Commonwealth v. Cash
| Decision Date | 03 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-P-366 |
| Citation | 101 Mass.App.Ct. 473,192 N.E.3d 290 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. William A. CASH. |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Joanne T. Petito, for the defendant.
Marina Moriarty, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Present: Green, C.J., Kinder, & Neyman, JJ.
A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of various charges, including murder in the second degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1, armed assault with intent to murder, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b ), and trafficking of a person for sexual servitude, G. L. c. 265, § 50. On appeal, the defendant claims error in the trial judge's denial of his for-cause challenge to a juror based on the juror's use of equivocal language concerning her ability to be impartial. Additionally, he challenges the joinder of the murder-related and trafficking-related charges, the failure of the judge to instruct the jury on manslaughter and self-defense, and the prosecutor's closing argument. Discerning no cause to disturb the judgments, we affirm.
Background. We summarize the facts as the jury may have found them, reserving facts relevant to the defendant's claims of instructional error for later discussion. The defendant ran a sex trafficking scheme in which he provided drugs to women and required them to engage in prostitution to repay him. Amy (a pseudonym) was a victim of this trafficking scheme, and she alleged at trial that the defendant threatened her and burned her with a heated clothes hanger if she failed to earn her quota when she worked for him.
In early 2017, the defendant met another woman, Marcy (a pseudonym), at the apartment building where Amy lived. Over several encounters, he provided drugs to Marcy, complimented her, and attempted to convince her to join his prostitution scheme. However, Marcy stopped visiting him after a while, because she did not want to engage in prostitution.
On April 16, 2017, the defendant, while driving, saw Marcy walking with Leonardo Clement and Prince Belin. Marcy was in a romantic relationship with Belin and was living with him and Clement. The defendant attempted to talk to Marcy, but Belin prevented him from doing so. The defendant angrily drove away, but minutes later returned on foot. After another verbal confrontation with Belin, the defendant shot both him and Clement, killing Clement and seriously wounding Belin. At trial, two eyewitnesses testified that Clement threw a lightweight plastic basket at the defendant immediately before or contemporaneously with the shooting.
The defendant was tried on seven indictments related to the shooting (the murder-related charges) and four indictments related to sex trafficking (the sex trafficking-related charges). The latter included two indictments alleging sex trafficking, one indictment of mayhem regarding Amy,1 and one indictment alleging assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon of Amy. The jury found the defendant guilty on all murder-related charges except for the charge of murder in the first degree of Clement, on which the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the lesser included charge of murder in the second degree instead. Additionally, while the jury found the defendant guilty on the two indictments charging him with sex trafficking, they acquitted him of the indictment charging assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon of Amy.
Discussion. 1. Juror challenge. The defendant claims that the trial judge erroneously denied his for-cause challenge of juror no. 15 due to the juror's equivocal response concerning her ability to be impartial.
Citing Commonwealth v. Susi, 394 Mass. 784, 477 N.E.2d 995 (1985),2 he argues that he is entitled to a new trial, as he was forced to use a peremptory challenge for juror no. 15, which prematurely depleted his peremptory challenges and required him later to accept a juror whom he would otherwise have excluded by exercise of a peremptory challenge.
When the trial judge described the nature of the charges in this case and asked whether she could be impartial, juror no. 15 stated that she found the allegations "very disturbing" and "not something that [she had] really been exposed to ever." The judge then inquired whether she could "decide this case based solely on the evidence despite [her] characterization of the conduct as disturbing."
The juror replied, "I believe I could decide it on the evidence that I hear." Defense counsel requested the judge to further question the juror as her answer was equivocal, but the judge declined the request. The judge then explained on record why he found the juror's response unequivocal:
Defense counsel subsequently challenged the juror for cause and when the judge overruled the challenge, defense counsel exercised a peremptory challenge, and the judge excused the juror.
Where a prospective juror "has expressed or formed an opinion regarding the case, or has an interest, bias, or prejudice related to the unique situation presented by the case," Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 482, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881, 100 S.Ct. 170, 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979), "[i]t is proper for the judge to question further in order to clarify whether the juror could be impartial." Commonwealth v. Jaime J., 56 Mass. App. Ct. 268, 274, 776 N.E.2d 1023 (2002). Through "further inquiry that is both meaningful and fair, and an assessment of the juror's credibility" (footnote omitted), Commonwealth v. Rios, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 463, 471-472, 135 N.E.3d 1056 (2019), "the judge must satisfy him or herself that the prospective juror will set aside that opinion or bias and properly weigh the evidence and follow the instructions on the law." Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 Mass. 443, 448, 116 N.E.3d 609 (2019).
We review a trial judge's determination of a prospective juror's impartiality for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Colton, 477 Mass. 1, 17, 73 N.E.3d 783 (2017). This deferential standard is appropriate because "[t]he determination of a juror's impartiality ‘is essentially one of credibility, and therefore largely one of demeanor’ " (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 425 Mass. 349, 352-353, 680 N.E.2d 1166 (1997). We have long recognized that a trial judge is in a superior position to assess credibility than an appellate court, see Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 449 Mass. 42, 50, 865 N.E.2d 746 (2007), as the judge has first-hand knowledge of the prospective juror's tone, demeanor, and body language, such as hesitation and eye contact, or the lack thereof. See Commonwealth v. Lopes, 440 Mass. 731, 736, 802 N.E.2d 97 (2004). Therefore, "[w]hen a trial judge ... has examined a juror for possible bias and declared her indifferent, appellate courts defer to the judge's [broad] discretion ‘unless juror prejudice is manifest’ " (citation omitted). Jaime J., 56 Mass. App. Ct. at 272, 776 N.E.2d 1023.
Citing Commonwealth v. Long, 419 Mass. 798, 804, 647 N.E.2d 1162 (1995), in which the Supreme Judicial Court held that a trial judge abused his discretion by empanelling a juror who would not state unequivocally that he would be impartial, the defendant argues that the judge erroneously denied his for-cause challenge of juror no. 15. However, "[i]t is well settled that a potential juror's use of seemingly equivocal language is not determinative of the juror's ability to be impartial." Commonwealth v. Bannister, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 815, 827, 125 N.E.3d 746 (2019). Prospective jurors’ words are often but one, albeit significant, factor in determining impartiality. See Jaime J., 56 Mass. App. Ct. at 274, 776 N.E.2d 1023 (). A trial judge must consider contextual factors, such as tone and demeanor, in evaluating a prospective juror at voir dire. See Williams, 481 Mass. at 453, 116 N.E.3d 609 (). But see Rios, 96 Mass. App. Ct. at 470, 135 N.E.3d 1056 ().
Here, the trial judge properly inquired about juror no. 15's ability to be impartial despite the nature of the charges, and the juror answered in the affirmative. Despite the juror's use of "I believe," the judge determined that her response amounted to an unequivocal statement of impartiality. While not required, the judge helpfully explained his reasoning, observing that prospective jurors often use equivocal language because they are conscientious, and expressing his view that this juror fell within that category. As the Supreme Judicial Court concluded in Colton, 477 Mass. at 17, 73 N.E.3d 783, a seemingly equivocal response from a prospective juror "fairly could be viewed as unequivocal" depending on the juror's tone and demeanor.3 Where, as here, the trial judge (who had the unrivaled benefit of observing first-hand the juror's demeanor and tone) determined that the juror's response was unequivocal, we discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision to empanel the juror.
2. Joinder. The defendant also claims that the murder-related offenses and sex trafficking-related offenses were improperly joined for trial, arguing that they were not sufficiently related.
Unde...
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