Commonwealth v. French

Decision Date14 February 2017
Docket NumberSJC-12012
Citation68 N.E.3d 1191
Parties COMMONWEALTH v. Eric S. FRENCH.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Joseph Visone , Worcester, for the defendant.

Alyson C. Yorlano , Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

RESCRIPT

Following a jury-waived trial in the District Court, a judge found the defendant, Eric S. French, guilty of breaking and entering in the daytime with the intent to commit a felony, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 18, and larceny of property over $250, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 30 (1). The defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions.1 The Appeals Court, in a divided decision, affirmed the judgments. See Commonwealth v. French, 88 Mass.App.Ct. 477, 38 N.E.3d 774 (2015). The case is now before this court on further appellate review. Because we conclude that the evidence was not sufficient to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crimes charged, we reverse.

Background. The convictions stem from a break-in and robbery that occurred at a market in Springfield in August, 2013. At trial, one of the proprietors of the store testified that she closed the store at 6 P.M. on August 30. She returned to the store "during the night" after being notified of a break-in. When she arrived she saw that "[s]omebody had broken in on the side window and taken the panel out and climbed in." She also testified that approximately $400 to $500 worth of cigarettes had been stolen.

Several Springfield police officers also testified. Officer Eugene Rooke responded to a call to go to the market on the morning of August 31, and arrived there with his partner at approximately 7:20 A.M. When they arrived, they spoke with two men who lived next door to the store and who had alerted the police that a front window to the store was "missing." Officer Rooke saw that the plexiglass window pane from the window located to the right of the front door had been removed and was set against the door. Photographs entered as exhibits at trial show the plexiglass leaning against the front door, next to the window frame from which it had been removed.

Officer Rooke estimated that when the plexiglass was intact, inside the window frame, the top of it was more than six feet, four inches from the ground. Additionally, he saw a milk crate on the ground nearby that he thought the perpetrator may have stood on to gain entry to the store (through the open window). Photographs show the milk crate on the ground, next to the plexiglass. Inside the store, Officer Rooke observed numerous items that would normally be on shelves located on the floor instead.

Detective Gifford Jenkins also responded to the scene after receiving a call to do so on the morning of August 31, at around 7 A.M. In the course of collecting evidence, Detective Jenkins recovered a latent fingerprint from the plexiglass. He testified that, on the basis of how he thought the plexiglass would sit in the window frame, the fingerprint was recovered from a portion of the plexiglass

that was "up high." If the plexiglass were sitting in the window frame as described by Detective Jenkins, the location of the fingerprint would have been, in his estimation, five feet, eight inches to six feet from the ground. When asked on cross-examination if he could identify which part of the plexiglass was the top half and which was the bottom half, he indicated that the "bottom" of the plexiglass, as he found it at the scene (that is, removed from the frame and leaning against the store's front door), had a crack. When asked whether he "kn[e]w ... for certain" which was the top of the plexiglass and which was the bottom, he responded "I'm just saying. I'm not sure. I mean that's what it looks like to me." He also testified that he took photographs inside the market but did not further dust for fingerprints.

Finally, Detective Juan Estrada, who is trained in fingerprint analysis, testified without objection that the latent fingerprint recovered from the plexiglass matched a known sample from the defendant. He also testified that a fingerprint cannot be dated and can remain on a surface for a long period of time.2

Discussion. Where, as here, a defendant's fingerprint at a crime scene constitutes the only identification evidence, "the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the fingerprint was placed there during the crime." Commonwealth v. Morris, 422 Mass. 254, 257, 662 N.E.2d 683 (1996), citing Commonwealth v. LaCorte, 373 Mass. 700, 703, 369 N.E.2d 1006 (1977). "The prosecution must couple the fingerprint[ ] with evidence which reasonably excludes the hypothesis that the fingerprint[ ] w[as] impressed at a time other than when the crime was being committed." Commonwealth v. Fazzino, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 485, 487, 539 N.E.2d 1060 (1989). See Commonwealth v. Baptista, 32 Mass.App.Ct. 910, 911, 585 N.E.2d 335 (1992). Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as we must, see Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676–677, 393 N.E.2d 370 (1979), the Commonwealth has not done that here.

In prior cases where a fingerprint was the only identification evidence, and thus a decisive factor in convicting the defendant, other evidence corroborated the finding that the fingerprint was placed during the crime. In Baptista, 32 Mass.App.Ct. at 911, 585 N.E.2d 335, for example, one of the defendant's fingerprints "was found inside a closed, locked Pepsi vending machine," the interior of which "was not available to members of the public." On this basis, the jury "could reasonably infer that the defendant's fingerprints were left ... at the time of the crime." Id. at 911–912, 585 N.E.2d 335. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wei Ye, 52 Mass.App.Ct. 390, 392–393, 754 N.E.2d 86 (2001) (fingerprint found on door of cabinet rarely used, located in basement, and opened by robbers coupled with other evidence including records of telephone calls connecting defendant to prior owner of home where robbery occurred...

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4 cases
  • Commonwealth v. Rivera, 16-P-331
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • 5 Abril 2017
    ...a reasonable doubt that the owner of that card was in possession of it during the commission of a crime"). Cf. Commonwealth v. French, 476 Mass. 1023, 1024, 68 N.E.3d 1191 (2017), quoting from Commonwealth v. Fazzino, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 485, 487, 539 N.E.2d 1060 (1989) (evidence held insuffici......
  • Commonwealth v. Anitus
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • 6 Abril 2018
    ...585 N.E.2d 335 (1992), quoting from Commonwealth v. Clark, 378 Mass. 392, 405–406, 393 N.E.2d 296 (1979). See Commonwealth v. French, 476 Mass. 1023, 1024, 68 N.E.3d 1191 (2017) ; Commonwealth v. Ye, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 390, 393, 754 N.E.2d 86 (2001).This principle applies because the presenc......
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    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 14 Febrero 2017
  • Commonwealth v. Miranda
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • 28 Marzo 2017
    ...excludes the hypothesis that the fingerprint was left at some time other than when the crime was committed." Common w ealth v. French , 476 Mass. 1023, 1026, 68 N.E.3d 1191 (2017). Commonwealth v. Fazzino, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 485, 487, 539 N.E.2d 1060 (1989). The Commonwealth met that burden he......

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