Commonwealth v. Fairell
| Decision Date | 23 December 1977 |
| Citation | 476 Pa. 128,381 A.2d 1258 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James J. FAIRELL, Jr., Appellant (two cases). |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Submitted Jan. 20, 1977.
Harvey A. Sernovitz, Philadelphia, for appellant.
F Emmett Fitzpatrick, Dist. Atty., Steven H. Goldblatt, Asst Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., Abraham J. Gafni, Deputy Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Before JONES C. J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and PACKEL, JJ.
Appellant James J. Fairell was convicted at a non-jury trial of murder of the first degree and related weapons offenses. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to meet the Commonwealth's burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt specific intent to commit murder, appellant having placed in issue his capacity to form such specific intent due to the use of narcotics.
Appellant was found guilty of murder of the first degree, guilty of possession of an instrument of crime generally, guilty of possession of an instrument of crime, i. e., a weapon, and not guilty of possessing a prohibited offensive weapon on October 6, 1975. Post-trial motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the charge of murder and to two and one-half to five years on each of the weapons charges, sentences to run concurrently. These appeals followed. [1]
A summary of the facts of the case are as follows: On April 27, 1975, at or about 1:00 o'clock p.m., appellant entered the home of his wife's parents, Mr. and Mrs. Leroy Quartman, and, after a brief, threatening verbal exchange with those present, shot and killed his estranged wife Francine Quartman Fairell in the presence of her parents and other eyewitnesses. The cause of death was attributed to gunshot wounds of the head, right arm and back of thorax.
Appellant's defense at trial was that he was intoxicated by narcotics to the extent that at the time of the incident he was unable to form a specific intent to commit murder. This defense was put forward through the testimony of appellant's half-brother, John Nelson, and that of Dr. Albert M. Levitt, a psychologist. Dr. Levitt testified without objection that appellant had told him of appellant's use of drugs the day of the shooting and on other occasions. [2] Dr. Levitt also gave opinion testimony as to appellant's psychological make-up and the possible effect on appellant of the use of such drugs. [3]
John Nelson testified [4] that a few hours before the shooting he saw appellant in possession of a number of glassine envelopes containing a white powder and that Fairell appeared "high" and "not normal" to him.
Relying upon the well-settled proposition that the presumption of an accused's innocence in a criminal prosecution places upon the Commonwealth an unshifting burden to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 321 A.2d 880 (1974) (hereinafter Rose I ); Commonwealth v. Bonomo, 396 Pa. 222, 229, 151 A.2d 441 (1959); In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), appellant argues that the Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the presence of an essential element of murder of the first degree, the specific intent to kill. [5] The presence of such specific intent is, of course, a distinguishing feature of murder of the first degree under the Crimes Code as well as at common law. Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa. 224, 235, 352 A.2d 30, 35 (1976); Commonwealth v. Bricker, 458 Pa. 367, 371, 326 A.2d 279, 281 (1974); Commonwealth v. Mosley, 444 Pa. 134, 139, 279 A.2d 174, 177 (1971); Commonwealth v. Ewing, 439 Pa. 88, 91, 264 A.2d 661, 667 (1970).
The Commonwealth responds to this argument with the assertion that the evidence as to appellant's intoxication, or drugged state, is at best equivocal, and that the total evidence adduced at trial, when coupled with the permissible inference of specific intent to kill from appellant's intentional use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim's body, is sufficient to sustain a conviction of murder of the first degree. Appellant counters with the argument, somewhat unclearly phrased, that once his capacity to form specific intent is in issue the Commonwealth may not rely alone upon the inference arising out of intentional use of a deadly weapon on a vital part.
While the deadly weapon inference, in the absence of other evidence relevant to intent, has been held sufficient standing alone to sustain a finding of murder of the first degree, Commonwealth v. O'Searo, supra; Commonwealth v. White, 442 Pa. 461, 463, 275 A.2d 75, 76 (1971); accord, Commonwealth v. Ewing, supra, we do not find it necessary to rely on this ground for disposition of the instant case. Our review of the record satisfies us that there was other evidence, discussed below, sufficient to establish appellant's capacity to form a specific intent.
Evidence which is sufficient to place in issue capacity to form a specific intent due to intoxication may come from any source and at any stage of the trial, including the case-in-chief of the defense or prosecution, or the cross-examination of any witness. Rose I, supra; Commonwealth v. Haywood, 464 Pa. 226, 346 A.2d 298 (1975). The defendant need not raise the issue of his intoxication through a deliberate and formal offering of evidence on that subject.
Commonwealth v. Rose, 463 Pa. 264, 268, 344 A.2d 824, 826 (1975) (hereinafter Rose II ) quoting Rose I, supra, 457 Pa. at 389, 321 A.2d at 884.
The Commonwealth may offer any relevant evidentiary response to defense evidence that it chooses, or none whatsoever. It is under no obligation to counter appellant's expert testimony with that of its own, but may rely on lay testimony and the testimony as to surrounding circumstances to prove its case. Commonwealth v. Zlatovich, 440 Pa. 388, 393, 269 A.2d 469, 473 (1970); Commonwealth v. Demmitt, 456 Pa. 475, 480-83, 321 A.2d 627, 630 (1974); Commonwealth v. Updergrove, 413 Pa. 599, 601-03, 198 A.2d 534, 535-36 (1974); Accord, Rose I, supra.
The well-known test of the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, was sufficient to sustain the conviction of murder of the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Robson, 461 Pa. 615, 625, 337 A.2d 573, 578 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 290, 46 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975). Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 605, 608, 334 A.2d 255, 257 (1975); Commonwealth v. McFadden, 448 Pa. 277, 281, 292 A.2d 324, 326 (1972).
Viewed in this light, the evidence in the case at bar is as follows: Appellant entered the Quartman home at approximately 1:00 p.m. on April 27, 1975, and shot and killed his estranged wife in the presence of several eyewitnesses. The victim's father, Leroy Quartman, called as a witness for the Commonwealth, testified that his daughter had left her husband the day before and was staying with Mr. Quartman at his house. Appellant entered the Quartman home without knocking and demanded to talk to his wife outside. After a brief exchange, the witness told Fairell, "I am going to call the cops, I think you are coming here for trouble." Fairell then shouted, "Don't touch the phone", and stated that he came to kill everyone in the house. [7] He then pulled a gun from his pocket, aimed it, and shot twice in the direction of his wife, killing her instantly. [8]
Mrs. Ethel Quartman, mother of the victim, testified that when the defendant appeared in the house he told her, "I am going to get you for that smart talk you were talking to me about." When she retreated towards the kitchen and the telephone, he shouted, "Don't touch that phone . . . nobody move because everybody is going to get killed in here today." [9] Frightened, Mrs. Quartman ran down the hall and into the cellar and in a short while heard shooting upstairs.
These facts were confirmed by the testimony of two other Commonwealth witnesses: Mary Root, a neighbor who was visiting the Quartmans, who ran upstairs when appellant began firing, [10] and Stanley Quartman, the brother of the victim, who also fled after appellant shot his sister. [11] Both witnesses corroborated the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Quartman, and stated that they had heard appellant say that he was going to kill everybody in the house.
There is clearly sufficient evidence in the record in contradiction of appellant's assertion that he was so drugged at the time of the shooting that he could not have formed the requisite specific intent. Appellant threatened to kill everyone in the house, subsequently did shoot his wife, and chased Mr....
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Com. v. Fairell
...381 A.2d 1258 ... 476 Pa. 128 ... COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ... James J. FAIRELL, Jr., Appellant (two cases) ... Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ... Submitted Jan. 20, 1977 ... Decided Dec. 23, 1977 ... [476 Pa. 130] Harvey A. Sernovitz, Philadelphia, for appellant ... F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, Dist. Atty., ... ...