Commonwealth v. Cohan
| Decision Date | 01 November 1940 |
| Citation | 29 N.E.2d 693,307 Mass. 179 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. COHAN. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Superior Court, Norfolk County; Dowd, Judge.
Sidney Cohan was found guilty of armed robbery by the jury, and he brings exceptions.
Exceptions overruled.
Argued before FIELD, C. J., and DONAHUE, DOLAN, COX, and RONAN, JJ.
M. E. Viola, of Boston, for defendant.
E. R. Dewing, Dist. Atty., and G. L. Rabb, Asst. Dist. Atty., both of Boston, for the Commonwealth.
The defendant was indicted, together with one Costa and others, for the crime of armed robbery. Costa and the defendant were arraigned and tried together, and the jury returned as to each of them a verdict of guilty. The case comes before us on the exceptions of Cohan alone to the admission of certain evidence at the trial.
There was evidence that on March 14, 1940, at about 11:15 p. m. one Wedderburn, while walking home, was held up and robbed by five men. On the following day (March 15) at about 2:15 p. m. the ‘Boston Police’ took into custody the defendant, Costa and two other men who were in a gray automobile on Blue Hill Avenue, in Dorchester. The vehicle was registered in the name of Costa's wife. Costa was at the wheel and Cohan was seated in the rear seat. The police found a nickel plated revolver fully loaded under the front seat. The four men were booked at 2:25 p. m. of the same day. On the following morning (March 16) Wedderburn identified Cohan as the man who held the revolver, and Costa as the man who stole his watch, chain and knife. Wedderburn also ‘picked out’ the Costa ‘car’ from other gray automobiles as ‘a car which ‘looked like’ the car in which the men left the scene of the robbery.'
Two days later the police located Wedderburn's watch in a Boston pawnshop conducted by one Goodman. He identified Costa from a number of photographs shown him by the police as the man who pawned the watch, and also identified him at the trial.
Costa and Cohan each set up an alibi as defence. On cross-examination of Goodman the defendant introduced in evidence a book kept by Goodman in which were recorded the name, address, article, and time of day with respect to each transaction involving a loan or renewal of a loan. This book indicated that the watch ‘was pawned on March 15, 1940, at 2:40 o'clock in the afternoon.’ After both sides had rested the Commonwealth recalled Goodman, who had previously testified as a witness for the Commonwealth. Goodman testified when thus recalled that every entry in the book recorded the exact time of the making of loans or the renewal thereof. An entry in the book under the name of one Morse was then pointed out to him, which indicated that Morse had renewed a loan on March 15, 1940, ‘at 6:06 o'clock in the evening.’ Goodman was then asked by the district attorney, ‘Can you tell us at what time this renewal of loan in the name of Mr. Morse was made?’ The defendant objected to this question on the ground that the district attorney was trying to impeach his own witness. The district attorney offered to prove that if Goodman testified that the renewal of the loan was made to Morse at the time that appeared in the book, he would offer evidence to contradict him. The question was allowed, the judge ruling that the district attorney could contradict his own witness by evidence other than of bad character, and the defendant excepted. Goodman in response testified that the loan to Morse was renewed at ‘6:06 in the evening.’ The defendant excepted to this answer. Morse was then called by the Commonwealth and testified that he renewed the loan, previously made to him, on March 15, 1940. He was then asked by the district attorney at what time the loan was renewed on that date. The question was allowed subject to the defendant's exception, and Morse replied that the loan was renewed on March 15, 1940, between 8:30 and 9 a. m. He was then asked whether he was in the pawnshop at any other time during that day or evening. The question was allowed over the defendant's objection and subject to his exception. Morse replied, ‘No, that is the only time I was there that day.’ The defendant then moved to strike out all of the testimony of Morse. The motion was denied subject to the defendant's exception.
The defendant contends that the judge abused whatever discretion he had in...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Com. v. Mascolo
...the probative value of the evidence would outweigh its prejudicial effect or a tendency to confuse the jury (Commonwealth v. Cohan, 307 Mass. 179, 183, 29 N.E.2d 693 (1940); Leach & Liacos, Massachusetts Evidence at 295-296 (4th ed. 1967); Hughes, Evidence § 284, at 340-341 (1961)); and his......
-
Com. v. Dane Entertainment Services, Inc. (No. 1)
...of the trial judge. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 388 Mass. 98, 103, 445 N.E.2d 1033 (1983), and cases cited. Commonwealth v. Cohan, 307 Mass. 179, 183, 29 N.E.2d 693 (1940). Commonwealth v. Mascolo, 6 Mass.App. 266, 278, 375 N.E.2d 17 (1978). Provided that the judge believed Willcox's descripti......
-
Com. v. Lucas
...evidence is too remote, confusing or prejudicial, much must be left to the discretion of the trial judge.' See Commonwealth v. Cohan, 307 Mass. 179, 183, 29 N.E.2d 693, 695. Assignment of error numbered 19 is based upon an exception to the denial by the judge of the motions of the defendant......