Commonwealth v. Coleman

• Decision Date: 23 November 2022
• Docket Number: 19 WAP 2021
• Citation: 285 A.3d 599
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Demetrius Carlos COLEMAN, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

285 A.3d 599

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Demetrius Carlos COLEMAN, Appellant

No. 19 WAP 2021

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: April 12, 2022

Decided: November 23, 2022

Aaron Joshua Marcus, Esq., Peter Rosalsky, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, for Amicus Curiae Defender Association of Philadelphia.

Norma Chase, Esq., for Appellant.

Michael Wayne Streily, Esq., Allegheny County District Attorney's Office, Daniel Albert Vernacchio, Esq., for Appellee.

BAER, C.J., TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.

JUSTICE BROBSON

OPINION

In this discretionary matter, Demetrius Carlos Coleman (Appellant) appeals from an order of the Superior Court, which vacated Appellant's judgment of sentence and remanded the matter to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (sentencing court) for resentencing. The Superior Court concluded that the sentencing court erred in failing to sentence Appellant pursuant to the mandatory sentencing enhancement set forth in Section 9715(a) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9715(a), requiring that any person convicted of third-degree murder "in this Commonwealth who has previously been convicted at any time of murder ... be sentenced to life imprisonment." We must decide whether the Superior Court was correct in concluding that the mandatory sentencing enhancement applies to a defendant such as Appellant, who killed three people simultaneously and was thereafter convicted of three counts of third-degree murder. Upon careful review, we conclude that the sentencing enhancement does apply in such a scenario. Accordingly, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In the afternoon of November 24, 2016, East McKeesport Police Officer Scott Lowden (Officer Lowden) was on patrol when he observed the driver of a white Hyundai make an illegal left turn. Officer Lowden followed the Hyundai as it proceeded into a gas station and stopped at a gas pump. Officer Lowden exited his patrol vehicle and approached the Hyundai, where he found Appellant in the driver's seat and Asia Camp (Camp), the owner of the vehicle, in the passenger seat. Officer Lowden explained to Appellant that Appellant had made an illegal left turn and asked Appellant to provide his driver's license, insurance information, and vehicle registration. Appellant advised Officer Lowden that he could not produce his driver's license because it was suspended. Camp was also unable to produce a driver's license.

Officer Lowden returned to his patrol vehicle, where he confirmed that Appellant's driver's license was suspended and learned that Appellant had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Officer Lowden then called the North Versailles Police Department for backup. When two North Versailles police cars arrived, Appellant fled in the vehicle, driving over the curb and sidewalk. A high-speed chase ensued, with Appellant heading toward an intersection at speeds approaching 100 miles per hour. Appellant weaved in and out of traffic without slowing or stopping, travelled in the opposite lane of traffic at times, and sped past a stopped police vehicle. Appellant eventually crashed the Hyundai into two vehicles at the intersection. One of the vehicles was a Ford Fusion sedan containing David Bianco (Bianco), Kaylie Meininger (Meininger), and their two-year-old daughter (Child). The force of the impact knocked the Ford Fusion into the air, causing it to collide with a utility pole and almost immediately thereafter explode into flames, killing all three occupants of the Ford Fusion instantly.

Based on the foregoing, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth) charged Appellant with, inter alia , three counts of third-degree murder. The Commonwealth charged Appellant with these offenses in the same Criminal Information, with Counts 1, 2, and 3 relating to the deaths of Bianco, Meininger, and Child, respectively. The matter proceeded to a jury trial, following which the jury convicted Appellant of all three murder offenses and several others. The Commonwealth then filed a notice of intent to proceed under Section 9715(a) of the Sentencing Code. The Commonwealth specifically took the position that the mandatory sentencing enhancement applied to Appellant for the murders of Meininger and Child at Counts 2 and 3 of the Criminal Information because, at the time of his sentencing on those counts, he would have a prior conviction for murder at Count 1 of the Criminal Information relating to Bianco. Appellant opposed the application of Section 9715 at sentencing. The sentencing court ultimately sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 70 to 140 years of incarceration. Pertinently, the sentencing court declined to apply the sentencing enhancement and instead imposed consecutive terms of 20 to 40 years of incarceration for each of Appellant's third-degree murder convictions.

Both parties appealed to the Superior Court. Relevant here, the Commonwealth claimed that the sentencing court erred and imposed an illegal sentence by refusing to apply the sentencing enhancement set forth in Section 9715(a) of the Sentencing Code. In its opinion issued pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a), the sentencing court opined that Section 9715(a) was a recidivist sentencing statute and that Appellant was not a recidivist because, while Appellant had been convicted of three counts of criminal homicide, he had never "previously" committed criminal homicide. (Sentencing Ct. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Op., 6/19/2020, at 26-27, 29.) The sentencing court added that it was "illogical" and "ludicrous" to apply the sentencing enhancement to Appellant under the circumstances, that the purpose of Section 9715 was "not served by engaging in grammatical chicanery," and that "the fair and proper interpretation [of Section 9715 ] was that it was not applicable to [Appellant's] case." (Id. at 27, 29-30.)

Notably, the sentencing court rendered its decision in the face of Superior Court precedent that applied the sentencing enhancement under arguably similar circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Morris , 958 A.2d 569 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc), appeal denied , 605 Pa. 711, 991 A.2d 311 (2010) ; Commonwealth v. Thompson , 106 A.3d 742 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied , 635 Pa. 743, 134 A.3d 56 (2016), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 106, 196 L.Ed.2d 87 (2016). In Morris , the defendant was charged with four counts of murder following the suspicious sudden deaths of his four children—a five-month-old daughter and an 18-month-old daughter in June of 1995, a 27-day-old son in October of 2002, and an infant son in September of 2003. Morris , 958 A.2d at 572-75. A jury convicted the defendant of two counts of third-degree murder in connection with the death of his 27-day-old son in October of 2002 and the death of his infant son in September of 2003, but it acquitted the defendant of the remaining charges. Id. at 575. The lower court sentenced the defendant to 20 to 40 years of incarceration for the third-degree murder conviction relative to the death of his 27-day-old son in October of 2002. Id. The lower court then applied the mandatory sentencing enhancement set forth in Section 9715(a) of the Sentencing Code and sentenced the defendant to a mandatory life sentence for the third-degree murder conviction relative to the death of his infant son in September of 2003. Id.

Following the lower court's denial of his motion to reconsider his sentence, the defendant appealed to the Superior Court, arguing that the lower court "misconstrued and imposed an illegal sentence under [ Section 9715 ] when it sentenced him to a mandatory term of life in prison" for the murder of his infant son in September of 2003. Id. at 575, 577. Upon review, the Superior Court affirmed, concluding that, "based upon the clear language of [S]ection 9715, ... the [lower] court did not commit legal error in using [the defendant's] first conviction for [the] murder [of his 27-day-old son in October of 2002] to enhance the sentence for [the defendant's] conviction for [the] murder [of his infant son in September of 2003], even though the two murders were tried and sentenced together" under one multiple-count criminal complaint. Id. at 580. In so doing, the Superior Court reasoned that "[S]ection 9715 is explicitly and unambiguously written" and "the plain language [thereof] specifies that the timing of the primary conviction is not relevant as long as the defendant had been convicted of the initial murder ... at the time of sentencing on the second murder." Id. at 579. The Superior Court further reasoned:

[S]ection 9715 only requires the [lower] court to determine, at the time of sentencing, whether the defendant previously has been convicted of murder ... at any time, and whether this initial conviction may be used to enhance the sentence on the second conviction. The legislature did not include a requirement in [S]ection 9715 that the previous conviction must antedate the commission of the second offense for which a defendant is being sentenced or that the crimes must have been tried and sentenced separately. We note that if the legislature intended such a result, it would have inserted such language in the statute.

Id. at 580 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).¹

In Thompson , the defendant fled the scene of an attempted traffic stop in a vehicle at a very high rate of speed, failed to stop the vehicle at a red light, and struck with his vehicle two young boys who had been crossing the street in a crosswalk, thereby killing both. Thompson , 106 A.3d at 748. In connection therewith, a jury convicted the defendant of, inter alia , two counts of third-degree murder. Id. Prior to sentencing, the Commonwealth filed a notice of intent to proceed under Section 9715 of the Sentencing Code. Id. At the time of sentencing, the lower court sentenced the defendant to 20 to 40 years of incarceration for the first count of third-degree murder and a mandatory term of life imprisonment for the second...