Commonwealth v. Clancy
| Decision Date | 25 June 1891 |
| Citation | 27 N.E. 1001,154 Mass. 128 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. CLANCY. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
A.E. Pillsbury, Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.
T.J Morrison, for defendant.
The motion to quash was properly overruled. The complaint charges an offense under St.1885, c. 342, § 1. That statute makes it criminal to be present in a room occupied with apparatus books, or devices for the purpose of registering bets, or of buying or selling pools, upon the result of a trial of speed of beasts, etc., engaged in the business of registering bets or of buying or selling pools upon the result of a trial of the speed of beasts, etc. It is not necessary that the defendant's business should embrace both registering bets and buying or selling pools. If it embraces any one of them, it is within the letter and the intent of the statute. If it embraces more than one, it still may be one business and one offense. Com. v. Ferry, 146 Mass. 203, 208, 15 N.E. 484; Com. v. Moody, 143 Mass. 177, 9 N.E. 511.
As the jurisdiction of the municipal court of the city of Boston does not extend to the whole city, it is necessary to allege the place more particularly than otherwise would be sufficient. We are of opinion that the established formula, "and within the judicial district of said court," following the allegations of city, county, and state, is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction. Com. v. Hoar, 121 Mass. 375. If it is in a sense a conclusion of law, so are many allegations of pleading. Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes, 577, 583; Windram v. French, 151 Mass. 547, 551, 24 N.E. 914; Evans, Pl. 138, 139, 143, et seq.; Id. (2d Ed.) 147, 152, et seq. But if the district had had a proper name, and had been designated by it, probably no one ever would have questioned that the allegation was one of fact, and sufficient. 2 Battle, Dig. 729, Pl. 2. In its present form it is an issuable allegation. U.S. v. Anderson, 17 Blatchf. 238; U.S. v. Jackalow, 1 Black, 484, 487. It is equivalent to an allegation that it was within some one of the words mentioned in Pub.St. c. 154, § 42, defining the judicial district in question, and it gives the same information as if couched in that form. People v. Breese, 7 Cow. 429, 430. Those words are established by statute. St.1886, c. 283; St.1888, c. 437. The other objections insisted upon are disposed of by Com. v. Ferry, 146 Mass. 203, 15 N.E. 484.
The next question is whether there was any evidence warranting a verdict against the defendant. There can be no doubt that the transactions described by the witnesses purported to be the registering of a bet on the result of certain horse-races, or that the room was occupied with apparatus for that purpose. There stood in the room blackboards with names and figures understood to be the names of horses and jockeys by a witness who had been there many times. Another witness copied from the blackboard certain names which he understood to be the names of horses, and asked the defendant what he would give him on them. The defendant answered 20 to 1. The witness gave the defendant some money and the list of names, and the defendant went into the office, stopped a minute, returned, and gave the witness his change, the sum paid by the witness being half a dollar; and then another man in the office gave the witness a ticket with the words, "Play or Pay Combination," written at the top; then the words, "1st race," "2nd race," etc, printed in a column, and the names selected by the witness written against certain of the races, thus: "1st race, Picknicker, 1-2;" "7th race, Tatler, 1-2," etc. At the bottom was written "10-1," and lower down "50," which it would not be a very violent conjecture to take as signifying the odds given and the sum paid by the witness. If the jury found that this transaction purported to be a bet on a horse-race, they were...
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