Commonwealth v. Guinan
| Citation | 17 N.E.3d 439,86 Mass.App.Ct. 445 |
| Decision Date | 03 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–P–592.,13–P–592. |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Douglas F. GUINAN. |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Susan E. Taylor, New Bedford, for the defendant.
John P. Bossé, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Present: BERRY, KATZMANN, & SULLIVAN, JJ.
Douglas F. Guinan appeals from convictions of motor vehicle homicide while under the influence of alcohol; and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, causing serious bodily injury. See G.L. c. 90, § 24G(a ) ; G.L. c. 90, § 24L(1). He contends that the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting, over objection, expert testimony ruling out the computer-assisted power steering mechanism of the defendant's automobile as a cause of the collision. We conclude that the
State trooper who offered this opinion lacked the qualifications to testify regarding the computer system employed in the operation of the motorized power steering mechanism. Because the issue of causation was a central issue at trial, the error was prejudicial. Accordingly, we reverse.
Background. 1. The collision. On October 23, 2010, while traveling north on South Street in Pittsfield, a 2011 Hyundai Sonata operated by the defendant crossed the center line and struck an oncoming Ford Focus, killing the passenger, Michael Ashline, and seriously injuring the driver, Nicole Rudd. The crash occurred at approximately 5:00 p.m. The weather and road conditions were dry, and the percipient and expert witnesses agreed that the defendant's car was going at the speed of traffic and within the speed limit.
Five witnesses who were traveling on South Street at the time of the collision testified that they observed nothing unusual before the defendant's car suddenly swerved left and crossed the center line. Two other witnesses testified that the car veered to the right once, then a second time, striking the curb and causing rubber to peel off the passenger's side tire. The car then veered to the left and into oncoming traffic. The Commonwealth's accident reconstruction experts did not, however, observe any damage to or marks on the tires or the whitewalls consistent with hitting a curb (or anything else) before the crash.
There were five cans of beer in the car—one open twelve-ounce “Bud Light” beer can with liquid on the lip found on the floor of the front passenger's side, and four unopened twelve-ounce “Bud Light” beer cans on the back seat and floor. The paramedic and the police officer at the scene detected an odor of alcohol coming from the defendant. The defendant's whole blood alcohol concentration was .06 percent; the judge instructed the jury that impairment could not be inferred from that blood alcohol concentration alone, and that they must look at all of the evidence in the case.
The defendant was prescribed Vicodin for pain on September 21, 2010, and was scheduled for gall bladder surgery in November of 2010. At the time of the collision, one month after receiving the prescription, he had taken six of the fifteen pills prescribed. Blood tests showed the presence of 1.4 micrograms of hydrocodone, the analgesic pain reliever found in Vicodin, per deciliter of blood. Both alcohol and hydrocodone are central nervous system depressants. According to the emergency department
trauma unit surgeon who treated the defendant, hydrocodone and alcohol in combination increase the effect of one another.
The surgeon treated the defendant for alcohol withdrawal because the defendant, unconscious on admission, appeared disoriented and agitated when he regained consciousness. Six days later, the defendant had a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) examination. He then was seen by a neurologist who determined that the defendant suffered from diffuse axonal injury, a traumatic brain injury otherwise known as “brain sheer.” The neurologist and the surgeon testified that the symptoms of brain sheer are the same as those of alcohol withdrawal, i.e., agitation and disorientation, and that brain sheer also causes short-term memory loss. Both physicians agreed that the brain sheer could not have been diagnosed upon admission, and that it was not evident until the MRI was conducted several days later, after the defendant's condition had stabilized. There was no testimony concerning long-term alcohol abuse or dependency.
The defendant testified at trial, stating he had no memory of the collision or of most of the events leading up to it. He did recall working with his wife Cheryl to close up their lake house on the day of the crash. The defendant could not recall whether he had taken Vicodin or had drunk beer that day. Cheryl testified that she left the lake house at 3:30 p.m. , and had not observed the defendant drink alcohol or take Vicodin while they were together. She saw him drive past her at approximately 4:00 p.m. She confirmed that, since the collision, the defendant has suffered from short-term memory loss, and has had issues with his speech and his judgment.
2. The recall notice. After the collision, Cheryl received a notice of recall from Hyundai Motor America (Hyundai), which stated that 2011 Hyundai Sonata vehicles “may have improperly assembled or loose steering column intermediate shaft universal joint connections,” a defect that, if uncorrected, “would” cause the driver to “lose the ability to steer the front wheels,” and “may increase the risk of a vehicle crash.” The recall notice also stated that a Hyundai dealer “will update the power steering software to ensure that steering wheel vibration or shaking will not occur as a result of a motor driven power steering malfunction.” The recall notice further stated that “manual steering is still operative,” and a warning light “will illuminate indicating that the power steering is not operating properly.” Cheryl brought the recall notice to the Pittsfield police.
3. Expert testimony. The role of the power steering in the collision was contested at trial. State Trooper Michael George testified as an expert for the Commonwealth. Trooper George attended vocational high school, and worked as an automobile mechanic and a tow truck driver before becoming a dispatcher for the North Attleborough police department. After joining the State police, Trooper George received extensive training and experience as an accident reconstruction specialist.
There was no objection to the trooper's testimony as a mechanical expert or as an accident reconstruction expert. The trooper conducted the mechanical inspection outlined in the recall notice and the accompanying technical service bulletin.1 He opined that there was no mechanical failure in the steering mechanism, and that the steering system was “properly installed.”
There was objection, however, to the trooper's testimony regarding the computer system and the software update. The Hyundai Sonata was powered by a computer-assisted, motor-driven power steering mechanism, not a mechanically operated hydraulic power steering mechanism. Because the recall notice was received after the collision, the software update had not been performed. The defendant objected to the testimony of Trooper George regarding the computer system on the ground that George had no “foundation for his knowledge” of the system or the software. The judge overruled the objection, but directed the prosecutor to lay additional foundation in the presence of the jury.
While the trooper had a background in automobile mechanics, he did not testify to any training or experience in computer science, computer software, or computer systems.2 He had “inspected,” but not “worked on” the type of computer-assisted motorized steering system described in the recall notice. He did not examine the software or the computer program, and did not observe the process for updating the software on any other vehicle. He did not display any specific knowledge of how the software program in the recall notice actually worked. The trooper testified that he had conversations with Hyundai mechanics and had read articles, manuals, and online resources, including interviews with engineers in peer-reviewed journals, concerning
the motorized power steering system.3
Over renewed objection, the trooper then testified at length regarding the computer software and the relationship between the motorized power steering and the computer system. He stated that the motorized power steering provided additional assistance to the steering mechanism, but could not “take over” the car.4 He further testified that, based on his discussions with the mechanics and his research, He stated that the mechanical system always remained available to steer the car, and that sensors in the computer system would “shut down a system if there are any malfunctions.” The trooper ruled out the motor-driven power steering as a cause of the crash.
On cross-examination, however, the trooper acknowledged that this description was based on what happened when the computer system was operating properly. He stated that the computer program linked to the motor changes the amount of assistance given to, and torque on, the steering column based on the speed of the car. He agreed that the motor may react very quickly and may move with a lot of force when it is directed to do so by the computer program, which controls both amperage and voltage. He also testified that similar motor-driven systems in other cars can be programmed to provide “park assist,” that is, parking of the car without any assistance by the driver or manual operation of the steering column. He reiterated, however, that this car did not have park assist, and that the safety features in this vehicle's computer program would turn the system off if there were an unusual event.
It also emerged during Trooper George's testimony that although he inspected the mechanical...
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