Commonwealth v. Baker
| Decision Date | 06 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2020-CA-1586-MR |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLANT v. JOSEPH BLAKE BAKER APPELLEE |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Daniel Cameron Attorney General of Kentucky
Ken W Riggs Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
Christina L. Romano Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Luke R. Lawless Campbellsville, Kentucky
Pursuant to KRS[1] 22A.020(4), the Commonwealth appeals the Marion Circuit Court's interlocutory order granting Joseph Blake Baker's motion to suppress evidence in his criminal case. After careful review of the facts and the law, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
At approximately 12:30 a.m. on January 4, 2020, Officer Samuel Knopp of the Lebanon Police Department was on patrol when he observed a vehicle parked in the bay of a carwash. The officer considered the location of the vehicle strange, not only because of the lateness of the hour, but also because it was raining. When Officer Knopp pulled up in his cruiser, the driver exited the vehicle. The driver did not have identification but identified himself as Joseph Blake Baker and provided his social security number. Officer Knopp ran Baker's information through dispatch, and there were no warrants for Baker's arrest.
Nevertheless, Officer Knopp still believed the situation was odd, and that Baker's behavior was suspicious. Specifically, Officer Knopp thought Baker was acting anxious and nervous and that his speech was unusually slow and slurred. Officer Knopp also observed that Baker's eyes were red and bloodshot. When questioned by Officer Knopp, Baker explained away his appearance and behavior as being from tiredness as he had spent the day moving. Baker told Officer Knopp that he was at the carwash to get the mud off of his vehicle. Officer Knopp was not convinced by Baker's explanation because he did not observe any mud on the vehicle and because Baker was not actively washing his vehicle. Officer Knopp asked Baker for permission to search his vehicle, but Baker refused. Since Officer Knopp did not any smell alcohol, he did not a conduct a field sobriety test.[2] And, despite his suspicions, he saw no immediate cause to prolong his encounter with Baker.
After departing the carwash, Officer Knopp contacted a fellow officer on duty at the time, Officer Christopher Cook, and told him about his encounter with Baker at the carwash. Approximately twenty minutes later, while patrolling through downtown Lebanon, Officer Cook found himself behind what he believed to be Baker's vehicle. He observed the vehicle make a right-hand turn without using a turn signal. Officer Cook called dispatch and had the vehicle's license plate number run through the system. Officer Cook was advised to verify insurance. At this point, Officer Cook initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle, which was in fact being driven by Baker. Officer Knopp and a canine unit officer, Quinton Cardwell, apparently learned that Officer Cook was conducting a traffic stop of Baker through dispatch and began making their way to the scene of the stop.
Officer Cook approached the vehicle and asked to see Baker's driver's license and proof of insurance. Baker had neither, and he once again identified himself using his name and social security number. Officer Cook relayed the information to dispatch and then returned his attention to Baker. Around this time, Officer Knopp arrived on the scene and again asked Baker for permission to search his vehicle. Baker once again refused.
During his exchange with Baker, Officer Cook noted that Baker had bloodshot eyes and what he described as a "slow pace" of speech. Baker's appearance and behavior suggested to Officer Cook that Baker could be under the influence of drugs.[3] Officer Cook asked Baker to step out of the vehicle and began conducting field sobriety tests. At some point during administration of the field sobriety tests, Officer Cardwell arrived on the scene with a canine unit and performed a sniff search around the exterior of Baker's vehicle while Officer Cook finished up with the field sobriety tests.
The field sobriety tests did not indicate that Baker was intoxicated; however, the dog alerted to the presence of narcotics in Baker's vehicle. The officers then searched the interior of Baker's vehicle. During their search, the officers found a handgun under the driver's seat of the vehicle, a pipe for smoking methamphetamine, a small quantity of methamphetamine, and what were described as marijuana crumbs throughout the vehicle.
Baker was indicted by a Marion County grand jury on the charges of first-degree possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), [4] possession of drug paraphernalia, [5] failure to maintain insurance (first offense), [6] and failure to properly signal.[7] Baker subsequently moved the trial court to suppress evidence seized during the traffic stop, arguing the traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged to conduct a dog sniff contrary to the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). (Record (R.) at 38.) In its order on the motion, the trial court agreed with the Commonwealth that Officer Cook had probable cause to stop the vehicle for the observed traffic violation. The trial court also found that Baker's bloodshot eyes and slurred speech gave the officer probable cause to conduct the ARIDE field sobriety tests, and there was no delay in administering these tests. (R. at 68.) Finally, the trial court concluded the canine unit arrived and conducted its sniff search prior to the completion of Officer Cook's field sobriety tests. (R. at 68-69.)
Despite these findings, however, the trial court granted Baker's motion to suppress, citing the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288 (Ky. 2016), as well as this Court's opinion in Olmeda v. Commonwealth, 601 S.W.3d 183 (Ky. App. 2020). Quoting Davis, the trial court stated, "[t]he 'key question' is not whether the duration of Appellant's roadside detention was unreasonable; rather, it is whether the sniff search was related to the purpose for which Appellant was stopped[.]" Davis, 484 S.W.3d at 294. The trial court then asserted the facts of this case were virtually identical to those of Olmeda, in that a dog sniff search "was conducted in the middle of the second set of field sobriety tests for drug usage" and the search in Olmeda was "admissible only because of the inevitable discovery doctrine." (R. at 70.) The trial court believed that, had the sniff search been appropriate, this Court would have used that as the basis for the decision and not the inevitable discovery doctrine. (R. at 70.) Based on these factors, the trial court granted the suppression motion. The Commonwealth thereafter exercised its right to appeal interlocutory orders in criminal cases pursuant to KRS 22A.020(4).[8]
"When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, the findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, and the conclusions of law are reviewed de novo." Commonwealth v. Conner, 636 S.W.3d 464, 471 (Ky. 2021) (quoting Moberly v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.3d 26, 29 (Ky. 2018)). "[I]f the court's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we then conduct a de novo review of the court's application of the law to the facts." Id. (quoting Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412, 417 (Ky. 2013)).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution provide safeguards against unreasonable searches and seizures.[9]Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is premised on "the basic rule that 'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1716, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (footnote omitted)).
"A traffic stop is considered a seizure of the driver." Commonwealth v. Bucalo, 422 S.W.3d 253, 258 (Ky. 2013). However, a warrant is not required for an officer to make a traffic stop "if [the officer] has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Id. Where the officer has witnessed a suspected traffic violation, he may conduct a traffic stop "regardless of his or her subjective motivation in doing so." Greer v. Commonwealth, 514 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Ky. App. 2017); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). This does not mean, however, that the officer is free to detain the subject for any length of time or to search the subject and his vehicle without limitation as part of the traffic stop. During an ordinary traffic stop, an officer's "seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission." Conner, 636 S.W.3d at 473 (quoting United States v. Lott, 954 F.3d 919, 923 (6th Cir. 2020)).
Absent reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot that would justify further investigation, the prolonging of a traffic stop, even for a de minimis...
To continue reading
Request your trial