Commonwealth v. Clark
| Decision Date | 07 May 1900 |
| Docket Number | 323 |
| Citation | 46 A. 286,195 Pa. 634 |
| Parties | Commonwealth to use v. Clark |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued April 23, 1900 [Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Appeal, No. 323, Jan. T., 1899, by defendant, from judgment of Superior Court, April T., 1899, No. 46, from judgment of Q.S. Crawford Co., Feb. T., 1897, No. 57, on case stated, in case of Commonwealth to use of City of Titusville v. L. S. Clark. Affirmed.
Appeal from Superior Court.
Case stated, appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace, imposing a fine on the defendant for failure to pay for, and take out a license required by an ordinance of the city of Titusville. The court below having entered judgment in favor of the commonwealth, the defendant appealed to the Superior Court which affirmed the judgment. See the report of the case in 10 Pa.Super. 507.
The facts appear by the opinion of the court below, THOMAS, P.J., which was as follows:
By agreement of counsel this case is tried upon a case stated for the opinion of the court in the nature of a special verdict.
The city of Titusville is, and has been since 1875, a city of the third class, and on June 25, 1888, the legislative body of the said city duly and regularly passed, and the mayor of said city duly approved of the ordinance by virtue of which the license tax under consideration is imposed.
The ordinance was evidently enacted by virtue of the unconstitutional act of May 24, 1887, but the municipal actions had under and based upon said act were legally ratified by the act of May 13, 1889: Melick v. Williamsport, 162 Pa. 408; City of Chester v. Pennell, 169 Pa. 300.
Nor is there any contention of the parties upon this point, but defendant denies the legality of the ordinance upon two grounds, viz: (1) because certain of the merchants and business men of Titusville are exempt from any taxation whatever; and (2) the tax imposed is not uniform, and the classification adopted is prohibited by the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution.
The tax imposed being authorized by clause 4, section 3 of article 5 of the act of May 23, 1889, is for general revenue purposes, and by virtue of the general taxing powers of the municipality, and not through or by virtue of its police powers: Williamsport v. Wenner, 172 Pa. 173; Oil City v. Trust Co., 151 Pa. 459.
Section 3 of the ordinance classifies those who make and effect annual sales of divers amounts. Section 4 provides "that contractors whose business and real estate agents whose sales exceed $1,000 per annum, shall be classified and rated as provided for in section 3 of this ordinance, and shall pay a license according to said section."
By section 3 no exemption is allowed to persons doing an annual business of less than $1,000, and as contractors and real estate agents are otherwise classified with the persons making and effecting sales, to thus exempt a part of the class doing an annual business of less than $1,000, and impose a tax upon others belonging to the same class is clearly violative of sections 1 and 2, article 9 of the constitution of this commonwealth: Com. v. Brewing Co., 145 Pa. 83; Com. v. Sharon Coal Co., 164 Pa. 304; Fox and Wife's Appeal, 112 Pa. 337; Pittsburg v. Coyle & Co., 165 Pa. 61.
This exemption is class legislation, which is forbidden by the constitution, and not in any way or under any guise to be tolerated. This portion of the ordinance must fall, but this defect alone does not render the entire ordinance void.
As was said by our Supreme Court in Fox and Wife's Appeal, 112 Pa. 337, in declaring unconstitutional that part of the act of 1885, which excepted from taxation notes or bills for work or labor done,
Section 16 of said ordinance provides "that no manufacturer who is a citizen of the city of Titusville, shall be considered a dealer or vender of merchandise within the spirit of this ordinance unless he sells goods not of his own manufacture."
We think that distingushing such persons from the ones classified in said ordinance is a valid exercise of the power of the legislative body of said city.
We can readily understand how and why manufacturers who regularly have taxable capital invested in a plant and whose chief item of profit consists in converting the raw material into the finished product should not be classified with venders of merchandise whose chief capital consists of their stock in trade, and whose profits are derived from selling at retail at an advanced price over that of the wholesale purchaser.
If the entire classification in this ordinance rested on as good, valid and reasonable grounds as does this distinction or classification, if we may so term it, we would see little to complain of.
Whether or not the merchant tailors, tinsmiths or tombstone dealers referred to in the case stated come under the manufacturers provided for by section 16, need not now be decided, nor need we decide in this action the rights of defendant against the city for a failure of its officials to enforce the ordinance against others who may properly come under its provisions.
Even were the said 16th section unconstitutional and void we do not think that would invalidate the entire ordinance. See Fox and Wife's Appeal, supra.
Let us then examine the second objection to the validity of this ordinance, and bearing in mind that it is a tax levied for general revenue purposes, determine whether the taxes levied by virtue thereof, and under the classification therein adopted are forbidden by the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, or whether they lack that uniformity imposed by the constitution of this commonwealth.
The said amendment provides: "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
It is true, as urged, that the equal protection of the laws herein enjoined is a pledge of the protection of equal laws (Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 369); but it does not forbid a classification of persons or property for various purposes, nor enjoin upon the legislative authorities the impossible duty of making the same or equal laws for the several classes. It does compel the equal application of the laws to all members of the same class, allowing classification, which should be based upon reasonable grounds and is not a mere arbitrary selection: Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 165.
Such classification is not only allowed, but it is recognized as necessary, in order that uniformity and equality of taxation, and of the just adaption of property to its burdens may be accomplished: W.U. Tel. Co. v. Indiana, 165 U.S. 304; Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U.S. 351.
In all cases where classification for purposes of taxation has been recognized, it has been held that the requirements of the federal constitution have been fulfilled if the rates, though different for separate classes, operate uniformly on each class: Chicago R.R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 164; Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U.S. 680; Com. v. Sharon Coal Co., 164 Pa. 304; Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U.S. 606; Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U.S. 321.
If the ordinance passed and the classification made therein is not in conflict with the federal constitution or some valid act of congress, the court may not say whether the law is the best that could have been enacted, or whether the common good demands or requires such a law. We can only determine whether, in such a case, the legislative body, acting under the laws and constitution of this commonwealth, had the power and authority to enact such a law.
The responsibility of the legislative body for so acting, if they had the power so to do, is not to the court, but to the people whom they represent. And for a construction of the federal laws and constitution, we must look to our federal courts, while the construction of the constitution and laws of the commonwealth, so far as they do not conflict with those of the nation, is determined by our own courts: Chicago R.R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 1c5; Memphis Gas Co. v. Shelby Co., 109 U.S. 398; United States v. New Orleans, 98 U.S. 381; Merriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.S. 355, and the cases therein cited; Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U.S. 669; Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 155; Lewis v. Monsan, 151 U.S. 549; Iowa Central Railway Co. v. Iowa, 160 U.S. 393; Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 109.
No objection is raised in this case as to the method of making the assessments or arriving at valuations. The principal contention is that by virtue of the classification made unequal burdens and rates are imposed upon the several members of different classes, but it is not alleged, with the exceptions heretofore noted, that the ordinance applies to or is enforced differently against the same members of any class.
We, therefore, conclude that the ordinance in question does not violate the provisions of the federal constitution, and we must determine whether or not it is in conflict with the constitution and laws of this commonwealth.
Article 9, section 1, of our constitution declares that...
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Commonwealth v. Clark
... 46 A. 286195 Pa. 634 COMMONWEALTH, to Use of CITY OF TITUSVILLE, v. CLARK. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. May 7, 1900. Appeal from superior court. Proceeding of the commonwealth, for the use of the city of Titusville, against L. S. Clark, to recover a fine for doing business as a retail gr......