Commonwealth v. Harkins

• Decision Date: 20 January 1880
• Citation: 128 Mass. 79
• Parties: Commonwealth v. Hugh Harkins
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

128 Mass. 79

Commonwealth v. Hugh Harkins

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

January 20, 1880

Argued November 8, 1878; November 25, 1879

Essex. Indictment on the Gen. Sts. c. 161, § 54, charging that the defendant, on June 9, 1877, at Lynn, "being a person of evil disposition, and devising and intending by unlawful ways and means to obtain and get into his possession the moneys of the city of Lynn, a municipal corporation, within said county of Essex, duly and legally established by the laws of said Commonwealth, and with intent to cheat and defraud, did then and there unlawfully, knowingly and designedly, falsely pretend and represent, to said city through its agent, servant and city solicitor, Rollin E Harmon, that said city, on the third day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six negligently suffered Union Street, a public highway and street in said Lynn, which said city was bound to keep in repair and safe for travel, to be out of repair and dangerous, that he the said Harkins, while travelling on said Union Street and using due care, on said third day of said September, was hurt and injured by reason of the dangerous condition of said street and highway, that before said hurt and injury he the said Harkins was well and strong, was able to labor daily, and that by reason of said hurt and injury he was disabled for many days thereafter from performing any labor whatever, and that by reason of said hurt and injury, so received as aforesaid, he had suffered great pain and inconvenience until said ninth day of said June; and he the said Harkins then and there exhibited to said Harmon, servant, agent and solicitor, as aforesaid, his the said Harkins's foot and ankle in a maimed and injured condition, and then and there falsely and fraudulently pretended and represented to said Harmon, servant, agent and solicitor as aforesaid, that said maimed and injured condition of his foot was caused by said hurt and injury received by him on said Union Street. And the said city of Lynn, then and there believing the said false pretences and representations, and being deceived thereby, and said Harmon, agent, servant and solicitor, as aforesaid, believing said false pretences and representations, so made as aforesaid, by said Harkins, and being deceived thereby, the said city of Lynn, and said Harmon, agent, servant and solicitor as aforesaid, were induced and did then and there consent and agree to the entry of a certain judgment, against said city, for the sum of, and of the value of, five hundred and eighty-seven dollars and fifty cents, which said judgment was then and there entered in pursuance of said agreement, in a certain suit, then pending in the Superior Court, civil session, for said county of Essex, in which suit said Harkins, under the name of Frank Hawkins, was plaintiff and said city was defendant; and said city of Lynn, and said Harmon, agent, servant and solicitor, as aforesaid, then and there believing said false and fraudulent representations and pretences, so made as aforesaid by said Harkins, and being deceived thereby, said city then and there paid to said Harkins the amount of said judgment, to wit, the sum of five hundred and eighty-seven dollars and fifty cents, of the property and money of said city. And the said Harkins did then and there obtain said judgment against said city of Lynn, and did then and there receive said sum of five hundred and eighty-seven dollars and fifty cents, by means of the false pretences and representations aforesaid, and with the intent to cheat and defraud said city of Lynn of the amount of said judgment, to wit, of said sum of five hundred and eighty-seven dollars and fifty cents. Whereas, in truth and in fact, said Harkins was not then and there hurt and injured by reason of any defect or want of repair in said Union Street, and said Harkins was not well and strong and able to labor daily before said third day of said September and before said alleged hurt and injury, and said Harkins was not disabled by reason of said alleged hurt and injury for many days thereafter from performing any labor whatever; and whereas in truth and in fact said Harkins was not then and there injured by reason of said alleged hurt on said Union Street, and he did not suffer great pain and inconvenience until said ninth day of said June; and whereas in truth and in fact said injured and maimed condition of said foot and ankle, so exhibited to said Harmon as aforesaid, was not caused by said hurt and injury on said Union Street, and in truth and in fact said Harkins was not injured or hurt on said Union Street, or in said Lynn at all; all of which the said Harkins then and there well knew; against the peace of the Commonwealth aforesaid, and contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided."

In the Superior Court, before the jury were empanelled, the defendant moved to quash the indictment, on the ground that it set forth no offence known to the law. Bacon, J. overruled the motion. The defendant was then tried, and found guilty; and alleged exceptions.

Exceptions sustained.

The case was argued at the bar in November 1878, by F. W. Griffin, for the defendant, and C. R. Train, Attorney General, for the Commonwealth; and submitted on briefs to all the judges in November 1879, by Griffin, for the defendant, and G. Marston, Attorney General, for the Commonwealth.

Colt, J. Soule, J. concurred.

OPINION

Colt

The defendant was indicted for obtaining money from the city of Lynn by false pretences. He moved to quash the indictment on the ground that it did not set forth an offence known to the law.

It is alleged in substance that the defendant falsely represented to the city of Lynn, through its agent, the city solicitor, that a street which the city was bound to repair had been suffered to be out of repair, and that the defendant, while travelling thereon with due care, was injured by the defect; that the defendant at the same time exhibited an injury to his foot and ankle, and represented that it was caused by the alleged defect. It is further alleged that the city and its solicitor were deceived by these representations, and, being induced thereby, agreed to the entry of a judgment against the city in a suit then pending in favor of the defendant in this case; and upon the entry thereof paid the amount of the same to him. It is not alleged that the suit was to recover damages on account of the defendant's injury from the alleged defect; but we assume that this was so, for otherwise there could be no possible connection, immediate or remote, between the pretences charged and the payment of the money in satisfaction of the judgment recovered.

In the opinion of a majority of the court, this indictment is defective. The facts stated do not constitute the offence of obtaining money by false pretences. The allegations are, that an agreement that judgment should be rendered was obtained by the pretences used, and that the money was paid by the city in satisfaction of that judgment. It is not alleged that after the judgment was rendered, any false pretences were used to obtain the money due upon it; and, even with proper allegations to that effect, it has been held that no indictment lies against one for obtaining by such means that which is justly due him. There is no legal injury to the party who so pays what in law he is bound to pay. Commonwealth v. McDuffy, 126 Mass. 467. People v. Thomas, 3 Hill 169. Rex v. Williams, 7 Car. & P. 354. A judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive evidence between the parties to it that the amount of it is justly due to the judgment creditor. Until the judgment obtained by the defendant was reversed, the city was legally bound to pay it, notwithstanding it may have then had knowledge of the original fraud by which it was obtained; and with or...