Commonwealth v. Goddard
| Decision Date | 09 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | SJC-11955 |
| Citation | 68 N.E.3d 1146 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. William GODDARD. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Robert S. Sinsheimer for the defendant.
Ellyn H. Lazar-Moore , Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Present: Gants, C.J., Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.
The jury convicted the defendant, William Goddard, of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation.1 On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the trial judge erred by permitting the Commonwealth's expert witness to testify that the defendant had premeditated the killing, (2) the same expert was impermissibly permitted to state the basis of her opinion on
direct examination, and (3) the prosecutor made statements not supported by evidence during closing arguments. We affirm the convictions and decline to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
1. Background. We summarize the facts the jury could have found and reserve other details for discussion of specific issues. On the morning of January 28, 2008, the defendant shot and killed his former girl friend (victim). The victim and the defendant met in October, 2005, developed a romantic relationship, and began living together. By August, 2007, their relationship began to deteriorate, partly because the defendant suspected the victim was having an affair with her boss. In October, 2007, the relationship between the victim and the defendant ended when she kicked him out of the house. The defendant did not take the break up well.
On the morning of the murder, the defendant arrived in his automobile at the automotive shop where the victim worked. The defendant forced an employee at gunpoint to bring him to the office that the victim shared with her boss.
Upon entering the office, the defendant said to the victim, The victim responded, "Bill, what are you doing?" The defendant then shot the victim a single time in the neck, killing her in a matter of minutes. The defendant also shot the boss in the left arm; he lay on the ground to "play[ ] dead." The defendant then attempted to fire the gun a third time, in an unspecified direction, but his weapon misfired.
Upon hearing the misfire, the employee who had taken the defendant to the office ran out of the room. The defendant fired several more times in his direction and in the direction of three other employees, who were hiding behind a forklift outside the office. The fleeing employee was able to get outside, but he slipped on a patch of ice and fell. While he was on the ground, the defendant caught up to him and again tried to shoot him, but again, the defendant was unable to fire the gun. The defendant told the man, "You better run."
The defendant then fled the scene in his vehicle. Minutes later, a Webster police officer stopped the defendant for speeding in a construction zone less than one mile from the shop. The defendant held the steering wheel and stared straight ahead while the officer reprimanded him, only saying, "Sorry, Officer." Unaware of the shooting, the officer allowed the defendant to leave with a warning.
While in his vehicle, the defendant used his cellular telephone to call an agent with the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. The defendant had known the agent for over a year through her work. The defendant told her that he was currently driving around Webster and that, When the agent suggested he turn himself in, he said, "No, I'd rather kill myself," and hung up the telephone.
The defendant then drove to his sister's house in Spencer. Once there, he told his sister that his vehicle needed repair and convinced her to give him a ride to Worcester. The defendant's sister testified that on the way to Worcester her brother seemed normal, but later told her, "If we get pulled over, I hope you don't get shot." When she asked what he was talking about, he repeatedly said, "The less you know, the better."
The sister dropped him off in a restaurant parking lot in Worcester, where he had arranged for a female acquaintance to meet him. The defendant had told the acquaintance a similar story about his vehicle needing repair. She brought the defendant back to her house, where they both stayed for about ninety minutes. During that time, the acquaintance observed the defendant acting strangely. The acquaintance received a telephone call from a friend, who informed her that the police were looking for her vehicle. The defendant, overhearing the conversation, ran out of the house.
The defendant sprinted to a nearby field, where he stood with his gun pointed at his head. A large police presence quickly arrived on scene. A State police negotiator talked with the defendant to try to prevent him from killing himself. The defendant was agitated and demanded that the police kill him. The defendant told the negotiator, "My side of the story is on a [compact disc] in my truck." The defendant was eventually convinced to accept a cup of coffee, and while he was bending over to pick it up, the police shot him with nonlethal ammunition and took him into custody.
The police obtained warrants and searched the defendant's apartment and vehicle. As the defendant had indicated, the search of his vehicle revealed a compact disc (CD) in a plastic sleeve. The CD contained an audio recording wherein the defendant made several statements about his intention to kill the victim and her boss. The search of the defendant's apartment uncovered his
computer. A forensic examination of that computer revealed Internet searches that had occurred between December, 2007, and January, 2008, and that included phrases such as "How to kill someone," "Murder an ex-girlfriend," and "How to use a handgun to kill."
At trial, the defendant did not dispute that he killed the victim. He presented a lack of criminal responsibility defense. To support his defense, the defendant called Dr. Eric Brown, an expert clinical and forensic psychologist, as a witness. Dr. Brown met with the defendant on several occasions after the killing. He testified that the defendant suffered from bipolar disorder
, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and possibly a seizure disorder. As a result of those mental disorders, Dr. Brown testified that he believed that the defendant "was unable to control his behavior to conform with the law." In rebuttal, the Commonwealth called Dr. Alison Fife, a psychiatric expert, as a witness. She testified that the defendant did not suffer from bipolar disorder, PTSD, seizure disorder, or a mental disease at the time of the killing. Further, she testified that the defendant had the substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.2
2. Discussion. a. Testimony on the ultimate issue of guilt. The defendant argues the Commonwealth's expert witness, Dr. Fife, was improperly permitted to testify that the defendant premeditated the killing. On direct examination, the prosecutor asked Dr. Fife the following question: "Based on your review of the material, and specifically the investigation of the case and the CD you mentioned, do you have an opinion as to whether or not on January 28th, [the defendant] engaged in goal-directed behaviors?" Over objection, Dr. Fife responded, "My opinion is that [the defendant's] behaviors on that day were planned."
There is no prohibition on an expert testifying to an opinion that touches the ultimate issue in a case. Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 543, 998 N.E.2d 322 (2013). See Mass. G. Evid. § 704 (2016). However, an expert opinion stating whether a defendant is guilty or innocent is not permitted. Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 459 Mass. 422, 439, 945 N.E.2d 877 (2011). The jury must be allowed to reach their own conclusion from the evidence; an opinion touching on guilt or innocence usurps the jury's function as the sole and exclusive
finders of the facts. Where testimony approaches an ultimate issue of guilt, "the probative value of the opinion must be weighed against the danger of unfair prejudice." Canty, 466 Mass. at 544, 998 N.E.2d 322. See Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2016).
Taken in context, Dr. Fife's opinion that the defendant's behavior was planned and goal-directed was relevant to the issue of criminal responsibility, not premeditation.
Although the form of the question and the answer lacked precision, it was an appropriate subject for expert testimony. See Commonwealth v. Boateng, 438 Mass. 498, 508, 781 N.E.2d 1207 (2003) ().
Even if Dr. Fife's statement that the defendant's behavior on January 28 was "planned" was error due to the form of the question or because it was inadmissible on the issue of premeditation,3 it caused no prejudice to the defendant. The evidence of the premeditation of the killing was overwhelming: the defendant searched the Internet using such highly incriminating phrases as "How do I get away with murder"; arrived at the victim's workplace with a gun and additional ammunition; and forced an employee at gunpoint to take him to the victim's office. Most damningly, the defendant said on the CD, i.e., "his side of the story," that "if you're listening to this recording, I accomplished what I set out to do," and
The defense's own expert also acknowledged that the defendant's actions on January 28 were "goal-directed." In response to the question, "Now, it's fair to say, isn't it, that all of the [defendant's] behaviors ... on [January 28] ... were purposeful, goal-directed behaviors, weren't they?" Dr. Brown responded, "I...
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