Commonwealth v. Cintora

• Decision Date: 28 June 2013
• Citation: 2013 PA Super 160,69 A.3d 759
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Oscar CINTORA, Appellant. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Jesus Alcantar Cintora, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

69 A.3d 759

2013 PA Super 160

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Oscar CINTORA, Appellant.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Jesus Alcantar Cintora, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted April 1, 2013.

Filed June 28, 2013.

Oscar Cintora, appellant, pro se (at 3272).

Jesus A. Cintora, appellant, pro se (at 3456).

Nicholas J. Casenta, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, West Chester, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER,^* JJ.

OPINION BY STRASSBURGER, J.:

These interrelated pro se appeals are from orders entered November 1, 2012, which dismissed Oscar Cintora's fourth petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) ¹ and his brother Jesus Alcantar Cintora's third petition filed pursuantto the PCRA. On appeal, Oscar and Jesus (collectively “Appellants”) both claim that the PCRA court erred in dismissing their petitions as untimely. Because identical issues are raised in each appeal arising from the same set of facts, we will address them together. We affirm.

These actions arose from an incident in March of 1994 wherein Oscar and Jesus burglarized a home, stabbed to death a male occupant, and tied up and terrorized the murder victim's mother and sister. The men fled the scene in the victims' car, but were later apprehended in the Commonwealth of Virginia.

On October 21, 1994, Jesus pled guilty to second-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, burglary, and two counts of robbery. Immediately following his plea, Jesus was sentenced to life imprisonment for the second-degree murder conviction and to an aggregate term of twenty to forty years' imprisonment for the remaining crimes, to be served concurrently with the life sentence. Jesus did not file a direct appeal.

On February 13, 1995, Oscar also pled guilty to second-degree murder, burglary and two counts of robbery. Oscar was sentenced that same date to life imprisonment for second-degree murder. Additionally the court imposed three concurrent sentences of five to ten years' imprisonment for the robbery and burglary convictions. No post-sentence motions were filed, and no direct appeal was taken.

Subsequently, both Appellants filed serial PCRA petitions. However, because those petitions are not at issue, we refrain from describing in detail the factual and procedural history of each petition for each Appellant. Rather we limit our discussion to the most recent PCRA petition filed by each Appellant.

On August 10, 2012, Appellants filed separate, but identical, pro se, PCRA petitions,² alleging that the United States Supreme Court in its decision in Miller v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), recognized a new constitutional right, which not only invokes a timeliness exception to section 9545(b)(1) of the PCRA, but also requires the reversal of Appellants' sentences of life imprisonment. After reviewing the petition, the PCRA court found Miller inapplicable and, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, gave notice to Appellants, by order dated September 28, 2012, of its intent to dismiss their petitions as untimely. Both Appellants filed a “Motion for Reconsideration of Order of Intent to Dismiss ‘PCRA’ Petition as Untimely,” on October 15, 2012. On November 9, 2012, the PCRA court dismissed Appellants' petitions. These timely appeals followed.³

On appeal, Appellants collectively raise the following issues for our consideration:

1. Whether the “PCRA” Court erred in dismissing [Appellants' petitions] as untimely, whereupon, such petition[s] alleged that two of the exceptions to the time requirements, applied to his untimely petition under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii-iii)?

2. Whether Newly Discovered Scientific facts, ratified by recent U.S. Supreme Court Rulings, and recognized as a Constitutional Right under [Miller, supra ], which renders unconstitutional life without parole sentences for juveniles, encompasses as well young adults whose brain [s] were immature at the time of their offenses?

3. Whether Mandatory life without parole terms for adults in homicide cases violates state and federal Equal Protection Clauses as well as Article 7 of the Universal declaration of human rights?

Appellants' Briefs at 2.

We have held that,

[t]his Court's standard of review regarding an order denying a petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA court's findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.

Commonwealth v. Walls, 993 A.2d 289, 294–295 (Pa.Super.2010) (citations omitted).

In the instant case, the PCRA court concluded that Appellants' petitions were filed untimely and failed to plead any valid exception to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA. PCRA Court Opinion, 12/6/2012 (citing Orders dated 11/9/2012 and 9/28/2012). Pennsylvania law makes clear that no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 500, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (2003). Statutory time restrictions are mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and may not be altered or disregarded to reach the merits of the claims raised in the petition. Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 Pa. 1, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (2000). Generally, a PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is deemed final for purposes of the PCRA “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA provides three narrow statutory exceptions to the general timeliness requirements:

(b) Time for filing petition.—

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A petition seeking relief pursuant to a statutory exception must adhere to the additional requirement of filing the claim within 60 days of the date the claim could have been first presented. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).

Section 9545(b) applies to any petition filed under the PCRA, including second and subsequent ones. Thus, notwithstanding that these are serial petitions, pursuant to statute, Appellants still had to file their petitions within one year from the date their judgments of sentence became final for the petitions to be timely. Because neither Appellant filed a direct appeal to this Court, each Appellant's judgment of sentence became final thirty days after his sentence was imposed and the time for filing a direct appeal expired. See42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903. Thus, Appellants' petitions, filed August 10, 2012 are facially untimely. Consequently, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review them unless Appellants pled and proved one of the statutory exceptions to the time bar, as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1), supra, applies.

In their first issue, Appellants assert that their petitions fell under the exceptions at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) and (iii), alleging newly discovered evidence, and a newly-recognized constitutional right to relief, pursuant to Miller, supra. See Appellants' Briefs at 7–13. We disagree.

In analyzing a claim of newly discovered evidence pursuant to section 9545(b)(1)(ii), our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Bennett, 593 Pa. 382, 930 A.2d 1264, 1271–72 (2007),

made clear that the exception set forth in subsection (b)(1)(ii) does not require any merits analysis of the underlying claim. Rather, the exception merely requires that the facts upon which such a claim is predicated must not have been known to appellant, nor could they have been ascertained by due diligence. Therefore, ... the plain language of subsection (b)(1)(ii) is not so narrow as to limit itself to only claims involving after-discovered evidence. Rather, subsection (b)(1)(ii) has two components, which must be alleged and proved. Namely, the petitioner must establish that: 1) the facts upon which the claim was predicated were unknown and 2) could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. If the petitioner alleges and proves these two components, then the PCRA court has jurisdiction over the claim under this subsection.

Id. at 1271–72 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Specifically, Appellants argue that the newly-discovered evidence is our Supreme Court's decision in Miller, supra, which is derivatively applicable to them and implicates the legality of their sentences. We do not find Appellant's argument persuasive.

Our Courts have expressly rejected the notion that judicial decisions can be considered newly-discovered facts which would invoke the protections afforded by section 9545(b)(1)(ii). See Commonwealth v. Watts, 611 Pa. 80, 23 A.3d 980, 986 (2011) (holding, a judicial opinion does not qualify as a previously unknown “fact” capable of triggering the timeliness exception set forth in section 9545(b)(1)(ii) of the PCRA; “section 9545(b)(1)(ii) applies only if the petitioner has uncovered facts that could not have been ascertained through due diligence, and judicial...