Commonwealth v. Ezra S. Goodwin &Amp; Another

Decision Date03 January 1877
Citation122 Mass. 19
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
PartiesCommonwealth v. Ezra S. Goodwin & another

Argued November 27, 1876 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Suffolk. Indictment on the Gen. Sts. c. 160, § 28, in three counts. The first count was as follows:

"The jurors for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on their oath present, that Ezra S. Goodwin, of Boston aforesaid, on the seventh day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five, at Boston aforesaid, with force and arms, unlawfully and maliciously, did verbally threaten one Ferdinand Geldowski, that he, said Goodwin, would accuse him, said Geldowski, of having theretofore committed the crime of feloniously and wilfully burning a certain building of him, said Geldowski, with the intent of him, said Geldowski, to injure the insurer of said building; said building having lately theretofore been burned and consumed by fire, and said building having been at the time of said fire insured against loss and damage by fire, with intent then and there and thereby to extort, from said Geldowski, a certain sum of money, to wit, the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars, against the peace of said Commonwealth, and the form of the statute in such case made and provided.

"And the jurors aforesaid, for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on their oath aforesaid, do further present, that William Fogg, of Boston aforesaid, before the said felony and threatening was committed, in manner and form aforesaid, to wit, on said day of December, with force and arms, at said Boston, did feloniously and maliciously incite, move, procure, aid, counsel, hire and command the said Goodwin, the said felony and threatening, in manner and form aforesaid, to do and commit; against the peace of said Commonwealth, and the form of the statute in such case made and provided."

The second count was as follows: "And the jurors aforesaid, for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on their oath aforesaid, do further present, that Ezra S. Goodwin, of Boston aforesaid, on the ninth day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five, at Boston aforesaid, with force and arms, with intent to extort money from Ferdinand Geldowski, unlawfully and maliciously, did verbally threaten said Geldowski, that he, said Goodwin, would accuse him, said Geldowski, that a certain building of said Geldowski, insured against loss or damage by fire, he, said Geldowski, had lately theretofore unlawfully and maliciously burned and consumed, while the same was so insured, as aforesaid, with the intent of him, said Geldowski, to injure the insurer thereof; against the peace of said Commonwealth, and the form of the statute in such case made and provided.

"And the jurors aforesaid, for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on their oath aforesaid, do further present, that William Fogg, of Boston aforesaid, before the said felony and threatening was committed, in manner and form aforesaid, to wit, on said day of December, with force and arms, at said Boston, did feloniously and maliciously incite, move, procure, aid, counsel, hire and command the said Goodwin, the said felony and threatening, in manner and form aforesaid, to do and commit, against the peace of said Commonwealth, and the form of the statute in such case made and provided."

In the Superior Court, before the jury were empanelled, the defendants moved to quash the indictment, for the following reasons: "1. Because the threats set forth in the several counts are not threats to accuse of any crime or offence. 2. Because neither count alleges that the building, the burning of which Geldowski was threatened to be accused of, was situated in Massachusetts, or in any place where the burning of it, with the intent to injure the insurer, was any offence or crime, or that such burning was at the time thereof any offence or crime, nor alleges where the building was situate. 3. Because neither count sets forth by what person or company, nor to what amount, the building was insured, nor what person or company Geldowski was threatened to be accused of intending to injure; nor that the threat was to accuse Geldowski of burning the building, knowing it to be insured. 4. Because neither count contains a sufficient description and designation of the building. 5. Because the second and third counts do not allege that the defendant Goodwin threatened to accuse Geldowski of having wilfully burned the building; and do not aver the amount of money intended to be extorted. 6. Because there is no sufficient allegation of time in either count as to the defendant Fogg." Aldrich, J., overruled the motion, and the defendants excepted. The defendants were then tried, and a bill of exceptions, in substance as follows, was allowed:

Ferdinand Geldowski, called by the government, testified as follows: "On December 7, 1875, the defendant Goodwin came to me at Boston, and spoke of a fire in my factory in East Cambridge, in 1870. He said he had brought a man from the South who knew the cause of the fire, and had made an affidavit that I hired him to set the fire. He then took a piece of paper out of his pocket, and said, 'I am the agent of these companies that you were insured in.' He showed me a piece of paper, and said, 'I suppose you recognize the companies.' I told him I recognized some of them; and he had some amounts put against the name of each company, and he said, 'Those companies paid you about $ 32,000, didn't they?' I told him that was about the amount. He said, 'I am authorized from those companies to get back that money, and I am the only man you can settle with; have you any proposition to make?' I asked him what he meant. He said, 'How mach will you give that nothing more will be said about it?' I told him I would not give one cent, as the whole matter was a lie. He then jumped up, and said, 'I shall go and have you prosecuted.' I told him to go ahead, as quick as he pleased, and to tell the insurance folks to do the same. He then left me." On cross-examination the witness testified that the piece of paper shown him was a list of the insurance companies, with the amounts of the loss of each set against them, and that this was the only paper shown him at that time. There was no other evidence touching this conversation except that of the defendant Goodwin, who denied that he said "I shall go and have you prosecuted," or anything to that effect. This was the evidence relied upon by the government on the first count.

Geldowski further testified: "The next day, Goodwin and William Fogg came to my factory, and Goodwin called me aside and said, 'This is the man that made the affidavit, and I give you a copy of it, and at your leisure you may study it. My name is Goodwin; I shall put it on the back of it, and my post-office address. If you want to address me by mail, you may do so after you have considered the matter.' He wrote his name and address, and then left. The next day Goodwin came to my store in Boston, and asked me if I had read the affidavit, and what I thought of it. I told him that there was not a word of truth in it; it was all a lie. He said 'That is nothing to me. I am authorized by the insurance companies, and I am their agent, and I am to settle with you. I have got this case put in my hands, and I want this settled, and you had better consider the matter; in the condition you are in now, you cannot afford to have any talk made at this time, and I can settle this matter quietly with you, (I was in bankruptcy at this time,) and let us go somewhere, where we can sit down and have a room all to ourselves, and talk that thing over, and I will explain it to you, and you will see it in a better light.' I told him just then I was busy; I had had some business to attend to with my counsel about my bankruptcy matters, but in the evening, if he would come to my house, I would talk with him as long as he had a mind to. He said he would come about seven o'clock. That evening, December 9, he came to my house in Boston. Two officers were there. I took him into the dining-room, and he drew out that same piece of paper again, on which he had the names of the insurance companies written, and said, 'Now let us talk business. These companies have paid you $ 32,000, and the interest for five years amounts to $ 10,000 more, which will make it now $ 42,000, and I am authorized from the insurance companies to settle with you. I am to reserve 50 per cent. of all I can collect of you. I have been put to a great deal of expense in working up this job, and I have been three months to work about it. I have been to Florida after this man. I have spent about $ 1000 out of my own pocket.' I said to him, 'What is it you want? Be easy with me, in my present circumstances, as I have not committed any crime, and would not be willing to pay one cent on that ground; but since you have been misled by a man who has perjured himself, and in order to avoid talk at the present time, I would be willing to compensate you for what expense you have been to; but not one cent of that money shall go to any of the insurance companies, as I would deem it a partial acknowledgment of guilt, of which I am innocent.' He said, 'I am alone in this matter, and hold the evidence in my own hands, and work for myself and nobody else.' Then I said to him, 'How will you satisfy the insurance folks?' 'The insurance folks can go to hell,' he said, 'and I will tell them the evidence I have is not worth a damn But how much will you give me to settle with me forever?' I told...

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39 cases
  • St. Louis Gunning Advertisement Co. v. City of St. Louis
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 9 Mayo 1911
    ...is plainer than in the case of statutes concerning malicious mischief. Commonwealth v. Walden, 3 Cush. [Mass.] 558. See Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 122 Mass. 19, 35. "Finally, we are of the opinion that it is not enough to satisfy the words of the act that malevolence was one of the motives, b......
  • Commonwealth v. McLaughlin
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 15 Mayo 2000
    ...done in self-defense would be an excused killing. 6. That malice in arson comprises only three components is clear from Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 122 Mass. 19, 35 (1877), where the court stated that "[t]he wilful doing of an unlawful act without excuse is ordinarily sufficient to support the......
  • St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 7 Junio 1911
    ...meaning is plainer than in the case of statutes concerning malicious mischief. [Commonwealth v. Walden, 3 Cush. 558. See Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 122 Mass. 19, 35.] we are of the opinion that it is not enough to satisfy the words of the act that malevolence was one of the motives, but that ......
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    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 26 Julio 2012
    ...and with criminal intent.’ ” Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 506, 513 n. 6, 729 N.E.2d 252 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 122 Mass. 19, 35 (1877). “[T]he modern definition [of wilfulness] is that ‘wilful means intentional’ without making reference to any evil intent.” Common......
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