Commonwealth v. Charles

• Decision Date: 22 July 2013
• Citation: 992 N.E.2d 999,466 Mass. 63
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Shubar CHARLES. Commonwealth v. Hector Milette. District Attorney For The Eastern District v. Superior Court Department of the Trial Court.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

466 Mass. 63

992 N.E.2d 999

COMMONWEALTH

v.Shubar CHARLES.

Commonwealth

v.Hector Milette.

District Attorney For The Eastern District

v.Superior Court Department of the Trial Court.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Submitted May 9, 2013.

Decided July 22, 2013.

Ronald DeRosa, Assistant District Attorney (Elin H. Graydon, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth & another.

Beth Eisenberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services (Matthew R. Segal with her) for Shubar Charles.

Matthew R. Segal (Emma A. Anderson, of New York, with him) for Hector Milette.

Jennifer Grace Miller, Assistant Attorney General, for Superior Court Department of the Trial Court.

Joel Z. Eigerman for Jewish Alliance for Law & Social Action & others.

C. Samuel Sutter, District Attorney, & Eva Zelnick, Assistant District Attorney, for District Attorney for the Bristol District.

Ryan Schiff & Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & Alex G. Philipson for Committee for Public Counsel Services & another.

Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, GANTS, DUFFLY, & LENK, JJ.

SPINA, J.

In June, 2011, allegations of misconduct at the William A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute in Jamaica Plain (Hinton drug lab) surfaced regarding work performed by Annie Dookhan, a chemist who had been employed in the forensic drug laboratory since November, 2003. Following an internal review, the Department of Public Health launched a formal investigation of the matter in December, 2011. The investigation concluded that “Dookhan failed to follow [Hinton drug l]ab protocols for the transfer and documentation of samples for testing, and subsequently created a false record of said transfers.” After being placed on paid administrative leave, Dookhan resigned from her position, effective March 9, 2012. A more extensive investigation of the Hinton drug lab was initiated in August, 2012, by the State police. As a result of this investigation, it has been alleged that, among other things, Dookhan deliberately and repeatedly falsified drug testing results, tampered with evidence, and forged signatures on documents. Although the full scope of Dookhan's purported misconduct is not yet known, it has been estimated conservatively that, during her tenure, Dookhan worked on at least 34,000 cases. The investigation of misconduct at the Hinton drug lab remains ongoing.

The three cases now before us concern the validity of certain procedures that have been adopted by the Superior Court Department of the Trial Court (Superior Court) to handle postconviction matters in criminal cases where a defendant has been convicted of a drug offense and the drugs at issue were analyzed at the Hinton drug lab. In October, 2012, the Chief Justice of the Superior Court assigned specific judges in seven counties to preside over special “drug lab sessions” that would deal with these postconviction matters. The first round of hearings focused on incarcerated defendants who had filed motions to stay the execution of their sentences in cases where the lead offense was a violation of the Controlled Substances Act, G.L. c. 94C, and Dookhan was the primary or confirmatory chemist.¹ From October 15 to November 28, the judges presiding over the drug lab sessions held 589 hearings, placing an enormous burden on the Superior Court.

On November 9, 2012, this court issued an order to facilitate the expeditious handling of matters relating to the alleged misconduct at the Hinton drug lab. The order provided, in relevant part:

“[A] Chief Justice of a Trial Court Department may assign for all purposes, including disposition, any post conviction motion in which a party seeks relief based on alleged misconduct at the Hinton [drug lab] to any judge of that Trial Court Department. The assigned judge may reassign the motion to the original trial judge where the interests of justice require.”

On November 26, 2012, in accordance with the provisions of Mass. R.Crim. P. 47, 378 Mass. 923 (1979),² the Chief Justice of the Superior Court appointed five retired Superior Court judges as “Special Judicial Magistrate[s] of the Superior Court, to preside over criminal proceedings in connection with cases relating to the [Hinton drug lab].” These special magistrates were assigned to six counties, and the Chief Justice of the Superior Court issued to each one an “Order of Assignment” delineating his or her authority and responsibilities. It provides, in part:

“[T]he Special Judicial Magistrate shall have the powers, duties, and authority to preside at arraignments, to set bail, to assign counsel, to supervise pretrial conferences, and to mark up motions for hearing. The Special Judicial Magistrate shall also have the power and authority to conduct hearings on post conviction motions, to issue orders regarding discovery, and other matters, and to make proposed findings and rulings to the Regional Administrative Justice.... Further, the Special JudicialMagistrate shall perform such other duties as may be authorized by order of the Superior Court.”

As of March 6, 2013, the special magistrates had conducted more than 900 hearings, a substantial number of which pertained to defendants' motions to stay the execution of their sentences.³

The three present cases originated in Essex County. Each arose as a consequence of the implementation of the procedures established by the Chief Justice of the Superior Court for handling postconviction matters in the special drug lab sessions. Following proceedings in the Superior Court with regard to each case, which will be discussed in greater depth in subsequent portions of this opinion, the Commonwealth filed petitions in the county court pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3, challenging those procedures. On March 13, 2013, a single justice held a hearing on the Commonwealth's petitions. She then reserved and reported three questions to the full bench:

“1. Does a special magistrate appointed by the Chief Justice of the Superior Court pursuant to Mass. R.Crim. P. 47, or a judge of the Superior Court, have the authority to allow a defendant's motion to stay execution of his sentence, then being served, pending disposition of the defendant's motion for a new trial?

“2. Does a special magistrate have the authority to reconsider and allow a motion to stay execution of a criminal defendant's sentence where a judge of the Superior Court has previously denied a motion to stay execution filed by the same defendant?

“3. (a) Is it appropriate for this court to answer the question set forth in 3(b) below, regarding the validity of plea colloquies conducted by special magistrates, where, under the terms of the protocol established by the Superior Court, neither side can be required to submit over its objection to a plea colloquy conducted by a special magistrate, and where, to date, because of the Commonwealth's objections, all colloquies in Essex County have been conducted by judges and not by special magistrates?

“(b) If the court answers the question in 3(a) in the affirmative,does such a special magistrate have the authority under Mass. R.Crim. P. 47 to conduct a guilty plea colloquy and to report findings concerning such issues as the voluntariness of the proposed plea and the factual basis for the plea to a presiding justice of the Superior Court?” ⁴

We shall proceed to analyze and answer each question in the context of the individual case in which it arose.⁵

ICommonwealth vs. Shubar Charles

The essential facts are not disputed. On the evening of April 2, 2009, a former girl friend of Shubar Charles contacted the New Bedford police department to report that, while at her home for a birthday celebration, Charles had held a firearm to her face and threatened to kill her. The ensuing police investigation suggested that Charles could be located in Lynn. When officers from the Lynn police department converged on an apartment on North Common Street, tenants informed them that Charles had gone into a back bedroom and had been “waving around” a small handgun. Officers discovered Charles alone in the back bedroom. They searched him and found in his pants pocket twenty individual baggies of a white powdery substance that they believed to be cocaine. A further search of the bedroom uncovered, among other things, a loaded firearm. Charles was arrested and taken to the Lynn police station. During booking, he was searched again, and officers found a single bullet in the pocket of the jacket that he was wearing.

On June 5, 2009, Charles was indicted on charges of possession of a class B controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to distribute, as a subsequent offense, G.L. c. 94C, § 32A ( b ); possession of a firearm without a firearm identification card, G.L. c. 269, § 10 ( h ); unlawful possession of ammunition, G.L. c. 269, § 10 ( h ); and possession of a firearm after having been convicted previously of three violent crimes or three serious drug offenses, G.L. c. 269, § 10G ( c ) (two counts). Dookhan was the primary chemist who analyzed the substance in the baggies; she was not involved in the examination of firearm evidence. On a certificate dated December 28, 2009, Dookhan certified that the substance was cocaine.

On October 18, 2010, Charles pleaded guilty to reduced charges of possession of a class B controlled substance with intent to distribute, G.L. c. 94C, § 32A ( a ); unlawful possession of ammunition, G.L. c. 269, § 10 ( h ); and unlawful possession of ammunition after having been convicted previously of one serious drug offense, G.L. c. 269, § 10G ( a ). As part of the plea bargain, the Commonwealth agreed to enter a nolle prosequi on the remaining offenses. Charles was sentenced to concurrent terms of from four to seven years in the State prison for his convictions of possession of a Class B substance with intent to distribute and being a felon in possession of ammunition; he was sentenced to a concurrent term of two years in the house of correction...