Commonwealth v. Hamilton

• Citation: 449 Pa. 297,297 A.2d 127
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Leonard C. HAMILTON.
• Decision Date: 22 November 1972
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

297 A.2d 127

449 Pa. 297

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Leonard C. HAMILTON.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 22, 1972.

Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., Richard A. Sprague First Asst. Dist. Atty., James D. Crawford, Deputy Dist Atty., Milton M. Stein, Chief, Appeals Div., Carolyn E Temin, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for appellant.

Peter A. Galante, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION

NIX, Justice.

On November 19, 1965, Rudolph Frazier was found shot to death in the City of Philadelphia. Initial police investigation led authorities to believe that Leonard Curtis Hamilton was the principal suspect and a warrant was obtained for his arrest. Subsequently, Hamilton was found to be incarcerated in Spartansburg, South Carolina, having been charged with robbery and murder in that jurisdiction. On November 30, 1965, Sergeant Francis Brennan of the Philadelphia Police Department went to Spartansburg to interview Hamilton. After obtaining his statement, Sergeant Brennan lodged an arrest detainer against Hamilton charging him with murder.

Nothing further was done in the case until March of 1971 when Hamilton initiated proceedings to remove the detainer. As a result he was brought back to Philadelphia and on July 13, 1971, counsel was appointed to represent him. Following a preliminary hearing, Hamilton was indicted for murder on August 25, 1971, and counsel then filed a petition to dismiss the indictment claiming that the Commonwealth had denied him his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Subsequently, a hearing was held and on September 27, 1971, Hamilton's application to quash the indictment was granted. The Commonwealth appeals.

I. Constitutional Limitations of the Right to a Speedy Trial

Although it is well settled that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require a state to provide every defendant a speedy trial, Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 26 L.Ed.2d 26 (1970); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967), the United States Supreme Court has only recently identified with specificity the factors to be balanced in determining whether a particular defendant's right has been denied in this regard. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). The considerations are: The length of the delay; the reason for the delay; the defendant's assertion of his right; and the prejudice to the defendant. A balancing of these factors in the instant case causes us to conclude that appellee was denied a speedy trial.

A. Length of the Delay

The delay in this case must be computed from the time when Commonwealth authorities lodged a detainer against the appellee in November, 1965, to the time when appellee petitioned to dismiss the indictment in September, 1971--a period of almost six years. Such an appalling delay is a convincing indication that appellee's right was violated. At the very least, it is long enough to trigger an inquiry into the other factors. 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117.

B. Reason for the Delay

The record is clear that the Commonwealth made no effort to bring appellee to trial for nearly six years after the institution of criminal proceedings, yet no legitimate excuse is offered for this inaction. Commonwealth authorities made no attempt to extradite appellee even though they knew he was incarcerated in South Carolina. ^[1] Having failed to pursue this procedure, the Commonwealth cannot now offer the fact of incarceration in another jurisdiction as an excuse for the delay. ^[2]

C. Assertion of the Right to Speedy Trial

Under the Barker formulation, an accused's claim of excessive delay is enhanced by evidence that his demands to go to trial were refused. Appellee testified that he did not know of the Pennsylvania detainer until sometime in 1971, and therefore he could hardly be charged for not challenging it earlier. ^[3] When appellee did learn of the detainer, he petitioned to have it removed. Only then did the Commonwealth proceed to take action to accomplish his return to Pennsylvania. Appellee thus exhibited no reluctance to go to trial; to the contrary, it was at his initiative that the Commonwealth reactivated the case.

D. Prejudice to the Accused

Appellee has demonstrated that the delay in trying his case worked to his considerable disadvantage. Most significant is the intervening death of Shirley Goings, a witness who might have offered testimony favorable to the appellee. In addition, appellee has received treatment in a psychiatric hospital and claims to be suffering from loss of memory. He testified that this memory loss has prevented him from recalling the circumstances of the alleged offense, the name of the bartender who could have testified as to his state of intoxication on the date of the crime, and the name of his landlady's son who could have testified as to his emotional state on the date of the offense and the nature of his relationship with the decedent.

We hold, under the standards announced in Barker, that the appellee has been denied his right to a speedy trial and affirm the order of the lower court quashing the indictment.

II. The Pennsylvania Rule

Barker represents the minimum standards guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We also have the mandate of Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution: 'In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to . . . a speedy public trial .', and our interpretation of this section need not be limited to the standards set forth to enforce the Federal guarantee. See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967); Commonwealth v. Harris, 429 Pa. 215, 219 n. 2, 239 A.2d 290, 292 n. 2 (1968). In Barker, the Supreme Court declined to establish a presumptive time period within which a state must try a defendant because it felt that such a rule 'goes further than the Constitution requires'. 407 U.S. at 529, 92 S.Ct. at 2191, 33 L.Ed.2d at 116. At the same time, however, the Court was careful to make it clear that, '(n)othing we have said should be interpreted as disapproving a presumptive rule adopted by a court in the exercise of its supervisory powers which establishes a fixed time period within which cases must normally be brought.' 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, n. 29, 33 L.Ed.2d at 116, n. 29. In fact, '(m)ost states have enacted statutes setting forth the time within which a defendant must be tried following the date when he was arrested, held to answer, committed or indicted . . .' American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards For Criminal Justice--Standards Relating to Speedy Trial, Approved Draft, 1968, at 2. ^[4] We will therefore proceed to examine the right to speedy trial as guaranteed by Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

Pennsylvania has long had a 'two term' or '180-day' rule providing for the discharge from imprisonment of any accused who has not been tried the second term after his commitment (within six months for a county of the second class), unless the delay happens on the application of or with the assent of the accused. ^[5] Such a discharge from imprisonment does not bar posecution of the charges and only admits the defendant to bail until the cause is ultimately brought to trial. Commonwealth v. Clark, 439 Pa. 192, 196, 266 A.2d 741, 744 (1969); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 153 Pa.Super. 582, 34 A.2d 905 (1943), affirmed on the opinion below, 349 Pa. 559, 37 A.2d 443 (1944). Further the rule is designed to apply only to committed defendants awaiting trial and privides no relief for defendants who are in a bail status but are being denied a speedy trial.

Inordinate delay between the institution of charges and the trial seriously interferes with the defendant's liberty whether he is free on bail or not. The defendant who is free on bail may find that the pending charges 'disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him, his familty and his friends.' United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 463, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). In addition to the general concern that all accused persons be treated according to decent and fair procedures, the Supreme Court in Barker noted the following societal interests in providing a speedy trial to defendants Free on bail: 'The inability of courts to provide a prompt trial has contributed to a large backlog of cases in urban courts which, among other things, enables defendants to negotiate more effectively for pleas of guilty to lesser offenses and otherwise manipulate the system. In addition, persons released on bond for lengthy periods awaiting trial have an opportunity to commit other crimes. . . . Moreover, the longer an accused is free awaiting trial, the more tempting becomes his opportunity to jump bail and escape. Finally, delay between arrest and punishment may have a detrimental effect on rehabilitation.' (footnotes omitted). Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. at 2187, 33 L.Ed.2d at 111. Thus, the 'two term' rule's failure to apply to defendants free on bail renders it wholly inadequate to protect either the interests of the accused or the interests of society.

The rule is also inadequate in that it is effective only when the accused demands his release prior to trial. Commonwealth v Halderman, 299 Pa. 198, 149 A. 476 (1930). Often, the unsophisticated, indigent defendant is without counsel until the trial, and, since the rule is not self-executing, those defendants who most need the...