Appellant, Andrew Josiah Goslin, appeals pro se from the judgment of sentence of one year of probation, imposed on June 2, 2015, after the trial court convicted him of possessing a weapon on school property.1 After careful review, we affirm.
Our review of the certified record reveals that on November 19, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a complaint charging Appellant with possessing a weapon on school property, after Pennsylvania State Trooper Kendra Kaley "arrived at Providence Elementary School ... to contact Principal Christina M. McLaughlin about a previous incident at the school." Affidavit of ProbableCause, 11/19/14. A bench trial convened on June 2, 2015. Ms. McLaughlin testified that on September 4, 2014, she met with Appellant for the purpose of an "informal hearing" concerning an incident where Appellant's son was found to have possessed a knife on school property. N.T., 6/2/15, at 4-5, 15-18. The purpose of the hearing was to "allow the family and student to discuss and answer any questions they may have and the school administration to ask any questions they may have and review the incident as they know it to have been." Id. at 5. Ms. McLaughlin testified as follows.
At the hearing, during one point of discussion, [Appellant] did state that he had a knife and asked if we would arrest him for having it. At that point, he forcefully placed it on the table in front of people at the meeting.
...
I don't remember whether he was standing or sitting, but I do remember the words were, I have a knife, are you going to call the police on me and then [he] slammed it down on the table in front of him.
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There was silence in the room and we allowed him to sit and calm down, honestly. That was our hope.
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At some point after that, he removed it from the table and put it back in his pocket.
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I remember it being a strained meeting. He had stated - and the reason I say that is because he seemed very upset that we called the police and had stated that he didn't feel it was our right and that he doesn't appreciate that.
I felt that at some time, quite honestly, that his demeanor was threatening. He looked personally at me and made comments that made me feel that way, saying that you sent armed police to my house and that doesn't go well. I sensed the tone of his feeling was tense at that meeting.
Id. at 20-22.
On cross-examination, Ms. McLaughlin clarified that Appellant did not point the knife at anyone, and it was in a "closed state the entire time." Id. at 26.
Thereafter, the defense stipulated that Appellant possessed the knife on school grounds. Id. at 28. Appellant testified that he left work as a carpenter early to attend the meeting. Id. at 29-30. He also testified that he carries the knife with him to work and "every day everywhere." Id. at 30. Appellant further explained as follows.
I carry this knife with me every day because I use it. I use it at work, I use it to sharpen pencils, I use it to open tuna cans when my wife forgets to pack me a tuna can opener. I whittle sticks with my sons.
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It occurred to me at the moment, oh, my goodness, they called the police on my nine-year-old son for having a whittling knife. I actually have a pocket knife on me now and am I a criminal as well?
I grew up in the southern end my whole life. It never occurred to me that possessing a pocket knife was a criminal act. It seemed ridiculous.
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My intention was not to provoke people or to frighten people.
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My intention in that moment was to say, this is ridiculous. I mean, you send the state police to my home for my nine-year-old son having a whittling knife.
Id. at 30-32. Appellant indicated that he put the knife away after the assistant superintendent told him he was "in violation" for having the knife. Id. at 32.
Following the testimony of Ms. McLaughlin and Appellant, and closing arguments by counsel, the trial court, in rendering its guilty verdict, gave its detailed reasoning as follows.
I have reviewed all of the information that was supplied by counsel pursuant to the closing arguments in this case.
I have thoroughly reviewed the statute. And as both sides have I think acknowledged, there is some confusion, I suppose, with regard to the language of the statute.
And I'll say this, [Appellant], I understand your frustration with this scenario. I can speak for myself. When I've looked at some of the situations that have arisen with these policies with regard to weapons on school property, and I'll agree that it appears to me that the balance has not beenproperly found yet in terms of what the schools need to do to adequately protect themselves.
We've gone from one extreme back before all of the rash of unfortunate violent offenses on school property to something in the far other direction in terms of what we've done, but that's the environment in which we live at the moment.
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My view of the plain reading or the plain language in the statute is that the defense is there for some lawful purpose upon which the weapon would be brought onto the school property, that's not the same thing as saying that the weapon wasn't brought there for some unlawful purpose.
I see a distinction between those two, and I guess I would agree with the position the Commonwealth has taken that that defense is there for someone to bring a weapon onto the property for some legitimate reason pursuant to their presence on the school property, and there are probably lots of things.
I think in [Appellant's] case, if [he] had said he brought the knife that [his] son was accused of having and it was the basis of the hearing, [Appellant] brought it from an evidentiary standpoint for the hearing itself, that to me would be some type of an example of bringing a weapon onto the property for lawful purposes.
The hearing was there, it involved that particular item which the school was alleging was a weapon, and if you had said the reason you had it was for that, I could see that's something that probably the statute would cover.
But that isn't the case here. This is a different weapon. It's clearly one that's set forth in the statute as being prohibited. There isn't a questionabout you knowing that it was on your person at the time.
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The statute is clearly created to prohibit weapons from being brought onto school property unless there is a specific reason as carved out in the statute that they are to be viewed as not violating this criminal provision, but I don't think [Appellant's] situation falls within one of those reasons.
So based on my view of the statute and the evidence presented in this case, I do find [Appellant] guilty of violation Section 912(a) of the Crimes Code.
Id. at 49-52.
On June 2, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a year of probation. On June 29, 2015, Appellant filed this timely appeal.2 As Appellant appealed pro se, the trial court convened a Grazier3 hearing on August 11, 2015, and determined that Appellant was competent to proceed pro se.
On appeal, Appellant presents a single issue for our review.
Whether the Trial Court erred in appropriately [sic] applying "lawful purpose" under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 912(c).
What is the definition of "other lawful purpose?"
Appellant's Brief at 6.
In interpreting a statute, our Supreme Court recently provided the following guidance.
The purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). In this respect, the language of the statute is the best indication of this intent; accordingly, where the words of the statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. Id., § 1921(b). Only in the event of an ambiguity may we consider other aspects of the statute and the statutory process, and may we discern the General Assembly's intent by considering, inter alia, the various factors listed in the Statutory Construction Act, Id., § 1921(c). See Commonwealth v. Walls, 592 Pa. 557, 926 A.2d 957, 962 (2007).
Commonwealth v. Lynn, 114 A.3d 796, 818 (Pa. 2015).
As noted by both the Commonwealth and the trial court, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921 provides as follows.
Legislative intent controls
(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.
(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.
1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921.
Here, the statute at issue reads as follows.
§ 912. Possession of weapon on school property
(a) Definition.--Notwithstanding the definition of "weapon" in section 907 (relating to possessing instruments of crime), "weapon" for purposes of this section shall include but not be limited to any knife, cutting instrument, cutting tool, nun-chuck stick, firearm, shotgun, rifle and any other tool, instrument or implement capable of inflicting serious bodily injury.
(b) Offense defined.-- A person commits a misdemeanor of the
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