Commonwealth v. Beasley

• Decision Date: 18 April 1984
• Citation: 504 Pa. 485,475 A.2d 730
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Leslie C.X. BEASLEY, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

475 A.2d 730

504 Pa. 485

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Leslie C.X. BEASLEY, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

April 18, 1984

Argued Oct. 25, 1983. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Thomas J. Turner, III, Philadelphia (court-appointed), for appellant.

Robert B. Lawler, Chief, Appeals Div., Steven Cooperstein, Asst. Dist. Attys., Philadelphia, Marion E MacIntyre, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before ROBERTS, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON and ZAPPALA, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

FLAHERTY Justice.

The appellant, Leslie C.X. Beasley, was convicted of murder of the first degree, and sentenced to death, in connection with an incident in 1980 in which a police officer was shot to death at a restaurant in Philadelphia. The officer had gone to the restaurant in response to a radio dispatch alerting him that a man with a gun was present there. Upon arriving at the restaurant, the officer was fatally wounded by the appellant. Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(h), we are called upon to review the record for errors at trial ^[1] and to determine whether the sentence of death should be affirmed or vacated.

I. TRIAL ERRORS

Appellant's primary allegation is that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial when the prosecutor, during cross-examination of the only fact witness presented by the defense, discredited the veracity of the witness. Examination of the circumstances under which the discrediting comments were made, however, reveals that the comments did not warrant the grant of a new trial.

The witness in question testified that on the night of the shooting, he appellant, and another man named "Church" were present at the restaurant, and that it was "Church" rather than appellant who shot the police officer. On cross-examination, the witness testified that after the shooting incident he went to Georgia, where he was convicted for committing a series of robberies, for which he was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. The following exchange then occurred.

PROSECUTOR: And that was the one for which you were sentenced for 20 years?

WITNESS: That's the one that you told me that if I would testify against Mr. Beasley that you would help me out on the 20 years and I told you I wasn't going to do that.

PROSECUTOR: You're talking to me?

WITNESS: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: You say that I said that, sir?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

PROSECUTOR: [Y]ou know that very well is an outright lie.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I object to [the prosecutor's] statement, testimony, and I move for a mistrial ... you have intentional prosecutorial misconduct.

THE COURT: Just a minute.

....

PROSECUTOR: Because I never talked to you.

THE COURT: [Prosecutor], just a minute. Please, sit down, and control yourself, will you?

You will disregard the [prosecutor's] last statement.

Motion for mistrial is denied.

Now, calm down.

....

PROSECUTOR: [W]hen have I talked to you? Mention one? When did I speak to you? When did I ever speak to you?

WITNESS: You spoke to me quite a few times.

PROSECUTOR: How many times....?

WITNESS: Well, you was upstairs one day talking to me about helping me out with the 20 years if I said Mr. Beasley killed the police officer. The same when you were talking to other people that was there.

PROSECUTOR: I'm talking about how many times--You say that was one time I came to you? Was I alone or with someone else?

WITNESS: You were by yourself.

PROSECUTOR: No one else that you can bring? Do you want me out of this case; is that what you're trying to do?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I object to that statement and I move for a mistrial.

PROSECUTOR: Your honor, I will state this as an absolute fact. I have never seen him before. I've never seen this man before.

THE COURT: Just a minute. All right. Just a minute.

PROSECUTOR: Except at the preliminary hearing.

THE COURT: Just a minute. Now, please. Gentlemen, will you shut-up a minute? Will you? Please. Now, everybody sit down and keep quiet. Please. This is not a circus. Gentlemen, there are ways of doing this and let's do it the proper way. I don't like to be angry.

PROSECUTOR: Yes, sir.

....

THE COURT: (To the witness) You just answer questions.

THE COURT: (To the [prosecutor] ) You just ask questions. No side comments, okay?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor--

THE COURT: The motion for a mistrial is denied.

The jury will disregard all of the last outburst.

....

PROSECUTOR: How was I going to do that?

WITNESS: You told me you had connections with the D.A.'s office down there and you could possibly give--you know, get me a lesser sentence if I would help you out. And I told you I wasn't going to lie. PROSECUTOR: And you're going to--you're saying that with a straight face, aren't you?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I object to the comments, Judge. [Defense counsel did not, in response to this last prosecutorial comment, make another motion for a mistrial.]

Clearly, as a general rule, it is improper for a prosecutor to express his personal belief as to the credibility of a witness. Commonwealth v. Kuebler, 484 Pa. 358, 363-364, 399 A.2d 116, 118-119 (1979); Commonwealth v. Potter, 445 Pa. 284, 286-287, 285 A.2d 492, 493 (1971). Not every unwise or unwarranted remark made by counsel during the course of a trial, however, warrants the grant of a new trial. Commonwealth v. Stoltzfus, 462 Pa. 43, 61, 337 A.2d 873, 882 (1975); Commonwealth v. Goosby, 450 Pa. 609, 611, 301 A.2d 673, 674 (1973). It is axiomatic that "comments by the Commonwealth's attorney do not constitute reversible error unless the 'unavoidable effect of such comments would be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant so that they could not weigh the evidence objectively and render a true verdict.' Commonwealth v. Van Cliff, 483 Pa. 576, 397 A.2d 1173, 1176 (1979) (citations omitted)." Commonwealth v. Anderson, 501 Pa. 275, 461 A.2d 208, 211 (1983). Viewed in context, the instant prosecutorial comments could not have so prejudiced the jury as to have interfered with attainment of a true verdict.

The witness's assertion that the prosecutor had offered him a deal in exchange for testimony against appellant was not responsive to any question posed by the prosecutor. The testimony was, in fact, a direct attack upon the integrity of the prosecutor which produced an emotional reaction, consisting of a denial of the witness's accusation, under circumstances where the prosecutor would no doubt have felt that remaining silent in the face of such an accusation would be construed by the jury as an admission of its truth.

Of great significance is the fact that the prosecutor's comments did not relate to the substance of the witness's primary testimony, namely the witness's assertion that "Church", rather than appellant, shot the police officer. Hence, the prosecutor's comments related solely to the witness's veracity as to a purely collateral matter, i.e., the prosecutor's prior communications with the witness.

The risk of prejudice was further vitiated by the trial court's prompt responses, whereby the court on two occasions during cross-examination of the witness instructed the jury to disregard the comments in question. Commonwealth v. Brightwell, 479 Pa. 541, 545, 388 A.2d 1063, 1065 (1978) (improper prosecutorial questions cured by prompt cautionary instruction); Commonwealth v. Martinolich, 456 Pa. 136, 149, 318 A.2d 680, 687-688 (1974) (prompt instruction cured improper remark of prosecutor). The following day, the court consulted with counsel about this matter to determine whether additional cautionary instructions were desired. Defense counsel objected to any further instructions being given at that time, but suggested that the matter could be addressed in final instructions. Accordingly, during final instructions, the court cautioned the jury as follows:

It is part of the function of the jury to decide the credibility of the witnesses. You are the triers of the facts. No one, including the attorneys and myself as judge, have a right to usurp your authority to determine credibility of witnesses that you have seen as to who is or who is not telling the truth.

If you find that anyone has given his personal views as to the truth or falsehood of any witnesses, you're not to be influenced by his personal viewpoint.

In addition, the effect of the prosecutor's remarks should be evaluated within the context of the entire trial. See Commonwealth v. Byrd, 490 Pa. 544, 559, 417 A.2d 173, 181 (1980). The instant exchange between prosecutor and defense witness was an isolated incident in the course of a trial which spanned nearly seven days, and no further mention of the exchange occurred during the remainder of the trial. More significant, however, is the fact that the Commonwealth's evidence against appellant was so overwhelming, and the testimony of the defense fact witness in question so weak, that the impact of the prosecutor's remarks was necessarily de minimis. Cf. Commonwealth v. Norris, 498 Pa. 308, 317-318, 446 A.2d 246, 250-251 (1982); Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 410, 383 A.2d 155, 164-165 (1978).

The Commonwealth presented the testimony of three eyewitnesses who saw appellant shoot the police officer. In addition, appellant's possession of the murder weapon just moments before the shooting was established, as were his flight after the shooting and possession of and attempt to discard the murder weapon at the end of that flight. ^[2]

The testimony of the defense fact witness in question, however, cannot be regarded as having been of significant, or perhaps any, value to the defense, and this fact would remain unchanged even if the comments of the prosecutor had not been made. In his testimony, the witness admitted to having been convicted of a...