Commonwealth v. Caldwell

• Decision Date: 06 May 2021
• Docket Number: SJC-12907
• Citation: 167 N.E.3d 852,487 Mass. 370
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Clifton CALDWELL.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

487 Mass. 370

167 N.E.3d 852

COMMONWEALTH

v.Clifton CALDWELL.

SJC-12907

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Plymouth..

Argued December 2, 2020.

Decided May 6, 2021.

Lisa M. Kavanaugh, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant.

Carolyn A. Burbine, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Karen A. Newirth, of New York, Radha Natarajan, Debra Loevy, & Robert M. Bloom, for Exoneration Project & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: Budd, C.J., Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.

BUDD, C.J.

The defendant, Clifton Caldwell, appeals from a Superior Court judge's denial of his motion for a new trial on an indictment for aggravated rape of which he was convicted in 2002. Among other arguments, the defendant contends that his motion should have been granted because his defense was prejudiced by the Commonwealth's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence concerning a key witness -- the defendant's former cellmate, who testified at trial that the defendant had confessed his participation in the charged offense. We agree, and therefore conclude that the defendant is entitled to a new trial.¹

Factual background. We summarize the relevant facts as found by the motion judge, supplemented with evidence from the records of the motion hearing and trial. In 1999, the defendant's niece (victim) alleged that eight years earlier, when she was four years old, she had been raped by her father with the assistance of his two brothers, one of whom was the defendant. All three brothers subsequently were indicted for aggravated rape of a child under the age of fourteen years.

Several days before the defendant's trial in December 2002, the Commonwealth informed the judge that it intended to present testimony from a witness as to statements that the defendant had made when the witness and the defendant were being held together in a house of correction. At that time, the Commonwealth also moved to sever the defendant's trial from that of his two brothers. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (admission of codefendant's confession in joint trial violates defendant's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses under Sixth Amendment to United States Constitution). The defendant's brothers thereafter were tried together and were acquitted.

Prior to trial, the defendant's trial counsel had requested the witness's criminal record and filed a motion seeking information concerning any threats, rewards, inducements, or promises made to the witness, but received no response prior to the start of the trial. On the first day of jury selection, the prosecutor disclosed at sidebar that although the witness "might have" requested favorable treatment in connection with his testimony, there had been no offers of rewards, promises, or inducements to the witness. The Commonwealth also disclosed that the witness's father had raped his sister, his girlfriend was a victim of sexual abuse, and the witness had no sympathy for rapists. Trial counsel also had access to a police report from 2000, which stated only that the witness had cooperated with police in the past.

At the defendant's trial, the victim testified that her father had sexually assaulted her several times in 1991, including one incident when her father vaginally penetrated her while the defendant held her arms and her other uncle held her legs. During her testimony the victim admitted that, in 1999, after having accused her father and uncles of rape, she falsely accused one of the two uncles (the defendant's brother) of physically assaulting her on a separate occasion, and that she had falsely testified under oath in her uncle's ensuing criminal trial that he had assaulted her.

The Commonwealth also presented testimony from the witness who had been held in custody with the defendant at a house of correction. This witness testified that while he was serving a sentence for violation of probation, he had been held in a two-man cell with the defendant in November or December of 1999. According to the witness, the defendant said that he should not be in prison because "all he did was hold his niece's arms down" when his brothers penetrated the victim. The witness further testified that despite the stigma against "snitches" in prison, he spoke to police about the defendant's confession because "someone who commits an act like this doesn't deserve to be on the street." He also testified that he had not been offered any rewards or promises of leniency in exchange for his testimony, and that there was "nothing in it" for him.

On cross-examination, the witness admitted that he hated rapists and had a bias against them, and that once he learned of the rape charge against the defendant, he attempted to extract a confession from the defendant. The witness denied asking anyone from the Commonwealth about getting preferential treatment, such as receiving early probation or having pending criminal charges against him dropped. A detective who interviewed the witness about his conversations with the defendant also testified that the witness did not request leniency and that she did not offer him any inducements.

The defendant was found guilty and sentenced to from twenty-seven to thirty-five years in prison.

Motion for a new trial. In 2018, the defendant filed his third motion for a new trial.² At the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel presented testimony that the witness had been a long-time police informant who had received unusually lenient sentences for previous crimes.³ In connection with testimony from an investigator, defense counsel introduced a handwritten note that the trial prosecutor had created during a pretrial meeting with the witness, which stated:

"[witness's name]

-- met all 3 in Plymouth holding

-- [name of State police trooper] -- called

-- testified for Comm before in Bristol -- got kid to write down what happened"

This note had been produced posttrial by the Commonwealth in response to court-ordered discovery requested by the defendant.

The investigator opined -- and the motion judge agreed -- that the last two lines of this note referred to the witness's involvement in the 1985 prosecution case of Michael Rancourt for rape. See Commonwealth v. Rancourt, 399 Mass. 269, 503 N.E.2d 960 (1987). In that case, the same cellmate-witness who testified against the defendant in the instant case had met Rancourt in a house of correction. Id. at 272, 503 N.E.2d 960. Rancourt spoke freely about the charges pending against him and admitted that he had raped the victim in that case. Id. The witness then spoke with an officer to whom he previously had provided information, and the officer told the witness that he would arrange a meeting with the prosecutor handling Rancourt's case. Id. Thereafter, the witness sent Rancourt an internal prison letter imploring Rancourt to tell him the details of the rape so that he could help Rancourt create an alibi. Id. at 273, 503 N.E.2d 960. Rancourt sent the witness a letter detailing the rape, and the witness turned the letter over to police. Id. The witness later was granted early release from incarceration to minimize the risks of testifying against a fellow inmate. Id. at 274 & n.6, 503 N.E.2d 960.

Rancourt moved to suppress the letter he wrote, arguing that the witness was an agent of the Commonwealth. Id. at 271-272, 503 N.E.2d 960. The judge disagreed, finding that although the witness hoped to gain favorable treatment, he did not coerce Rancourt into writing the letter and did not act as an agent of the Commonwealth. Id. at 273, 503 N.E.2d 960. We upheld that ruling on appeal. Id. at 274-275, 503 N.E.2d 960.

At the hearing in the present case, the defendant's trial counsel testified that he had been unaware of the witness's involvement in the Rancourt case and thus had not cross-examined the witness about it. The motion judge nevertheless denied the defendant's motion for a new trial, finding that the defendant had established neither that the witness was a long-time police informant nor that, as a result, he received lenient treatment. The judge also found that there was no credible evidence that there was a correlation between the witness's cooperation with police in the defendant's case⁴ and the final disposition of the cases the witness had pending at the time of his cooperation. Finally, the judge noted that defense counsel cross-examined the witness concerning whether he had asked for preferential treatment with regard to his then-pending cases. The judge concluded that the failure⁵ or inability to impeach the witness regarding his involvement in the Rancourt case, or with other alleged instances of the witness's cooperation with the government,⁶ did not merit a new trial.

The defendant appealed, and we granted his application for direct appellate review.

Discussion. As a general matter, we review a judge's denial of a defendant's motion for a new trial to determine whether there has been a significant error of law or other abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 478 Mass. 369, 380, 85 N.E.3d 934 (2017). Where, as here, the motion judge was not the trial judge, we accept findings made by the judge based on testimony at the evidentiary hearing, and do not disturb them unless they clearly are erroneous. Commonwealth v. Drayton, 479 Mass. 479, 486, 96 N.E.3d 163 (2018). However, we review independently findings made by the motion judge based entirely on documentary evidence. Id. Further, we "make an independent determination as to the correctness of the judge's application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 205, 950 N.E.2d 421 (2011).

In criminal prosecutions, the government constitutionally is obligated to disclose material exculpatory evidence, even if it is not requested by the defendant. Sullivan, 478 Mass. at 380, 85 N.E.3d 934, citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). See Mass....