Commonwealth v. Boria
| Decision Date | 26 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | SJC–10833. |
| Citation | 951 N.E.2d 10,460 Mass. 249 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTHv.Yainira BORIA. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Gail S. Strassfeld for the defendant.Robert C. Thompson, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.Daniel F. Conley, District Attorney, & Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney, for District Attorney for the Suffolk District, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.Brownlow M. Speer & Donald S. Bronstein, Boston, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, GANTS, & DUFFLY, JJ.CORDY, J.
Yainira Boria was convicted of distributing cocaine, second offense, in violation of G.L. c. 94C, § 32A ( d ), on June 27, 2006, and sentenced to a five-year mandatory term of imprisonment (from five years to five years and one day). During trial and over the defendant's objection, the Commonwealth introduced a certificate of drug analysis (drug certificate) confirming that the substance, which had been purchased from the defendant by an undercover police officer and submitted to the State laboratory for analysis, was cocaine. The defendant appealed from her conviction, and her sentence and her appeal was entered in the Appeals Court on August 27, 2007. The sole legal issue raised in the appeal was the correctness of the judge's conclusion that G.L. c. 94C, § 32A ( d ), required the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence of five years.
On March 17, 2008, and prior to oral argument of her direct appeal in the Appeals Court, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Commonwealth v. Melendez–Diaz, 69 Mass.App.Ct. 1114, 2007 WL 2189152 (2007), cert. granted, 552 U.S. 1256, 128 S.Ct. 1647, 170 L.Ed.2d 352 (2008) ( Melendez–Diaz I ), to resolve the question whether drug certificates were admissible consistent with the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution without the testimony of the analyst who prepared them. Appellate counsel did not include the issue of the admissibility of the drug certificate in the defendant's appeal. In an unpublished memorandum and order pursuant to its rule 1:28, the Appeals Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on August 13, 2008, Commonwealth v. Boria, 72 Mass.App.Ct. 1113, 891 N.E.2d 718 (2008), and we denied further appellate review, 452 Mass. 1108, 897 N.E.2d 592 (2008). Ninety days later her conviction became final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) & (d) (2006).
On June 25, 2009, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Melendez–Diaz I, ––– U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), concluding that drug certificates are testimonial, subject to the requirements of the confrontation clause, and are inadmissible in a criminal trial without the testimony of the analyst who prepared them. Id. at 2532. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial on November 5, 2009, arguing that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of the admissibility of the drug certificate in her direct appeal and for further failing to seek a stay of the appeal while Melendez–Diaz I was pending in the Supreme Court. The defendant's motion was denied on the ground that any error in admitting the drug certificate was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the overwhelming evidence presented by the Commonwealth that the defendant was involved in the distribution of cocaine. The defendant appeals from the denial and asks us to apply Melendez–Diaz retroactively to the collateral challenge to her conviction.
We today concluded that the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in Melendez–Diaz I was a new rule not applicable to convictions, such as the defendant's, that had become final prior to its issuance. See Commonwealth v. Melendez–Diaz, 460 Mass. 238, 239–240, 950 N.E.2d 867 (2011) ( Melendez–Diaz II ). Consequently, there was no error in the admission of the drug certificate at the defendant's trial based on the law in effect at the time. See Commonwealth v. Verde, 444 Mass. 279, 827 N.E.2d 701 (2005). Because we also conclude that the defendant's attempt to obtain relief under the rubric of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel fails, we affirm the denial of her motion for a new trial.
1. Evidence at trial. On June 22, 2005, State Trooper David Patterson, working undercover, approached the defendant outside a Chinese restaurant in Brockton and told her he was looking for a “twenty,” referring to twenty dollars' worth of cocaine. The defendant said, “No problem,” and approached another individual who removed something from his mouth, placed it in a menu, and handed the menu to the defendant. The defendant handed the menu to Trooper Patterson, who gave the defendant twenty dollars in exchange. Inside the menu was a clear plastic bag containing off-white powder. The defendant was subsequently arrested.
The substance given to Trooper Patterson was weighed and field tested, 1 then labeled and secured in a Brockton evidence locker to be analyzed later at the State laboratory. At the defendant's trial, the substance inside the clear plastic bag was identified as the substance provided to Trooper Patterson by the defendant in exchange for twenty dollars. The substance was accompanied by a drug certificate which stated that it contained cocaine with a net weight of .15 grams. The certificate was admitted in evidence over defense counsel's objection.2 The jury were instructed with respect to how they might consider the drug certificate in the following terms:
2. Discussion. The defendant claims that her appellate counsel was ineffective in representing her because she failed to pursue trial counsel's objection to the admissibility of the drug certificate on the direct appeal, and then failed to move to stay that appeal until the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in Melendez–Diaz I. If she were to succeed in her arguments, the defendant would be entitled to a new appeal, rather than a new trial. See Commonwealth v. Stote, 456 Mass. 213, 217–218 n. 9, 922 N.E.2d 768 (2010).
To prevail, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that, “there has been serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel—behavior of counsel falling measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer,” and that, as a result, the defendant was “likely deprived ... of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence.” Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96, 315 N.E.2d...
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