Commonwealth v. Harper
| Decision Date | 19 October 1887 |
| Citation | 145 Mass. 100,13 N.E. 459 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. HARPER. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
John Hopkins, for defendant.
The government undertook to prove two propositions: (1) That Frank Dolan intended to sell the liquor; and (2) "that on June 12th he was generally known and reputed to be a dealer in intoxicating liquors in this place and grocery store." The defendant claims that the evidence offered to establish the first proposition was not competent, as against him, upon the issue presented. The question of Dolan's intent is only of consequence as it bears upon the question of whether the defendant had reasonable cause to believe that the intent was unlawful. It is therefore of consequence only as it appears that he knew it. If Dolan had received the whisky, and was under indictment for its illegal keeping, it may well be, upon the adjudicated cases, that his purpose might be proved by evidence of his former dealings with liquors, and his suspicious actions detailed in the evidence of the assistant marshal might be competent as against him. The former transaction is within his knowledge. It is within his power to explain it, if it is susceptible of explanation on the theory of his innocence.
As a general proposition, the fact of detection in one crime does not prove, or tend to prove, the commission of a second offense, either like or unlike. To hold otherwise would be to hold that there is, outside of confinement, no room for repentance and reform, and their natural result, and to overcome the presumption of innocence, and establish the presumption of guilt, as a practical doctrine in case of second offenders. It does not follow that evidence competent to prove the intent of Dolan, when the issue is between himself and the government, is competent to prove his intent when the issue is between another and the government. To make it so, it must be within the knowledge of the defendant. The case does not find that the defendant had any knowledge of the transaction of June 9th, as detailed by the assistant marshal.
The doctrine that general reputation is admissible upon the question of reasonable cause to believe the fact concerning which a general reputation is alleged to exist, is found, in our reports, in cases arising between the assignees of insolvent debtors and persons dealing with them and with the property of the debtor. The reason of the rule is that a person dealing with the insolvent may fairly be presumed to acquaint himself with his financial standing. He has an interest in it. He is to be affected by it. His interest in the subject-matter puts him upon inquiry. He thus learns the general reputation. The reason of the rule fails when the person sought to be affected by it has no interest in the subject-matter. The term "general reputation" in the business world has a restricted meaning. It is the reputation among that class of persons and in that sphere in which the person of whom it is affirmed moves. Is the servant of either to be affected civilly by the general reputation of the other? Assuming the fact to be proved that Dolan was generally known and reputed to be a dealer in intoxicating liquor, the defendant contends that, standing by itself, that is not competent to charge him, criminally, with reasonable cause to believe that Dolan intended unlawfully to sell the whisky which he, as servant of the Millbury dealer, was to deliver. In order to its competency, it must be brought home to him. The case does not find that he had any dealings with or knowledge of Dolan after May 1, 1886, prior to which time Dolan could lawfully sell liquors. There is no presumption that he would unlawfully sell after that time.
Andrew J. Waterman, Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.
The rulings of the court were correct. The defendants' request for specifications, the requiring of which is...
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