Commonwealth v. Barnacle

• Decision Date: 09 January 1883
• Citation: 134 Mass. 215
• Parties: Commonwealth v. Peter Barnacle
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

134 Mass. 215

Commonwealth v. Peter Barnacle

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

January 9, 1883

Argued November 27, 1882

Middlesex.

Exceptions sustained.

W. B Gale & J. P. Gale, for the defendant, in addition to the cases mentioned in the opinion, cited Selfridge's case 33, 56, 60, 64, 66, 164; Hurd v. People, 25 Mich 405; Dukes v. State, 11 Ind. 557; State v Keene, 50 Mo. 357; State v. Bryant, 55 Mo. 75; State v. Harris, 59 Mo. 550; State v. Benham, 23 Iowa 154; State v. Collins, 32 Iowa 36; People v. Lamb, 2 Keyes 360, 364; Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Penn. St. 9; State v. Tackett, 1 Hawks 210; State v. Hogue, 6 Jones (N.C.) 381; State v. Smith, 12 Rich. 430; Fields v. State, 47 Ala. 603; Rippy v. State, 2 Head 217; Wesley v. State, 37 Miss. 327.

G. Marston, Attorney General, for the Commonwealth.

Morton, C. J. Devens & Holmes, JJ., absent.

OPINION

Morton

This is an indictment for manslaughter, charging the defendant with the killing of one Thomas Barnacle, by stabbing him with a knife. The evidence tended to show that said Thomas attacked the defendant with a knife and fork. The defendant contended that he stabbed Thomas when this attack was made; and that he acted in self-defence, and under a reasonable apprehension that Thomas would do him great bodily harm. To prove this issue, he offered to show by a witness, who knew both Thomas and the defendant, that Thomas was a larger and more powerful man than the defendant. Upon the objection of the Commonwealth's attorney, the court rejected this evidence; and the defendant excepted.

It is well settled that, if a man is attacked, he has the right to defend himself. If the attack is of such a character, and made under such circumstances, as to create a reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm, and he acts under such apprehension, and in the reasonable belief that no other means will effectually prevent the harm, he has the right to kill the assailant. In such cases, therefore, the questions whether there was reasonable cause to apprehend great bodily harm, and whether the defendant acted under such apprehension; are material issues. Commonwealth v Woodward, 102 Mass. 155. Commonwealth v. O'Malley, 131 Mass. 423. It necessarily follows, that, in the case before us, the question whether the defendant acted under a reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm to himself from the attack of Thomas, was a material issue. Any evidence which tends to prove this issue is competent. The jury could not intelligently pass upon this issue without being informed as to the character and circumstances of the attack. It seems to us clear, that the fact that the assailant was a larger and more powerful man than the defendant has a bearing upon the issue. The test is whether the fact is, according to the general experience of mankind, capable of affording a reasonable presumption or inference as to the issue in dispute. The question whether a man has reason to apprehend danger from an attack must depend in some measure upon the size and strength of the assailant. If the assailant is a child, or a weak and effeminate man, much inferior in strength to the party assaulted, and unarmed, common experience teaches us that there is no cause to apprehend serious danger from the assault. On the other hand, if the assailant is a large and powerful man, whom the assaulted party could not successfully resist by his unaided strength, this fact would naturally create in his mind an apprehension of danger, which might justify him in using a deadly weapon for self-defence. Certainly it must be competent to show that the assailant was armed with a deadly weapon; for the same reason, it may be shown that he is armed by nature with a superior size and strength, which makes his attack irresistible and dangerous.

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