Commonwealth v. Haddad
| Decision Date | 08 December 1924 |
| Citation | 250 Mass. 391,145 N.E. 561 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. HADDAD. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exception from Superior Criminal Court, Middlesex County; E. B. Bishop, Judge.
John A. Haddad was convicted of burning merchandise with intent to injure insurers, and he excepts. Exceptions overruled.A. K. Reading, Dist. Atty., and W. L. Bishop, Asst. Dist. Atty., both of Boston, for the Commonwealth.
Herbert Parker, of Boston, for defendant.
The defendant was tried on two indictments, one, charging him with willfully and maliciously burning the dwelling house of John Kirby, on which he was acquitted; and the other, with burning certain personal property which was insured against loss and damage by fire with intent to injure the insurers, on which indictment he was found guilty. The exceptions are stated in an original and a supplemental bill of exceptions, and relate to the admission and exclusion of evidence at the trial, and to the refusal of the trial judge, at the hearing on a motion for a new trial, to rule that the verdict of ‘guilty’ must be set aside, because it was manifestly inconsistent and in conflict with the finding and verdict by the same jury and upon the same evidence of ‘not guilty’ under the indictment charging the defendant with burning a dwelling house.
The testimony tended to show that the defendant was the lessee and occupant of certain rooms used by him in the manufacture of women's garments located on the ground floor of a building in Natick; that his premises extended from the front to the rear of the building, and immediately adjoining, and on the same floor was a plumbing shop and a wet wash laundry plant; that the second floor was occupied by lodgers; and that one John Kirby, the owner of the building, with his family occupied as a dwelling, a part of the third floor, above the premises of the defendant. Evidence was introduced in support of all material allegations in the indictment upon which the defendant was convicted.
[1][2] The first exception relates to the exclusion of a question asked in cross-examination of a witness called by the commonwealth, whether she had a talk with the defendant in reference to hiring more girls to do the work, after she had testified to the employment by the defendant of a smaller number of employees than formerly. The trial judge ruled that that ‘conversation was not material in this case if she had one,’ to which ruling the defendant excepted. The trial judge suggested that inquiry be made whether she had a conversation. Counsel then asked: ‘Did you have a talk with Mr. Haddad in reference to hiring more girls or doing any big job?’ And the witness replied: Counsel then said: ‘* * * State what that conversation was.’ This question was excluded subject to the defendant's exception.
The question was rightly excluded. The witness had not testified that there was a conversation. Furthermore, had there been one, a statement made by the defendant on the subject would be self-serving, and there was no offer of proof to show what testimony was expected in reply to the excluded question.
[3] The commonwealth offered as a witness the tax collector of the town of Natick, who testified that he had with him the tax books of that town for the years 1921 and 1922; that the book produced by him was ‘an exact duplicate of the book that the assessors keep’; that there was another book kept by the assessors (which the witness did not have) showing abatements. Counsel for the defendant excepted to the admission of any evidence from the book which the collector had, on the ground that it was not a complete record. The commonwealth then offered the following entry in the book: ‘John A. Haddad * * * Tax on personal estate, $69.12; on real estate, $201.60; on gypsy moth, $2.28; a total of $273 for the year 1921.’ The witness testified, without objection, that he had not received payment of any part of that tax. The jury were permitted to see the book, but it was not marked as an exhibit, and the defendant took an exception to its admission. The witness also was permitted to show the jury, subject to the defendant's exception, similar entries for the year 1922, making a total tax of $230.62, no part of which had been paid. The judge then stated to the jury that ‘the books are admitted, or the testimony of the witness is admitted from the book, to show * * * the charge that has been made-it does not appear on the record that the charge has been paid; that is as far as they go.’
The exception to the admission of the entries in the books because they are not complete records is not well taken. If there had been an abatement it was open to the defendant to show it. The testimony that no part of the tax had been paid may have a bearing on this contention. It is the duty of the assessors to commit the tax list with their warrant to the collector of taxes (G. L. c. 59, § 53), and it is his duty to collect the taxes therein set forth (G. L. c. 59, § 2), and also to keep in the book containing the tax list committed to him, against the name of every person assessed, entries showing the disposition thereof, whether reassessed, abated, or paid, together with the date of such disposition (G. L. c. 60, § 6). Apparently the book shown the jury was the tax list required to be delivered by the assessors to the collector for his official action, if not, the evidence was limited to the single purpose of showing that it does not appear on the record that the tax has been paid. Its admissibility, therefore, is not controlled by the decisions which hold that assessors' records are not competent, as between third parties, to prove the situation of land, the domicile of the person assessed, or, apart from statute, the value of land. It was the contention of counsel for the defendant that the amount of the taxes assessed to him was in dispute. The judge...
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Com. v. Jacobson
...taxes on time was clearly relevant to the prosecutor's theory of Jacobson's motive for burning the house. See Commonwealth v. Haddad, 250 Mass. 391, 396-397, 145 N.E. 561 (1924). Jacobson was free to contradict this evidence by providing the jury with legitimate explanations for his delinqu......
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...v. Cooper, 264 Mass. at 374, 162 N.E. 729. The evidence of the defendant's "financial embarassment," see Commonwealth v. Haddad, 250 Mass. 391, 397, 145 N.E. 561 (1924), her immediate and frantic efforts to obtain insurance advances and the circumstances surrounding the rental, use and conc......
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...defendant, he should have been permitted to show them to rebut the evidence of motive introduced by the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Haddad, 250 Mass. 391, 145 N.E. 561. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 368, 162 N.E. 729. It would not be illogical to assume that the money would be availab......
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