Commonwealth v. Copenhaver
| Decision Date | 02 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 383 MDA 2018,383 MDA 2018 |
| Citation | 238 A.3d 509 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Victor Lee COPENHAVER, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Sean A. Mott, Public Defender, Gettysburg, for appellant.
Brian R. Sinnett, District Attorney, Gettysburg, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Daniel S. Topper, Assistant District Attorney, Gettysburg, for Commonwealth, appellee.
This case is before us on remand from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Copenhaver , ––– Pa. ––––, 229 A.3d 242 (2020). Victor Lee Copenhaver (Appellant) has appealed the judgment of sentence imposed after the trial court convicted him of two counts of driving under the influence of alcohol and a controlled substance (DUI), possession of a small amount of marijuana, and three summary violations of the Vehicle Code. Appellant challenges, inter alia , the denial of his suppression motion. With the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision, we vacate Appellant's judgment of sentence, reverse the order denying suppression, and remand to the trial court.
We previously summarized the underlying facts:
On August 31, 2015, Adams County Deputy Sheriff Timothy Beall initiated a traffic stop of Appellant's vehicle because it had an expired registration. ... At trial, Deputy Beall testified that after he stopped Appellant's vehicle, he asked Appellant to produce his license, registration, and insurance information. Appellant flailed his hands in the air and stated that he didn't have a license and was suspended. While speaking with Appellant, Sheriff Deputy Beall observed an odor of alcohol and marijuana emanating from the passenger compartment of the vehicle. Sheriff Beall noticed that Appellant had bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. Sheriff Deputy Beall asked Appellant to exit the vehicle. Appellant complied and stated, "I have a bowl in my pocket." Sheriff Deputy Beall took the smoking device out of Appellant's pocket. In addition, Sheriff Deputy Beall recovered suspected marijuana from the glove box in Appellant's vehicle. Sheriff Deputy Beall advised Appellant that he was going to conduct Standard Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs) and then led Appellant to a flat, well-lighted area. Appellant showed signs of impairment and stated that he could not complete the SFSTs. For Appellant's safety, Sheriff Deputy Beall concluded the SFSTs. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Sheriff Deputy Beall suspected that Appellant was under the influence of drugs, alcohol, or a combination of both. Sheriff Deputy Beall took Appellant into custody.
Commonwealth v. Copenhaver , 200 A.3d 956 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted), appeal granted , 215 A.3d 970 (Pa. 2019), and vacated , ––– Pa. ––––, 229 A.3d 242 (2020).
The Commonwealth charged Appellant with DUI and other offenses. In response, Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion asking the trial court to suppress evidence from the vehicle stop on the basis that Appellant had not breached the peace, and therefore Deputy Beall lacked authority to enforce the Vehicle Code. Appellant's Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 12/31/15, at 1 (unnumbered).
At the suppression hearing, in lieu of testimony, the parties stipulated to facts, which the trial court memorialized in a pre-trial order.1 See Pre-Trial Order, 1/12/16, at 1-2. On March 11, 2016, the court entered an order denying Appellant's suppression motion.
Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted Appellant of DUI and other offenses, and sentenced him to 72 hours to six months of partial incarceration. Appellant timely appealed to this Court, again arguing that the court erred in denying his suppression motion "because operating a vehicle with an expired registration sticker does not by itself constitute a breach of the peace." Copenhaver , 229 A.3d at 244.
Based on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holdings in Commonwealth v. Leet , 537 Pa. 89, 641 A.2d 299 (1994) and Commonwealth v. Marconi , 619 Pa. 401, 64 A.3d 1036 (2013), we could not conclude that an expired registration sticker fell outside the type of Vehicle Code violation that constituted a breach of the peace. We explained:
Although "sheriffs and their deputies are not ‘police officers’ under the Vehicle Code," Marconi , 64 A.3d at 1041, in Leet , our Supreme Court held "that the common law powers of the sheriff include the power to enforce the motor vehicle code, and that such powers have not been abrogated by statute or otherwise." Leet , 641 A.2d at 301. The Supreme Court stated: "a sheriff (and his deputies) may make arrests for motor vehicle violations which amount to breaches of the peace committed in their presence," where the sheriff or deputy has "complete[d] the same type of training that is required of police officers throughout the Commonwealth." Id. at 303. Notably, the Supreme Court in Leet did not identify violations which would amount to "breaches of the peace." See Marconi , 64 A.3d at 1049 n.5 () (emphasis added).
Copenhaver , 200 A.3d at 961. We continued, "Given this guidance—where we determined that driving while under suspension is a breach of the peace—we cannot say in Appellant's case that driving with an expired registration is not." Id. at 963. Accordingly, we discerned no error in the trial court's denial of Appellant's suppression motion.2
Appellant petitioned for allowance of appeal. On June 27, 2019, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition. The Supreme Court phrased the issue as follows:
Did the Superior Court err in finding that an expired vehicle registration tag constitutes a "breach of the peace", thus granting sheriffs and citizens a common law power to arrest on that basis alone?
Commonwealth v. Copenhaver , 215 A.3d 970 (Pa. 2019) (per curiam ).
On April 22, 2020, the Supreme Court issued its decision finding in Appellant's favor. The Court opined:
[F]or purposes of a deputy sheriff's common law authority to enforce the Vehicle Code — a breach of the peace arises from an act or circumstance that causes harm to persons or property, or has a reasonable potential to cause such harm, or otherwise to provoke violence, danger, or disruption to public order.
Applying the above definition to Deputy Beall's common law authority to stop Appellant for violating the Vehicle Code, the Supreme Court continued:
In our view, operating a vehicle with an expired registration sticker does not fit within that description, as it is not a violent or dangerous action, nor is it likely to lead to public disorder. Indeed, to the contrary, a vehicle's registration tag expires with the passage of time, and, as such, the expiration is passive in nature (although there may be intentionality or knowledge with regard to the decision to drive with an expired registration). Driving a vehicle with such a sticker, moreover, does not tend to incite violence, disorder, public or private insecurity, or the like. That being the case, we conclude that driving a vehicle with an expired registration does not entail a breach of the peace.
Consistent with the foregoing, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed our previous decision, "insofar as it held that operating a vehicle with an expired registration tag involved a breach of the peace, thus alone authorizing the deputy to stop Appellant's vehicle." Id. at 247. Because we did not "proceed to consider other relevant questions, such as whether the parties' factual stipulation should be read as indicating that the officer's understanding that the registration sticker was associated with a different vehicle arose in the pre-stop timeframe — consistent with the Commonwealth's position throughout this litigation," the Supreme Court instructed us to resolve these issues on remand.3 Id. Accordingly, we revisit whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's suppression motion.
It bears repeating that:
When we review the ruling of a suppression court we must determine whether the factual findings are supported by the record. When it is a defendant who has appealed, we must consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted. Assuming that there is support in the record, we are bound by the facts as are found and we may reverse the suppression court only if the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are in error.
Commonwealth v. Hicks , ––– Pa. ––––, 208 A.3d 916, 925 (2019) (citation omitted). "[O]ur scope of review from a suppression ruling is limited to the evidentiary record that was created at the suppression hearing." Commonwealth v. Rapak , 138 A.3d 666, 670 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citing In re L.J. , 622 Pa. 126, 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (2013) ).
As we stated previously, Appellant argues he "was deprived of his Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 guarantees when the trial court failed to suppress evidence that was obtained as the result of an illegal stop and search." Copenhaver , 200 A.3d at 960 (citation omitted). Now, after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has expressly held that Appellant's expired registration does not entail a breach of the peace, we determine whether Deputy Beall had a legal basis for initiating the traffic stop.
It is well settled that police officers may initiate a traffic stop when they have probable cause that a violation of the Vehicle Code has occurred. Commonwealth v. Brown , 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied , 79 A.3d 1096 (Pa. 2013). Although "sheriffs and their deputies are not ‘police officers’ under the Vehicle Code," Marconi , 64 A.3d at 1041, the Supreme Court held that ...
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...from a suppression ruling is limited to the evidentiary record that was created at the suppression hearing." Commonwealth v. Copenhaver , 238 A.3d 509, 513 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. Rapak , 138 A.3d 666, 670 (Pa. Super. 2016) (alteration and additional citation omitted)). A......
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