Commonwealth v. Granito
| Decision Date | 30 November 1950 |
| Citation | 95 N.E.2d 539,326 Mass. 494 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. GRANITO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Argued Oct. 2 1950.
F T. Doyle, Asst. Dist. Atty., Boston, for Commonwealth.
P. T. Smith, H. F Callahan and R. J. DeGiacomo, all of Boston, for defendant.
Before QUA, C. J and LUMMUS, RONAN, SPALDING and WILLIAMS, JJ.
Shortly after eight o'clock on the morning of October 30, 1947, approximately $112,000 was delivered by armored express ot the B. F Sturtevant Division of the Westinghouse Electric Company in Hyde Park for its payroll. Soon after the express truck had departed, six armed robbers entered the building where the money had been delivered, cowed the personnel in charge, and made off with approximately $110,000. On November 8, nine days later, the defendant was arrested in New York and was questioned about the robbery by New York police officers and an assistant district attorney. Subsequently he was charged with participation in the crime in an indictment accusing him of robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon. At the trial of the case, which was ordered to be tried subject to the provisions of G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 278, §§ 33A-33G, as amended, the defendant was found guilty. The identification of the defendant as one of the robbers and an alibi were the principal issues at the trial. The sole identifying witness for the Commonwealth was one Marshall, the paymaster at the Sturtevant plant. The defendant's appeal comes here with numerous assignments of error relating to rulings made at the trial and in connection with a motion for a new trial.
1. Assignments 2 and 3 relate to rulings excluding questions put to one Tuohey, a captain in the Boston police department. Captain Tuohey was asked by the defendant on cross-examination whether the subject matter of his talks at police headquarters concerning the robbery had to do with a description of any of the alleged robbers, and he was also asked to give the names of the officers with whom he talked. The exclusion of these questions reveals no error. 'How far the cross-examination of a witness may be relevant to the issue on trial must be left largely to the sound discretion of the court; such questions are not open to revision unless substantial rights of a party are clearly shown to have been prejudiced'. Commonwealth v. Corcoran, 252 Mass. 465, 486, 148 N.E. 123, 128. See Commonwealth v. Kaplan, 238 Mass. 250, 255, 130 N.E. 485.
2. The questions raised by assignments 8 and 14, inclusive, are closely related and will be dealt with together. They arose in these circumstances. One Crowley, a Boston police officer called by the defendant, had testified that he was present at the lineup at police headquarters involving the defendant. He was then asked the date of the lineup, whether a number of persons were called in to look at the lineup, and the names of such persons. These questions were excluded and form the basis of assignments 8 to 10, inclusive. Assignments 11 and 12 relate to the exclusion of questions put by the defendant on direct examination to witnesses Skinner and Morse, employees at the Sturtevant plant. Each was asked whether he had attended a lineup at police headquarters. The thirteenth and fourteenth assignments arise out of the exclusion of questions put by the defendant on direct examination to one Gallahue, a Boston police officer. Gallahue was asked whether he had brought with him some records in response to a summons to the superintendent of police, and whether these included a record of the description of the alleged bandits.
The defendant contends that he was prejudiced by the exclusion of this evidence because it deprived him of information necessary for the preparation of his defense. It is to be noted that in excepting to these rulings the defendant made no offer of proof, except with respect to the question which asked for the date of the lineup. Even if the defendant did not know the answers to the questions put he should at least have got something into the record which would reveal their possible materiality. The defendant has failed to show that he was prejudiced by these rulings. Smethhurst v. Barton Square Independent Congregational Church, 148 Mass. 261, 267, 19 N.E. 387, 2 L.R.A. 695; Commonwealth v. Pelletier, 264 Mass. 221, 225, 162 N.E. 308; Commonwealth v. Farrell, 322 Mass. 606, 623, 78 N.E.2d 697. Whether some of the rulings might also be sustained on the ground that the questions would reveal the identity of informers need not be decided. See Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487, 488-489.
3. Assignments 4 to 7, inclusive, relate to the overruling of the defendant's objections to a series of questions asked of the witness Putterman. Putterman was called by the Commonwealth and answered questions concerning his name, address, age, and occupation. Thereafter, with one exception, he refused to answer numerous questions on the ground that the answers would tend to incriminate him. Those questions were designed to elicit information as to whether Putterman knew the defendant; whether he had talked with the defendant in New York four or five weeks prior to the robbery about the latter's coming to Boston; whether he had on occasions given the defendant money to go to Boston; whether he had met the defendant prior to October 31, 1947; whether he had a telephone conversation with the defendant on October 31, 1947, in reference to the robbery; whether he met the defendant in a New York hotel on October 31, 1947, and received $200 from him; whether on October 31 the defendant asked the witness to 'change small bills into large bills'; whether the defendant had told the witness that he had been connected with a $100,000 robbery at the Sturtevant plant; whether he had given a statement to the district attorney in New York relative to his conversation in New York; and whether the defendant had told him that he and his accomplices had stolen a black automobile and had used it in making their get-away from the scene of the robbery. It appears that the prosecution asked some thirteen questions in this vein before the defendant took any exceptions. [1] At no time did the court compel the witness to answer any question as to which the claim of privilege was made.
The defendant contends that the asking of these questions was prejudicial because it created the inference that affirmative answers had been given on a prior occasion and the inference of 'guilty knowledge of the defendant by the witness by his refusal to answer the questions on the grounds of self incrimination.' Of course, if questions of this sort were put in bad faith and without foundation, they would be highly improper, and very unfair to the defendant. But we cannot assume on this record that there was no basis for them. The questions were not in themselves improper. To be sure many of them were leading, but no objection was made on that ground, and in the circumstances they could hardly have been otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 319 Mass. 228, 230, 65 N.E.2d 422. Until the witness claimed the privilege it could not be known that they would not be answered. The possibility that the witness may claim the privilege does not prohibit the asking of the question. Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) § 2268. Cutter v. Cooper, 234 Mass. 307, 318, 125 N.E. 634. The fact that evidence was not introduced to show that Putterman had made the statements as to which he was interrogated does not necessarily indicate that the questions were put in bad faith. As stated above, the privilege was claimed to all questions put, with one exception, and in these circumstances there was virtually no basis for showing prior statements under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 233, § 23. Commonwealth v. Chin Kee, 283 Mass. 248, 261, 186 N.E. 253.
The defendant asked the judge to instruct the jury that the fact that Putterman had claimed his privilege with respect to any question was not to be considered by them to the prejudice of the defendant. This request was granted. The judge told the jury that the questions were not evidence, that the fact that the witness claimed the privilege should not be used against the defendant, and that all of the testimony of Putterman should be disregarded. We think that in the circumstances the rights of the defendant were adequately protected. See Commonwealth v. Bellino, 320 Mass. 635, 645, 71 N.E.2d 411.
4. The defendant took the stand and testified that he was elsewhere at the time of the robbery, giving a detailed account of his whereabouts and doings at the time of the robbery and during the periods immediately preceding and following it. This testimony was corroborated by numerous witnesses. Assignments of error 15 to 26, inclusive, relate to the overruling of the defendant's objections to questions put to him on cross-examination concerning his interrogation by police officers and an assistant district attorney during his detention in New York on November 8, and 9. He was asked whether during that questioning, when inquiry was made as to his whereabouts on October 30 (the day of the robbery), his reply was that he did not know and could not say. Assignments 28 to 38, inclusive, are based on other questions permitted on cross-examination relating to the New York interrogation. These questions were designed to show that the defendant was there asked numerous questions concerning his activities at or near the time of the robbery and the names of persons with whom he associated at that time, and that his replies were that he did not know. As to some of the questions put to him touching the New York interrogation the defendant replied that he did not remember whether or not they had been asked.
There was no error in...
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