Commonwealth v. Di Stasio

• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Citation: 298 Mass. 562,11 N.E.2d 799
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. ANTHONY DISTASIO.
• Decision Date: 01 December 1937

298 Mass. 562

11 N.E.2d 799

COMMONWEALTH
v.
ANTHONY DISTASIO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

December 1, 1937

November 8, 1937.

Present: FIELD, DONAHUE, LUMMUS, QUA, & DOLAN, JJ.

Practice, Criminal, Verdict, Appeal with assignments of error. Accessory. Res Judicata. Evidence, Presumptions and burden of proof.

The sentence to be imposed upon an accessory before the fact to "murder" depended upon the degree of murder of which the principal was guilty.

The requirement of G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 265, Section 1, that the degree of murder shall be found by the jury, does not apply at the trial of an indictment as accessory before the fact to murder.

The defendant at the trial of an indictment as accessory before the fact to a felony is not bound by a previous conviction of the principal, and the

Commonwealth has the burden of proving the commission of the felony. [298 Mass. 563]

In reviewing sentence of death imposed after an unqualified verdict of

"guilty" upon an indictment charging that the defendant was accessory before the fact to "murder," this court, upon examination of the transcript sent up with a previous appeal in the case, determined that the only issue tried and submitted to the jury had been the defendant's guilt or innocence of being accessory before the fact to murder in the first degree, and affirmed the sentence.

INDICTMENT, found and returned to the Superior Court on May 10, 1935. Following rescript ordering judgment on the verdict, 297 Mass. 347 , a motion for new trial was denied and sentence of death was imposed by Dowd, J. The defendant filed an appeal with assignments of error.

W. R. Scharton, for the defendant. W. J. McCluskey, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

LUMMUS, J. One Frank DiStasio was convicted of murder in the first degree in causing the death of Daniel Crowley on May 6, 1935. Judgment on the verdict was ordered on April 7, 1936. Commonwealth v. DiStasio, 294 Mass. 273. An indictment was found against his son Anthony, the present defendant, which charged that "Frank DiStasio . . . did assault and beat Daniel Crowley with intent to kill and murder him and by such assault and beating, did kill and murder said Daniel Crowley. That Anthony DiStasio before the said felony was committed, did incite, procure, aid, counsel, hire or command the said Frank DiStasio the said felony to do and commit." No objection was taken to the use of the disjunctive "or" in the indictment (Commonwealth v. McKnight, 283 Mass. 35 , 38) which followed the form under G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 277, Section 79. But see Commonwealth v. Min Sing, 202 Mass. 121 , 132, where the original papers show that the word "and" was used. On June 2, 1936, the jury rendered a general verdict of guilty, without addition or qualification, upon that indictment. On appeal, we found no error, and on May 27, 1937, ordered judgment on that verdict. Commonwealth v. DiStasio, 297 Mass. 347 . The question now raised concerns the judgment or sentence on that verdict. [298 Mass. 564]

G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 274, Section 2, provides: "Whoever aids in the commission of a felony, or is accessory thereto before the fact by counselling, hiring or otherwise procuring such felony to be committed, shall be punished in the manner provided for the punishment of the principal felon." See also 3. Ever since St. 1858, c. 154, murder, which previously had been invariably punishable by death, has been divided into two degrees, only one of which is punishable by death. G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 265, Section 1, provides: "Murder committed with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, or with extreme atrocity or cruelty, or in the commission or attempted commission of a crime punishable with death or imprisonment for life, is murder in the first degree. Murder which does not appear to be in the first degree is murder in the second degree. . . . The degree of murder shall be found by the jury." Section 2 provides: "Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer the punishment of death, and whoever is guilty of murder in the second degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life." These statutes do not create two separate and distinct crimes, murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree, which must be pleaded accordingly. "The legislature manifestly considers murder as one kind or species of crime, the punishment of which may be more or less severe according to certain aggravating circumstances, which may appear on the trial." Commonwealth v. Gardner, 11 Gray, 438, 444. Commonwealth v. Desmarteau, 16 Gray, 1, 15, 16. Green v. Commonwealth, 12 Allen, 155, 170-174. An indictment for murder may, it is true, charge the degree of the crime; but the usual practice is to charge murder simply, and leave the degree to be stated by the jury in their verdict. Commonwealth v. Ibrahim, 184 Mass. 255 . Commonwealth v. Scicchitani, 240 Mass. 402 . It is evident from this recital of the relevant statutes, that the sentence which may and must be imposed upon the present defendant, Anthony DiStasio, depends upon the degree of the murder committed by his father, Frank DiStasio.

Has the degree of the murder committed by Frank [298 Mass. 565]

DiStasio been lawfully determined for the purpose of imposing sentence upon Anthony DiStasio? This question was not presented by any of the assignments of error upon the earlier appeal, and therefore was not considered or decided in our former opinion. The jury did not find expressly that the crime of Frank DiStasio was murder in the first degree rather than murder in the second degree. It would have been better practice to take from the jury an express finding as to the degree of murder of which Frank DiStasio was guilty. But the statutory requirement that "The degree of murder shall be found by the jury" does not by its terms apply in a trial for a crime other than murder. State v. Buzzell, 59 N.H. 65, 69. Fuerst v. State, 115 Tenn. 357. Wallace v. State, 180 Ark. 627, 632. The judge, on July 7, 1937, imposed sentence of death upon the present defendant, and that sentence could be warranted only upon the theory that the crime of Frank DiStasio had been established as murder in the first degree. The defendant had seasonably raised the question whether such a sentence, or any sentence, could lawfully be imposed upon the verdict, by making a motion for a new trial, and excepting to its denial, and also by excepting to the action of the judge in proceeding to impose sentence. The case comes here upon the defendant's appeal, with a summary of the record, a transcript of the evidence, and an assignment of errors, all in accordance with G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 278, Sections 33A-33G. Although in form there are two assignments of error, the only question raised is the one stated at the beginning of this paragraph.

The Commonwealth contends that the defendant has been found to be accessory before the fact to whatever degree of murder Frank DiStasio committed, and that to determine the degree we have only to look at the judgment rendered against the latter. But an accessory is not bound by the verdict or judgment against the principal. An accessory by our statute may now be tried before the principal. G.L. (Ter. Ed.)...