Commonwealth v. Coolidge
| Decision Date | 27 January 1880 |
| Citation | 128 Mass. 55 |
| Parties | Commonwealth v. Henry W. Coolidge |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Argued September 16, 1879
Franklin Indictment on the Gen. Sts. c. 160, § 28, charging the defendant with maliciously threatening Ralph H. Chapin to accuse him of having committed the crime of larceny, by sending him a written communication of the tenor following with intent thereby to extort money from said Ralph H. Chapin.
At the trial in the Superior Court, before Pitman, J., the jury returned a verdict of guilty; and the defendant alleged exceptions, the substance of which appears in the opinion.
Exceptions Overruled.
C. C Conant, for the defendant.
G Marston, Attorney General, for the Commonwealth.
OPINION
In the trial of causes, civil or criminal, it is not the right of a party to have an instruction in law given simply because the instruction asked is right as an abstract proposition of law; and it is not the duty of a presiding judge to give any instruction which is not called for by the evidence in the case. It is true that whether the instruction asked is called for by the state of the evidence is itself a question of law, upon which the party has the right of revision by the ultimate tribunal.
Upon the trial in this case, the defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that they must find, in order to convict the defendant:
In order to determine whether the judge properly refused to give these instructions, or improperly gave the instructions which he substituted for them, it is necessary to see what was the charge against the defendant, and what was the state of the evidence when such instructions were asked.
The defendant was charged with a violation of the Gen. Sts. c. 160, § 28, which is in these words: "Whoever, either verbally or by a written or printed communication, maliciously threatens to accuse another of any crime or offence, or by such communication maliciously threatens an injury to the person or property of another, with intent thereby to extort money or any pecuniary advantage whatever, or with intent to compel the person so threatened to do any act against his will, shall be punished," &c.
The evidence tended to show that the defendant was the owner of a field of buckwheat ready for harvest, and made an arrangement with Chapin to assist him in harvesting it; and that the payment for his services was to be made by a portion of the buckwheat. What that portion was to be was a subject of dispute between the parties. The defendant had taken a portion of the crop when Chapin went and took a portion which the defendant contended was much more than he had the right to take, and that it was taken without his knowledge; and it is proper to be presumed in behalf of the defendant, that, in consequence of such taking, the letter was written. Upon this condition of the indictment and the evidence several questions arise:
First. Was it proper to allege the intent to be to extort money from the said Chapin?
Second. Upon such state of pleading and evidence, ought the requests of the defendant for instructions to have been granted? and
Third. Were the instructions actually given appropriate to the case as it was developed upon the trial?
In reference to the first of these propositions, it will be observed that the statute has various alternatives in reference to the purpose or intent with which the threat is made. The intent may be, either "to extort money," or "any pecuniary advantage whatever," or "to compel the person so threatened to do any act against his will."
It is not necessary in the indictment to allege more than one of these purposes. It may be that the same act may involve more than one of them; but it is necessary to allege only one intent, if that intent is proved, and all the other facts necessary to constitute the crime are established. In this case, the intent alleged is to extort money, and that fact must be proved; and this leads to the inquiry into the meaning of the Legislature in the use of the phrase, "to extort money." It is...
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Attorney Gen. v. Pelletier
...He had no shadow of right to threaten criminal prosecution in order to bring about the settlement of civil claims. Commonwealth v. Coolidge, 128 Mass. 55,G. L. c. 265, § 25. 9. It is charged in paragraph 30 of the information that-- The respondent, ‘having sufficient evidence in his possess......
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Com. v. Cohen
...person" (emphasis added). In the context of the entire instruction, the judge correctly stated the law. Cf. Commonwealth v. Coolidge, 128 Mass. 55, 59-60 (1880) (no error in instruction that "threat, made by one whose goods had been stolen, that he would prosecute the supposed thief ... cou......
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Com. v. Cohen
...person" (emphasis added). In the context of the entire instruction, the judge correctly stated the law. Cf. Commonwealth v. Coolidge, 128 Mass. 55, 59-60 (1880) (no error in instruction that "threat, made by one whose goods had been stolen, that he would prosecute the supposed thief ... cou......
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Commonwealth v. Snow
...verdict on this branch of the case was denied rightly. This conclusion is more or less directly supported by authority. Commonwealth v. Coolidge, 128 Mass. 55, 57;Commonwealth v. Corcoran, 252 Mass. 465, 483, 148 N. E. 123;People v. Thompson, 97 N. Y. 313. At the close of the evidence the j......