Commonwealth v. O'brien
| Decision Date | 06 December 1899 |
| Citation | 175 Mass. 37,55 N.E. 466 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. O'BRIEN. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
L. Le B. Holmes, Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.
J. W. & C. R. Cummings, for defendant.
On December 3, 1897, the defendant was found guilty of having obtained property by false pretenses, and was immediately sentenced to imprisonment in the state prison for not less than three years or more than five years. The offense was committed on October 31, 1894. After announcing the sentence, the clerk said to the sheriff: 'Mr Sheriff, the prisoner at the bar is in your custody under sentence.' Exceptions having been taken, the court, about a half or three-quarters of an hour later, at the request of the defendant, made an order staying the execution of the sentence, and the prisoner was admitted to bail. In the meantime he had remained in the court room in the custody of the sheriff. No transcript, under the Public Statutes (chapter 215, § 25), was ever delivered or made out. The exceptions were argued in this court in October, 1898, and were overruled in November, 1898. 52 N.E. 77. On the receipt of the rescript, the defendant was not present in the superior court, and was defaulted. A capias was issued, on which he was arrested, and brought before the court on January 16, 1899, at a regular sitting, held in Fall River for the transaction of civil business. While the court was in session the district attorney moved for sentence against the defendant, and informed the presiding justice that the original sentence was under St. 1895, c. 504, which, in the case of Murphy v. Com., 172 Mass. 264, 52 N.E. 505 had been held inapplicable to offenses committed prior to January 1, 1896, and suggested to the court that a sentence should be imposed which would be applicable. Thereupon the court, against the defendant's objection and subject to his exception, sentenced him to a term of three years in the state prison, the first day of which was to be in solitary confinement, and the balance at hard labor.
It is contended that the court had no power to modify the original sentence, which had been imposed immediately after the trial. When criminal business could be done only at regular terms of the court held for that purpose, and before the enactment of the statute directing the imposition of sentence on conviction in all cases notwithstanding exceptions, it was held that sentences could be changed during the term of the court at which they were imposed, and not afterwards. This rule was founded on the doctrine that the imposition of a sentence in a criminal case, when finally completed and embodied in the record of the court, was the end of the case, after which the proceeding was no longer pending, and the court was without jurisdiction to take further action, unless, on an appeal or other authorized supplemental proceeding, some error was discovered. Such a sentence was like the formal entry of a final judgment in a civil action or the enrollment of a final decree in equity. But it was held that, until the end of the term, the final record was not completed, and that the matter remained so far in the breast of the judge that he could revise his action in regard to an unexecuted sentence, and change the judgment in any proper way. Com. v. Weymouth, 2 Allen, 144; Mason v. Pearson, 118 Mass. 61; Com. v. Foster, 122 Mass. 323. There are two recent statutes which modify this doctrine,--the statute of 1895 (chapter 469), which directs the imposition of sentences on conviction notwithstanding exceptions, and gives power to the presiding justice or a justice of this court afterwards to stay the sentence; and the statute of 1897 (chapter 490), which abolished criminal terms. The effect of the first of these statutes is to continue in the superior court jurisdiction of the case for some purposes, after the imposition of a sentence and after the expiration of the term at which the sentence is imposed. There is power in the court to make an order staying the execution of the sentence immediately after it is imposed or at a later time, and admitting the defendant to bail or otherwise providing for his custody. This implies a power, if exceptions are overruled, to make an order which shall put the sentence in execution. The case remains in the superior court so far unfinished that the court has jurisdiction to make proper orders, not only to stay the execution of the sentence, but also, at the...
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