Commonwealth v. Coyne

• Decision Date: 20 October 1917
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. COYNE et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

228 Mass. 269

117 N.E. 337

COMMONWEALTH

v.COYNE et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Oct. 20, 1917.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Worcester County; George A. Sanderson, Judge.

Thomas P. Coyne and another were jointly indicted for breaking and entering a dwelling house of another, and from certain rulings of the court bring exceptions. Exceptions overruled.

Edwd. T. Esty. Dist. Atty., and Geo. R. Stobbs, Asst. Dist. Atty., both of Worcester, for the Commonwealth.

Daniel J. McNerney, of Fall River, M. Fred O'Connell, of Fitchburg, and Jas. M. Hoy, of Boston, for defendants.

RUGG, C. J.

The defendants were indicted jointly for breaking and entering the dwelling house of one Wallace in the nighttime with the intent to commit larceny, and the larceny therein of divers articles of jewelry and precious stones of an aggregate value of about $5,000. There was evidence tending to show that the defendants committed the crime.

[1] After the defendants had introduced some evidence the court, at the request of the district attorney, permitted him to reopen the case and introduce further evidence in support of the charge in the indictment. The conduct of the trial and the order of the introduction of evidence ordinarily is within the discretion of the trial judge. There is nothing to indicate an abuse of such discretion.

[2] The evidence thus introduced out of order was to the effect:

That when arrested the defendant Coyne had in his possession $350 in money; ‘one New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company 500-mile ticket, containing 156 miles, stamped, ‘Bridgeport, Conn., Oct. 20, 1916;’ one platinum ring set with three diamonds, stated by the defendant to be worth $1,000, but he declined to tell where he got it; one diamond stick pin set in platinum, stated by the defendant to be worth $500; one gold-handled knife attached to a 14? gold and platinum link chain, stated by him to be worth together $45; one gold stud button set with a diamond, stated by him to be worth $20; one gold collar button, stated by him to be worth $10; one small gold stick pin set with a diamond, stated by him to be worth $20; one gold locket set with a diamond, attached to a gold chain, both stated by him to be worth $20; one pearl-handled knife, stated by him to be worth $4; one open-faced gold Elgin watch with the monogram ‘T. P. C.’ on the case, stated by him to be worth $40; one pair gold cuff links, stated by him to be worth $20; one black leather traveling bag containing various articles of clothing; * * * and that the defendant Farrell had in his possession money amounting to about $117; one New York, New Haven & Harford Railroad Company 500-mile ticket, containing 3 miles, stamped, ‘Stamford, Conn., Oct. 9, 1916;’ one Elgin gold watch, stated by the defendant Farrell to be worth $28; one gold ring set with a diamond, stated by him to be worth $425; one platinum watch chain. 14? long, stated by him to be worth $50; one crown stick pin set with diamonds and sapphire, stated by him to be worth $65; one pair pearl cuff links with diamond, stated by him to be worth $15; one gold stud with diamond stated by him to be worth $20; one gold-handled knife set with two small diamonds with the initials ‘M. F.’ engraved on handle, stated by him to be worth $10; and one black leather traveling bag containing the pair of shoes, clothing and other articles. It was admitted by the commonwealth that none of the specific articles taken from the Wallace residence were found in the possession of the defendants, or of any one else connected with the defendants.'

The defendants objected to this evidence unless it could be shown:

That these articles ‘had some connection with, or relation to, the breaking and entering of and larceny in the Wallace residence, or could be identified as property stolen from the Wallace residence.’

No other ground of objection appears then to have been suggested. It is manifest that this ground of objection is not sound. The possession of property of considerable value, whether jewels or money, although not identified as a part of the property stolen, is...