Commonwealth v. Crawford

• Decision Date: 18 May 2021
• Docket Number: No. 855 MDA 2020, No. 854 MDA 2020,No. 853 MDA 2020,853 MDA 2020
• Citation: 254 A.3d 769
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Christopher Michael CRAWFORD, Appellant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Christopher Crawford, Appellant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Christopher Crawford, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

254 A.3d 769

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Christopher Michael CRAWFORD, Appellant

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

v.Christopher Crawford, Appellant

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

v.Christopher Crawford, Appellant

No. 853 MDA 2020

No. 854 MDA 2020

No. 855 MDA 2020

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted March 29, 2021

Filed May 18, 2021

Reargument Dismissed June 7, 2021

Donna M. DeVita, Public Defender, Scranton, for appellant.

Lisa A. Swift, Assistant District Attorney, Scranton, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.^*

OPINION BY PELLEGRINI, J.:

Christopher Michael Crawford (Crawford) appeals the judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County (trial court) following a bench trial on numerous fraud-related charges in three consolidated cases. Essentially, he was found guilty of lying about his status as a military veteran in order to join and defraud a post of the American Legion. Crawford was sentenced to a prison term of 6 to 12 years, followed by four years of probation. He now argues that the offense of misrepresenting veteran status is unconstitutional, that the evidence as to all of his convictions is legally insufficient, and that his sentence was overly harsh and excessive as to all counts. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for resentencing.

I.

The underlying record facts are not in dispute. Crawford enlisted with the United States Army in 2007. Within three months of his enlistment, Crawford had gone AWOL from boot camp and was classified as a deserter without having completed his training.

Crawford surrendered himself to military authorities on November 9, 2007, and was discharged on other than honorable conditions at that time. According to the discharge papers that Crawford signed, the lack of an honorable discharge meant that he could be deprived of "rights and benefits as a veteran under both federal and state law." The testimony of the Director of Veterans Affairs in Lackawanna County (David Eisele) established that these discharge conditions would relegate Crawford to the status of a civilian who would not be entitled to join any American Legion posts. (See Trial Transcript, 2/25/2020, at p. 23) (a.m. session).

Nevertheless, some time after his discharge, Crawford managed to join an American Legion post in Pittsburgh. In 2018, after moving to Lackawanna County, Crawford set out to join Post 568. He spoke with the Post's Sergeant at Arms and canteen manager, Robert Kerrigan (Kerrigan), about membership.

At trial, Kerrigan recalled that Crawford made several representations about his past military experience during those conversations. Id . at pp. 28-34 (p.m. session). He falsely told Kerrigan that he was a veteran of the Iraq War and that he had received a Purple Heart for sustaining a brain injury

from an explosive device. Crawford also regularly wore a cap affixed with badges and pins which are only conferred upon military veterans for exploits that Crawford had never achieved. These unearned decorations included a Combat Infantryman Badge¹ and a 10th Mountain Division pin.²

Due to his past membership in the Pittsburgh post, Crawford's background check for Post 568 was abridged and he was made a member. Soon thereafter, he was promoted to its executive committee which, among other things, controlled the Post's finances and proceeds from its canteen. Crawford was elevated to the administrative position of adjutant and finance officer in part because he was very familiar with the Post's regulations and he had promised to help recruit younger members.

Between March and August of 2019, Crawford obtained debit cards linked to the bank account of Post 568. They were used to make purchases and withdrawals totaling over $17,000 for purposes that did not at all relate to the Post. For example, some of the charges on the debit cards included payments for bars, hotels, restaurants, casinos and flights to Florida.

Three members of Post 568 testified that Crawford did not produce receipts for these charges as was required when incurring any expenses on behalf of the Post. Further, these witnesses testified that the subject expenditures were not authorized or approved by the rest of the Post's executive committee. Post 568 had never even used debit cards to conduct its business until Crawford successfully pitched the idea.

At the conclusion of the bench trial, Crawford was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 6 to 12 years, followed by 4 years of probation.³ The sentence as to each of the three cases is as follows:

• 19-CR-2126: receiving stolen property (2.5 to 5 years), access device fraud (2.5 years on one count, and 2 years of probation on each of other two counts), theft by unlawful taking (2 years of probation, consecutive to other counts)

• 19-CR-2127: receiving stolen property (2.5 to 5 years, consecutive to 19-CR-2126), access device fraud (2.5 years on one count, and 2 years of probation on each of other two counts), theft by unlawful taking (2 years of probation, consecutive to other counts)

• 20-CR-254: misrepresentation of status as member or veteran of military (6-12 months, consecutive to other sentences), misrepresentation of decoration or medal (6 to 12 months, consecutive to other sentences).

Crawford filed post-sentence motions,⁴ all of which were denied. He then timely appealed in compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925 and the trial court issued a 1925(a) opinion. In his appellate brief, Crawford asserts six main issues, some of which contain several sub-issues within them:

(1) Whether [Crawford] is entitled to acquittal as 18 Pa.C.S. § 6701(b) is unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 9, of the Pennsylvania Constitution since the statutory language: (a) does not specify a precise mens rea or actus reus to provide notice to persons of Common understanding as to the proscribed conduct, (b) as written invites the Commonwealth to engage in arbitrary enforcement ... on an ad hoc and subjective basis, (c) is vague and no person of ordinary understanding would be able to determine the meaning of the status of "veteran" as necessary under this statute[.]

2. Whether [Crawford] is entitled to acquittal as 18 Pa.C.S. § 6701(b) unconstitutionally violates the right to freedom of speech as protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution since the language of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6701(b), as written, invites the Commonwealth to suppress constitutionally protected speech.

3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Crawford] was guilty of access device fraud, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, misrepresentation of member or veteran of military, and misrepresentation of decoration or medal.

4. Whether the verdicts on the charges of access device fraud, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, misrepresentation of member or veteran of military, and misrepresentation of decoration or medal were against the weight of the evidence.

5. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to order that the sentences for receiving stolen property and for theft by unlawful taking merge.

6. Whether the trial court imposed harsh and excessive aggregate sentences on all charges.

Appellant's Brief, at 5.

II.

We address Crawford's first two claims together, as they both turn on the constitutionality of Section 6701(b), which criminalizes the misrepresentation about one's past military service with the intent to profit from the falsehood. Crawford first argues that Section 6701(b)(1) of the statute is vague because it does not clearly define who qualifies as a military "veteran." He then argues that Section 6701(b)(2) of the statute is overbroad because it criminalizes speech protected by the First Amendment. We find no merit in either claim.

A.

Before evaluating Crawford's two constitutional challenges, it is necessary for us to review the terms of Section 6701(b), categorize the precise types of claims that Crawford is making, and then identify the standards that must be used to ascertain the statute's validity.

From the plain terms of Section 6701(b), the statute's purpose is to make it illegal to profit by touting a bogus military record. Subsection (b)(1) concerns misrepresentations as to being a veteran and subsection (b)(2) concerns misrepresentations as to being awarded decorations or medals by the armed forces:

(b) Misrepresentation of military service or honors.

A person commits a misdemeanor of the third degree if, with intent to obtain money, property or other benefit, the person fraudulently holds himself out to be any of the following:

(1) A member or veteran of any branch of the armed forces of the United States or of any of the several states.

(2) The recipient of any decoration or medal authorized by the Congress of the United States for the armed forces of the United States or any of the service medals or any decoration awarded to members of the armed forces of the United States or of any of the several states.

18 Pa.C.S. § 6701(b).

Like all enacted statutes, Section 6701(b) is afforded a presumption of validity.

Commonwealth v. Mayfield , 574 Pa. 460, 832 A.2d 418, 421 (2003) ; Commonwealth v. Barud , 545 Pa. 297, 681 A.2d 162, 165 (1996). "[W]e presume ‘the General Assembly does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or of this Commonwealth.’ " Mayfield , 832 A.2d at 421 (quoting 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(3) ). A statute will only be struck down if it "palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution; all doubts are to be resolved in favor of a finding of constitutionality." Mayfield , 832 A.2d at 421.

To comport with the right to due process, statutes need only be clear enough to make the prohibited conduct reasonably understood. See Commonwealth v. Magliocco, 584 Pa. 244, 883 A.2d 479, 487 (...