceptation, they embrace the subject of the act. We are therefore of the opinion that the act is not open to the objection just considered.
Second. It is asserted that the act violates section 30 of article 2 of the constitution, which declares that " all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the house of representatives; but the senate may propose amendments as in other bills, provided that they shall not introduce any new matter under color of amendments which does not relate to raising revenue."
It is admitted that the bill in this instance originated in the Senate.
If, therefore, it be a bill " for raising revenue," it is unconstitutional.
According to Mr. Story, section 874, section 7, article 1, of the constitution of the United States, which is in the exact language of the first clause of the section above quoted from the present constitution of the state, means what are usually termed " money bills," and that, in practice, the constitutional provision is applied to bills to levy taxes in the strict sense of the word.
Such seems to be the view of Judge Tucker. (Tucker's Blackstone, Appen., 261.)
" A bill for raising revenue," as we understand it from the debates on the federal constitution, authorities, and textwriters, embraces all appropriations of money for the public treasury where the bill either provides for the levy of duties or...
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