Commonwealth v. Grossman

• Decision Date: 14 October 1927
• Citation: 261 Mass. 68,158 N.E. 338
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. GROSSMAN.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

261 Mass. 68

158 N.E. 338

COMMONWEALTH

v.GROSSMAN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Oct. 14, 1927.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Worcester County; Winfred H. Whiting, Judge.

Jack Grossman was convicted of having received stolen cigars, knowing them to have been stolen, and he excepts. Exceptions overruled.

C. B. Rugg, Dist. Atty., of Worcester, for the Commonwealth.

John H. Meagher, Emil Zaeder, John L. Bianchi, and Henry T. George, all of Worcester, for defendant.

CROSBY, J.

The defendant was convicted on an indictment charging him in two counts with having received stolen cigars.

It is not disputed by the defendant that one John Guthrie broke and entered the cigar factory of William H. Bachellor Company, Inc., and stole the cigars described in the first and second counts of the indictment; that he concealed them, and, after the cigars mentioned in the first count had been stolen, he had a conversation with his brother, Thomas Guthrie; and the latter testified that he had a conversation with John and removed the cigars from the place where they had been secreted to the cellar of his house and afterwards sold them to the defendant at his (the defendant's) store. It is also undisputed that, after the cigars above referred to were stolen, John Guthrie again broke and entered the same factory and stole the cigars described in the second count of the indictment; that he secreted these cigars. Thomas Guthrie testified that after these cigars had been stolen he had a conference with his brother John, and thereafter he, John, and one Barck went in the latter's automobile to the place where the cigars had been secreted; that they placed them in the automobile, which was driven to a place near the defendant's store, and the cigars were sold by Thomas Guthrie to the defendant. There was evidence that all the cigars were sold to the defendant for much less than they were worth. He testified he knew the real value of some of them, but denied that he had purchased them. At the close of the testimony the defendant presented a motion that the judge direct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. This motion was denied.

[1] It is the contention of the defendant that to sustain a charge of receiving stolen goods it must appear that they were received from the person who stole them. This contention is without merit. The offense charged in the indictment is set forth in G. L. c. 266, § 60, and so far as pertinent to the question raised provides that:

‘Whoever buys, receives or aids in the concealment of stolen * * * property, knowing it to have been stolen * * * shall be punished. * * *’

[2] The offense described in the statute is not the receiving of stolen property from any particular person, but is that of buying or receiving such property knowing it to have been stolen. The name of the thief need not be alleged or proved. If the goods were in fact stolen and the defendant received them, no matter from whom, knowing them to have been stolen, the offense charged in the indictment was proved. Commonwealth v. Slate, 11 Gray, 60, 63;Commonwealth v. Hogan, 121 Mass. 373;State v. Feuerhaken, 96 Iowa, 299, 302, 65 N. W. 299;State v. Alderman, 83 Conn. 597, 78 A. 331;Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S. 47, 62, 63, 19 S. Ct. 574, 43 L. Ed. 890; Rex v. Jervis, 6 C. & P. 156.

[3] One McIsaac, called by the defendant, testified that the reputation of the latter for honesty and fair dealing was excellent. On cross-examination he...