Commonwealth v. Carson C.

• Decision Date: 31 January 2022
• Docket Number: SJC-13107
• Citation: 489 Mass. 54,187 N.E.3d 361
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. CARSON C., a juvenile.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

489 Mass. 54

187 N.E.3d 361

COMMONWEALTH

v.CARSON C., a juvenile.

SJC-13107

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Argued September 10, 2021

Decided January 31, 2022.

Taylor Henley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the juvenile.

Donna-Marie Haran, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Timothy J. Cruz, District Attorney, & Patricia Reilly, Assistant District Attorney, for District Attorney for the Plymouth District, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Cristina F. Freitas, Debbie F. Freitas, Methuen, & Joshua M. Daniels, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.

GEORGES, J.

In this case, we are asked to decide whether a Juvenile Court judge abused his discretion under G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a ), or violated a juvenile's rights to due process, in denying the juvenile's motion to continue his arraignment for a competency evaluation. We also consider whether, after the juvenile was found incompetent to stand trial and the same judge dismissed all charges approximately four months after the arraignment, the judge abused his discretion in denying the juvenile's petition for expungement pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a ) (5). Discerning no error in either decision, we affirm the denials of the motion to continue and the petition for expungement.¹

1. Background. The relevant facts are undisputed. In June of 2018, the juvenile, then twelve years old and in the custody of the Department of Children and Families (DCF), was living at a residential program in Barre for children who have developmental difficulties or mental illness, are on the autism spectrum, or have a history of trauma or abuse. On June 21, 2018, while riding in a school van, the juvenile allegedly struck the driver with his sandal multiple times before jumping out of the van and creating a disturbance on a busy road. On March 10, 2019, when the juvenile was thirteen years old and still living at the residential program in Barre, he allegedly discharged a fire extinguisher several times in a staff conference room and sprayed the legs and feet of two staff members.

As a result of these incidents, two complaints issued against the juvenile in March of 2019. The first charged him with (1) assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b ) ; (2) disorderly conduct, G. L. c. 272, § 53 ; and (3) disturbing the peace, G. L. c. 272, § 53. The second charged the juvenile with two counts of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 272, § 15A (b ), and two counts of vandalism, G. L. c. 266, § 126A.

On April 1, 2019, the juvenile appeared in the Juvenile Court for arraignment in both cases. Prior to arraignment, he filed a motion to continue so that he could undergo a competency evaluation, and he also filed a motion to dismiss. The juvenile argued that arraigning him despite his inability to understand the proceedings against him would deprive him of his rights to due process under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. He asserted that the judge had discretion to order a prearraignment competency evaluation pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a ).

At a hearing on the motion to continue, defense counsel expressed concerns about the juvenile's competency due to his age and "his having some difficulty in our conversations." Counsel also informed the judge that several staff members at the group home also thought that a competency evaluation would be a "good idea," because they shared her concerns about the juvenile's ability "to understand what's going on." The Commonwealth orally opposed the motion; it maintained that incompetency "doesn't preclude an arraignment going forward" and that competency "can be evaluated after the arraignment."

The judge conducted colloquies first with the director of the group home and then with the juvenile. The judge asked the juvenile about his family and his school, and the juvenile responded appropriately, giving answers that contained essentially the same factual information that the director had provided about where his family was then living, where he and his family had lived before he was placed in the group home, his grade in school, and his favorite subject. The judge also asked the juvenile about the role of a judge. The juvenile responded that he did not know what a judge does or what a judge's robe means. The judge subsequently denied both the motion to continue and the motion to dismiss, arraigned the juvenile on all charges, and ordered him released on personal recognizance with conditions. The juvenile remained in the custody of DCF and was returned to the group home.

Several months later, the juvenile was evaluated by a forensic psychologist who had been retained by the juvenile's attorney. Following this evaluation, which concluded that the juvenile was incompetent to stand trial and was unlikely to become competent within the foreseeable future, the Commonwealth moved to dismiss the charges. On August 30, 2019, the judge who had arraigned the juvenile entered findings of incompetency in both matters and dismissed all pending charges.

On the same day that the charges were dismissed, the juvenile moved for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to continue, and also filed a petition for expungement. The juvenile argued that the judge had erred in proceeding with the arraignment prior to a competency evaluation, and that this error was grounds for expungement under G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a ) (5).² After a nonevidentiary hearing, the judge denied the motion for reconsideration and the petition for expungement. The juvenile appealed, and we transferred the matter to this court on our own motion.³

2. Discussion. The juvenile argues that the judge erred in denying the motion for a continuance and then conducting the arraignment. The juvenile contends that the judge should have exercised the discretion afforded him under G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a ), to order a competency evaluation prior to arraignment, and that arraigning him notwithstanding his "manifest" incompetency, and without any articulable safety or security concerns, violated due process. Before turning to the specifics of the juvenile's circumstances, we examine the statutory provisions governing competency evaluations and the related due process considerations.

a. Evaluation of competency under G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a). General Laws c. 123, § 15 (a ), provides:

"Whenever a court of competent jurisdiction doubts whether a defendant in a criminal case is competent to stand trial ..., it may at any stage of the proceedings after the return of an indictment or the issuance of a criminal complaint against the defendant, order an examination of such defendant to be conducted by one or more qualified physicians or one or more qualified psychologists."

That a competency evaluation may be ordered "at any stage" of the proceedings has been broadly construed, consistent with the plain language. See Commonwealth v. Conaghan, 433 Mass. 105, 110, 740 N.E.2d 956 (2000) (allowing order of examination for competency more than four years after defendant had pleaded guilty). To avoid undue delay in proceedings in which competency is disputed, G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a ), further provides that, "[w]henever practicable, examinations shall be conducted at the court house or place of detention where the person is being held."

A judge's authority to order an evaluation under G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a ), is discretionary; the provision states that a judge "may" order an evaluation if the judge becomes concerned about a defendant's competency but does not mandate such action. "While it may be useful for a judge to hear opinions from medical experts, the determination [of competency] is ultimately a legal, not a medical, judgment." Commonwealth v. Jones, 479 Mass. 1, 14, 90 N.E.3d 1238 (2018). A judge therefore has the discretion to determine whether examination by a medical professional is warranted under the circumstances.

Where a defendant—adult or juvenile—moves to continue arraignment for an evaluation pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a ), a judge may allow the motion, or instead may choose independently to assess the defendant's competency prior to ruling on the motion. This assessment must satisfy the judge that the defendant has sufficient mental capacity to participate in the arraignment. See Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 442 Mass. 228, 246, 812 N.E.2d 895 (2004) ("Proceedings in which a defendant cannot participate meaningfully may not be allowed to proceed"); Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 454, 454 (1967). If, after such an assessment, any doubt remains about the defendant's ability to participate, the judge may allow the motion to continue for a competency evaluation, or otherwise must conduct a balancing test, see discussion, infra, to determine whether due process permits the arraignment to go forward despite the defendant's potential incompetency.

"[A]rraignment is the judicial system's formal mechanism for providing the constitutionally prescribed description of criminal charges." Commonwealth v. Dixon, 458 Mass. 446, 456, 938 N.E.2d 878 (2010). Among other things, arraignment ensures that defendant receives fair notice of charges against him or her, a fundamental component of due process. See, e.g., Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 459, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 149 L.Ed.2d 697 (2001) (notice is one of "core due process concepts"). Rule 7 (b) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure, as appearing in 461 Mass. 1501 (2012), for instance, directs a judge at arraignment to (1) "read the charges to the defendant in open court," (2) "enter the defendant's plea to the charges," (3) "inform the defendant of all warnings and advisories required by law," and (4) ...