Commonwealth v. Dooley
| Decision Date | 19 September 1973 |
| Citation | 225 Pa.Super. 454,310 A.2d 690 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Charles DOOLEY. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Robert W. Duggan, Dist. Atty., Robert L Eberhardt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Pittsburgh, for appellant.
John J. Dean, John R. Cook, Asst. Defender, Pittsburgh, for appellee.
Before WRIGHT, P.J., and WATKINS, JACOBS HOFFMAN, SPAULDING, CERCONE and SPAETH, JJ.
The appellee Charles Dooley was tried before the Honorable Albert A. Fiok and a jury on an indictment charging the arson felony murder of Mrs. Martha Day. After a three day trial, the jury returned a general verdict of acquittal. Subsequently, the Commonwealth proposed to try him on an indictment charging the arson of the building in which Mrs. Day died. The appellee moved to dismiss this indictment alleging that the trial was barred by his felony murder acquittal. Without disposition of this motion, the court ordered the appellee to trial which resulted in an arson conviction. Subsequently, a motion in arrest of judgment was filed alleging that the arson trial was in violation of his Fifth Amendment protection against being twice placed in jeopardy. A court En banc arrested judgment on the basis of Commonwealth v DeVaughn, 221 Pa.Super. 410, 292 A.2d 444 (1972). This appeal by the Commonwealth followed.
In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), the United States Supreme Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. That doctrine 'means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.' 397 U.S. at 443, 90 S.Ct. at 1194. In applying this doctrine, the Court stated that 397 U.S. at 444, 90 S.Ct. at 1194. With this test in mind, this court must determine 'whether the jury in (appellee's) first trial for felonious homicide could have rationally grounded its verdict of acquittal on any other issue than (appellee's) non-participation in the (arson).' Commonwealth v. DeVaughn, 221 Pa.Super. 410, 413, 292 A.2d 444, 447 (1972).
The Commonwealth argues that the jury in the felony murder trial was faced with two ultimate issues, viz, whether appellant set fire to the building, and whether the decedent died as a result of that fire. The Commonwealth then argues that the jury could have found that Mrs. Day did not die as a result of the fire, and that, therefore, the issue of appellee's participation in the arson was not finally litigated so as to preclude a trial for the arson. To so argue is to merely state the difficult question [1] which this court must determine from a careful and searching examination of the record of the prior proceeding, keeping in mind that '(t)he 'twice put in jeopardy' language of the Constitution . . . relates to a Potential, i.e. the Risk that an accused for a second time will be convicted of the 'same offense' for which he was initially tried (and acquitted).' Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326, 90 S.Ct. 1757, 1759, 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970). (emphasis added).
Explicit in our decision in DeVaughn is a presumption that the jury in the first trial acted rationally in reaching its verdict of acquittal. Applying this presumption to the instant case, it is inconceivable that a Rational jury in the first trial grounded its verdict of acquittal upon a finding that decedent did not die as a result of the fire.
The evidence showed that Mrs. Day died from severe cerebral injuries. These injuries were the result of being struck by a flat object with sharp edges. The evidence further showed that when ignited, the accelerant (gasoline) used by the arsonist exploded. As a result of this explosion, the door to the decedent's apartment was violently blown off the hinges into the apartment in the general area where decedent was later found. Blood stains, which were never analyzed, were found on the edge of the door. [2] The Commonwealth's expert testified that the decedent's wounds were perfectly consistent with being struck by the door. This was the Commonwealth's theory of causation and the Only evidence adduced as to causation was directed to proving this theory. In his extensive charge to the jury [3] the trial judge mentioned the issue of causation only once, and then, only briefly. Indeed, in an opinion [4] filed November 4, 1970, the trial judge stated convincingly that in his opinion, '(T) he evidence of the Commonwealth at the first trial disclosed that as a result of the fire and explosion, Martha Day was pronounced dead from cranial cerebral injuries.' Thus, the trial judge was of the opinion that the Commonwealth convincingly proved its theory of causation. [5]
As in DeVaughn, 'without a scintilla of evidence that decedent died as result of some other cause than the (fire), a rational jury cannot be presumed to have found that the decedent died from anything but those' injuries received in the fire. Commonwealth v. DeVaughn, 221 Pa.Super. 410, 417, 292 A.2d 444, 448 (1972). For us to conclude that the jury did not find that decedent died as a result of the fire would be to assume that the jury disregarded the evidence presented as to causation, and speculated that death was caused by some other mysterious agency.
We, therefore, conclude that the ultimate issue determined by the jury in appellee's first trial was his non-participation in the arson. Any other conclusion would attribute to the jury an element of irrationality inconsistent with the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in criminal cases. [6]
The Order of the lower court is affirmed. [7]
Defendant Charles Dooley originally stood trial for the felony murder of one Martha Day resulting from the arson of an apartment building at 710 West North Avenue, North Side, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. That murder case was given to the jury for its consideration on two issues (1) whether or not defendant had in fact committed the crime of arson and (2) whether that offense proximately caused the death of Martha Day. The jury returned a verdict of acquittal.
Thereafter, the Commonwealth attempted to try defendant for the murders of Mary Carder and Kenneth Plater as victims of the same arson. The court, however, held the defense of autrefois acquit and the doctrine of collateral estoppel to be applicable and concluded that the Commonwealth is 'precluded from proceeding with subsequent prosecution for murders against this defendant based on the same factual and legal issues which had been previously determined by the jury adversely to the Commonwealth.'
The Commonwealth did not appeal but brought defendant to trial for the crime of arson, [1] which trial ended with a jury rendering a verdict of guilty. Defendant invoked the plea of double jeopardy, in consideration of which the trial judge granted defendant's motion in arrest of judgment holding that the issue was ruled by Commonwealth v. DeVaughn, 221 Pa.Super. 410, 292 A.2d 444 (1972), which decision was based on an application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
It is my opinion that the doctrine of collateral estoppel relied on in DeVaughn is not applicable in the instant case. DeVaughn involved a felony murder arising out of armed robbery. At the felony-murder trial, the ultimate issue presented to the jury for determination was whether defendant had participated in the armed robbery during which the homicide occurred. The jury found him not guilty. Our court there held that in the second trial (for armed robbery) the ultimate issue would be exactly the same as the one determined in the first trial and therefore the second trial would violate the defendant's right against double jeopardy in accordance with the collateral estoppel principle and extension of the fifth Amendment guarantee enunciated in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1969). In the instant case, at the first trial for felony murder, two issues were set forth by the court for the jury's determination. Since there is no way to determine upon which of these two issues the jury based its verdict, the doctrine of collateral estoppel would not apply to defendant's second trial for arson: Ashe v. Swenson, supra: Comm. v. DeVaughn, supra.
In fact double jeopardy, which gives a broader coverage of protection than collateral estoppel, is also not present in this case. The nature of the guarantee against double jeopardy is grounded on the universal maxim that runs through Greek, Roman and English common law that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more...
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