Commonwealth v. Buckley

• Decision Date: 06 January 1909
• Citation: 86 N.E. 910,200 Mass. 346
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. BUCKLEY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

200 Mass. 346

86 N.E. 910

COMMONWEALTH v. BUCKLEY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

January 6, 1909

COUNSEL

Isaac Isaacs, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Frederic H. Chase and Henry A. Guiler, for defendant.

OPINION

HAMMOND J.

This is an indictment under Rev. Laws, c. 212, § 20, charging the defendant with selling 'a certain printed book' which contained 'certain obscene, indecent and impure language and manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth.' The case is before us upon the defendant's exceptions to the overruling of the motion to quash the indictment and to the refusal of the court to give certain rulings requested at the trial. It is stated in the defendant's brief that the questions raised in the motion to quash, so far as now relied upon, are covered in his request for rulings. We therefore shall consider that motion no further, but shall pass at once to the questions of law which arise out of the refusal to give the rulings requested at the trial.

There were 26 requests, none of which was given in the language asked for, although the law contained in some of them, so far as material to the case, was adopted by the judge in his charge. It seems best to treat the question in a topical way rather than to speak of the requests individually. This is substantially the way in which the questions are discussed upon the defendant's brief.

The defendant strongly contends that the judge should have defined at greater length than he did the terms 'obscene,' 'indecent,' 'impure,' and 'manifestly.' While it is true perhaps that by illustration or the use of synonyms the judge might have explained more fully the meaning of these terms, still it is to be remembered that they are not technical terms. They are common words and may be assumed to be understood in their common meaning by an ordinary jury. So far as the judge undertook to define we see no error, and we cannot say as matter of law that his failure to define more at length was erroneous in law or prejudicial to the defendant.

It is strongly contended by the defendant that the language complained of is neither obscene nor indecent nor impure, and that it does not manifestly tend to the corruption of the morals of youth; and in support of his contention the following language is used in his brief:

'The language of those parts of the book specified in the indictment is neither impure nor indecent within the meaning of the statute. No word, sentence or paragraph can be pointed out which can be described by either of these terms. If the statute is to be construed to cover all language which conveys or suggests thoughts of sexual relations, or even illicit intercourse, it will certainly include a great part of what is considered good and decent literature. Indecent and impure language cannot be such as is widely read and openly discussed. The very terms themselves import that matters thus described cannot be openly read or decently discussed; yet it is submitted that the book in question can be widely and openly read and discussed without causing general corruption of morals or denoting general depravity.

'The language referred to does not manifestly tend to the...