Commonwealth v. Foster.

• Citation: 932 N.E.2d 287,77 Mass.App.Ct. 444
• Decision Date: 24 August 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-P-284.,09-P-284.
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Antwon FOSTER.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

77 Mass.App.Ct. 444

932 N.E.2d 287

COMMONWEALTH

v.Antwon FOSTER.

No. 09-P-284.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts,Suffolk.

Argued Dec. 16, 2009.

Decided Aug. 24, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Richard J. Fallon, West Acton, for the defendant.

Kris C. Foster, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: RAPOZA, C.J., KAFKER, & HANLON, JJ.

HANLON, J.

The defendant appeals from the finding of a Boston Municipal Court judge that he violated the terms of his probation by committing a new crime. He argues that the judge should have recused himself from hearing the case because he had earlier sentenced a defense witness; that a police report was wrongly admitted as “totem pole hearsay”; and that the hearing was improperly continued over his objection. We affirm.

Background. Antwon Foster was convicted of assault and battery in the Roxbury Division of the Boston Municipal Court and placed on probation for two years. Later, in the same court, he was convicted of two additional crimes, assault and battery and threatening to commit a crime, and sentenced to six months' probation on both, the terms to run concurrently. While the defendant was still on probation for these offenses, ¹ a probation officer issued a notice alleging that the defendant had violated his probation by committing a new crime, specifically, an assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon; the offense was docketed in the Dorchester Division of the Boston Municipal Court. No other violations of probation were alleged.

On the hearing day, the man alleged to be the victim in the Dorchester case, although summonsed, did not appear in court. The probation officer told the judge he believed the victim was reluctant to testify because the defendant's fiancée was the victim's niece, Nicole Lewis. The probation officer said that Nicole Lewis, who was present in court, had told the probation officer that the victim did not “want to go forward now.” The probation officer asked for a continuance to secure the victim's presence, and the defendant objected.

The judge gave the probation officer additional time to locate the victim that day, and indicated that, in the meantime, he would read the police report to see if he could make a determination as to whether the police report contained reliable hearsay, citing Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 551 N.E.2d 1193 (1990). The defendant did not object. When the victim did not appear, the probation officer, in response to the judge's inquiry, requested a warrant for the witness's arrest. The judge issued the capias, over the defendant's objection, and held the case until the victim could be brought to court.

When the case was called later that day, defense counsel told the judge that he had learned that a defense witness, the defendant's fiancée, had appeared before the judge on an earlier occasion and had received a probation sentence. He asked the judge to send the case to a different session because of the judge's “personal knowledge of a criminal past of one of the witnesses.” The judge replied that he now recognized the witness as a probationer who had appeared before him, but stated that he would not have remembered any details, had counsel not reminded him. He also stated that he saw no reason that he could not be fair and impartial to the defendant, about whom he knew nothing. Defense counsel then stated that he would “absolutely object that any surrender hearing be heard by this court.” The judge denied the motion, noting that, at that point, the hearing was already underway. When the victim could not be located, the judge allowed a four-day continuance, over the defendant's objection.

On June 30, 2006, Alfred Lewis (Lewis), the alleged victim, appeared in court and testified as a probation witness. He said that, on the day of the alleged probation violation, he had been at a family gathering with a number of people including the defendant and the defendant's fiancée, Lewis's niece, Nicole Lewis. ² Toward the end of the gathering, Alfred Lewis and the defendant began arguing about whether the defendant should leave the gathering with Nicole Lewis. Alfred Lewis pushed the defendant, who fell; the defendant then got up and stabbed him in the groin. Lewis was hospitalized briefly.

At the same hearing, Nicole Lewis testified that she was present when the argument began and that she saw the defendant fall twice. She saw mutual pushing and shoving, but she never saw the defendant holding a knife or making any movement toward her uncle's groin area. She testified that her uncle was drinking heavily and that the defendant drank only one beer. The defendant also offered medical records from the Nashua Street jail corroborating his report of a back injury on that day. Finally, the judge's findings indicate that he also considered at least one Boston police report. ³

Discussion. Recusal. After the hearing had begun, the defendant asked the judge to recuse himself because the judge had earlier sentenced Nicole Lewis, the defendant's fiancée and his only witness at the hearing, for a probation violation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge's denial of the motion was prejudicial error because the witness's credibility was an important issue at the hearing. From this, he reasons, the judge, knowing that the witness had been convicted of a crime, would be less likely to believe her, and the defendant was thereby prejudiced. In support of this argument, he cites the Supreme Judicial Court's Code of Judicial Conduct on the disqualification of judges, Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:09, Canon 3(E)(1)(e), as appearing in 440 Mass. 1319 (2003). ⁴

“To show that a judge abused his discretion by failing to recuse himself, a defendant ordinarily must show that the judge demonstrated a bias or prejudice arising from an extrajudicial source....” Commonwealth v. Adkinson, 442 Mass. 410, 415, 813 N.E.2d 506 (2004), citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (“[N]ot subject to deprecatory characterization as ‘bias' or ‘prejudice’ are opinions held by judges as a result of what they learned in earlier proceedings”). A judge generally is not barred from sitting in subsequent proceedings or a subsequent trial involving the same defendant. See Liteky v. United States, supra (“It has long been regarded as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the same case upon its remand, and to sit in successive trials involving the same defendant”); Fogarty v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 103, 111, 546 N.E.2d 354 (1989). Commonwealth v. Adkinson, supra; Ewing v. Commonwealth, 451 Mass. 1005, 1006, 885 N.E.2d 131 (2008); Commonwealth v. Eddington, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 138, 141-143, 879 N.E.2d 1261 (2008). The defendant argues that there is “a key difference between a defendant and a witness” and that because the judge had “first hand knowledge concerning the witness's credibility” he had “no discretion” to deny the recusal motion. We fail to see the distinction the defendant seeks to draw between a defendant and a witness, as a judge might also form an impression of a defendant's credibility in a prior proceeding, yet is not automatically barred from presiding in a future proceeding.

Further, any “information” concerning the witness's credibility here is not from an extrajudicial source and thus does not automatically bar the judge from sitting. Finally, “[t]he decision whether to recuse is to be made by the judge on a case-by-case basis using the well-settled standard set forth in Lena v. Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 571, 575 (1976).” Ewing v. Commonwealth, 451 Mass. at 1006, 885 N.E.2d 131. Under Lena, a judge is “to consult first his own emotions and conscience” and, if he passes this test, “he must next attempt an objective appraisal” whether this was “a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Id. at 579, 340 N.E.2d 884 (Kaplan, J.).

The present case presents a situation that is common in a busy district or municipal court. As the judge observed, “[I]t's not infrequent that someone appears multiple times before the same judge.” He also stated that he remembered the witness as a probationer, but that he saw hundreds of people and did not remember “exactly what had happened.” The judge here thus in effect followed the two-step process set out in Lena v. Commonwealth, supra. On appeal, the defendant does not point to any action or statement by the judge that showed bias in his treatment of the defendant; nor, despite a careful review of the record, do we find any such evidence. In short, the defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing that the judge abused his discretion when he denied the motion to recuse himself. ⁵

Hearsay. On appeal, for the first time, the defendant objects to the admission in evidence of police reports, on the grounds that the reports contain hearsay. In so doing he perpetuates a common misunderstanding about the law and procedure related to probation violation hearings-the failure to distinguish between what evidence is admissible in such a hearing and what evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the probationer has violated the terms of his probation. The defendant argues “the hearing Judge stated that ... he thought it was a close question whether the police reports qualified as admissible under ... Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108 (1990)....” On the contrary, it is clear from the context of the judge's remarks that he was considering, not whether the police reports were admissible, but whether the material contained therein would be sufficiently reliable, if the alleged victim did not testify, to sustain a finding that there had been a probation violation.

The Supreme Judicial Court “has always allowed the use of hearsay at probation revocation hearings.... The more difficult issue ... is when and to what extent a court may rely on hearsay in revoking probation.” Commonwealth v. Durling,...