Commonwealth v. Garcia

• Citation: 479 A.2d 473,505 Pa. 304
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Marvin A. GARCIA, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 13 July 1984
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

479 A.2d 473

505 Pa. 304

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Marvin A. GARCIA, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

July 13, 1984

Submitted Jan. 26, 1984. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Lewis S. Small, Philadelphia (Court-appointed), for appellant.

Robert B. Lawler, Chief, Appeals Div., Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

Before NIX C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

HUTCHINSON Justice.

On May 31 1978, Marvin Garcia bludgeoned Emilie Schmid to death with a meathook and, following the killing, took money and other property from the victim's grocery store and home. A jury found Garcia guilty of felony murder and robbery. Following the denial of post-verdict motions, Common Pleas imposed a sentence of life imprisonment and a concurrent sentence of ten to twenty years for Garcia's second degree murder and robbery convictions, respectively. This is Garcia's direct appeal from these sentences. Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, 42 Pa.C.S. § 722(1), right abolished by Act of September 23, 1980, P.L. 686, No. 137. Appellant's arguments in support of his contention that a new trial is warranted are meritless. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

At trial, Garcia conceded that he killed Mrs. Schmid, who was seventy-two years old at the time of her death, and that he took her money and other valuables. However, throughout these proceedings, Garcia's counsel has maintained that Garcia, who was seventeen years old at the time of the incident in question, and who suffers from organic brain damage and mild retardation, is, due to his diminished capacity, incapable of forming an intent to kill or commit robbery. Garcia's defense at trial was that he was guilty only of third degree murder and theft.

Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in excluding testimony of a clinical psychologist offered by the defense to establish that he lacked the specific intent to commit robbery at, or about, the time of the murder. Appellant asserts that he should have been given the opportunity to establish diminished capacity sufficient to negate the requisite intent to commit robbery as a defense against the robbery charge and against application of the felony murder doctrine.

To date, our Court has deemed psychiatric testimony admissible only to negate specific intent to commit first degree murder. See Commonwealth v. Terry, 501 Pa. 626, 631, 462 A.2d 676, 679 (1983); Commonwealth v. Weinstein, 499 Pa. 106, 113, 451 A.2d 1344, 1347 (1982); Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 360 A.2d 914 (1976). ^[1] In order to establish murder in the first degree, the Commonwealth must prove that the actor specifically intended to kill which, in turn, is shown by proving premeditation and deliberation. Commonwealth v. Weinstein, 499 Pa. at 115, 451 A.2d at 1348.

In the instant case, the trial court permitted the appellant's expert, a clinical psychologist, to testify extensively regarding his judgment that Garcia had not formed the specific intent to kill Mrs. Schmid. N.T. 1.679-680, 1.699, 1.753-754. ^[2] The jury obviously believed the testimony of Garcia's expert on this issue since they found him guilty of second, rather than first, degree murder.

The trial court correctly sustained the Commonwealth's objection to the following question posed to appellant's expert during direct examination:

Q. All right. Now, Dr. Cooke, were you able to form an opinion with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty as to whether or not Marvin Garcia had an intent to steal anything from Mrs. Schmid prior to or before committing this homicide?

N.T. 1.681. Common Pleas correctly ruled this psychiatric testimony inadmissible. Throughout these proceedings appellant has argued that this testimony is relevant to negate what he calls the specific intent to rob which intent he says, in this case, triggers the operation of the felony murder rule. Precisely, appellant argues that he did not form a specific intent to rob Mrs. Schmid either before or during her murder and that his theft of her property was merely an "afterthought." Consequently, appellant argues that there was no felony murder.

Proper psychiatric testimony is admissible only to negate the specific intent required to establish first degree murder. See Commonwealth v. Weinstein, supra. Therefore, the determination of whether Garcia ever formed an intent to rob, and if so, when he formed such intent, was required to be made on the basis of the factual circumstances surrounding the criminal episode as developed by demonstrative evidence and testimony other than psychiatric expert testimony. ^[3]

Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence three photographs which, he claims, were inflammatory and of little probative value. All of the disputed photographs are in black and white. The first, Exhibit C-4, depicts a meathook resting on top of a milk crate. A large pool of blood on the floor to the right of the crate is visible. The second photograph, Exhibit C-11, shows the bloodied body of the murder victim and the third, Exhibit C-28, represents drag marks transversing a pool of blood on the floor of the grocery store where the murder occurred.

The admission into evidence of photographs depicting the corpse of the homicide victim or the location and scene of the crime lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Commonwealth v. Hudson, 489 Pa. 620, 630, 414 A.2d 1381, 1386 (1980); Commonwealth v. Gilman, 485 Pa. 145, 152, 401 A.2d 335, 339 (1979); Commonwealth v. Gidaro, 363 Pa. 472, 474, 70 A.2d 359, 360 (1950). A photograph which is judged not inflammatory is admissible if "it is relevant and can assist the jury in understanding the facts." Commonwealth v. Gilman, 485 Pa. at 153, 401 A.2d at 339. A gruesome or potentially inflammatory photograph is admissible if it is of "such essential evidentiary value that [its] need clearly outweighs the likelihood of inflaming the minds and passions of the jurors." Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 499 Pa. 597, 602, 454 A.2d 547, 549 (1982) (quoting Commonwealth v. Petrakovich, 459 Pa. 511, 521, 329 A.2d 844, 849 [1974] ). The fact that blood is visible in a photograph does not necessarily require a finding that the photograph is inflammatory. Commonwealth v. Hudson, 489 Pa. at 631, 414 A.2d at 1387; Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 450 Pa. 273, 281, 299 A.2d 608, 612, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923, 93 S.Ct. 2745, 37 L.Ed.2d 150 (1973).

The photograph of the meathook, the murder weapon, is not inflammatory. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 268 Pa. Superior Ct. 123, 407 A.2d 860 (1979). Moreover, it had probative value. Among other things, the photograph was relevant to indicate to the jury the brutality of the defendant's attack which supports an inference of specific intent to kill, an element of murder in the first degree. See Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 499 Pa. at 602, 454 A.2d at 549; Commonwealth v. Edwards, 493 Pa. 281, 290, 426 A.2d 550, 554 (1981).

The trial court also correctly ruled that C-11, the photograph of the murder victim, was admissible. While appellant states that C-11 depicts the victim "with her dress up," the fact is that the trial judge ordered the nude portion of Mrs. Schmid's body blocked out. Her badly gored head, also, is not shown. The Commonwealth properly offered this photograph as evidence of the ferocity of appellant's attack which tended to prove premeditation and deliberation. N.T. 1.94. See Commonwealth v. McCutchen, supra. In addition, the trial judge found C-11 relevant because it shows the location of the body at the crime scene. N.T. 1.97. Moreover, the record shows that the trial judge took care to exclude highly inflammatory photographs of Mrs. Schmid. Specifically, the judge excluded C-8 which depicts the severe injuries to Mrs. Schmid's face and head. N.T. 1.101. Accordingly, the evidentiary value of this exhibit warranted its admission in evidence notwithstanding its potentially inflammatory nature.

Appellant's objection to the photograph of the drag marks is, likewise, unfounded. The photograph is not inflammatory. See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, supra. Exhibit C-28 shows the spot to which the appellant dragged the victim's body following the attack. It supports the Commonwealth's contention that Garcia dragged Mrs. Schmid to an area of the store where she was not visible to anyone and then proceeded to steal her property. Undoubtedly, this piece of demonstrative evidence was admissible to aid the jury in reconstructing the factual circumstances surrounding the murder.

Finally, appellant asserts that he was denied a fair trial on account of prosecutorial misconduct. First, he points to the prosecutor's attempt to introduce into evidence his juvenile arrest records in an effort to discredit his mother who testified that her son had never before been in trouble with the law. The trial judge ruled the records inadmissible. Nevertheless, the district attorney continued to question appellant's mother concerning the events culminating in her son's arrest. Eventually, the trial judge sustained an objection by defense counsel to the line of questioning whereupon the prosecutor stated, in the presence of the jury: "My hands are tied. I have no further questions." N.T. 1.637. Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor attempted to indicate to members of the jury that information concerning the defendant was being withheld from them. ^[4] N.T. 1.638.

Next appellant challenges a remark made by the prosecutor during defense counsel's direct examination of a character witness. When asked what people in the community said about Garcia following the murder, the witness...