Commonwealth v. Harris
| Decision Date | 29 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-P-755 |
| Citation | 190 N.E.3d 1124 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Ronnie M. HARRIS. |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Inna Landsman, Littleton, for the defendant.
Benjamin Shorey, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Present: Sullivan, Sacks, & Shin, JJ.
The defendant, convicted in 1975 of murder in the second degree and armed assault with intent to murder, appeals from an order denying his first motion for a new trial, filed in 2019, with respect to the murder conviction. He contends that the jury instructions included an unconstitutional mandatory presumption of malice, in violation of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). We conclude that the jury instructions created a presumption of malice, that the language was not explained and corrected by other language in the instructions, and that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, entitling the defendant to a new trial.1
Background. The underlying facts are largely set forth in Commonwealth v. Harris, 376 Mass. 201, 380 N.E.2d 642 (1978), which affirmed the defendant's convictions on a direct appeal that included plenary review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, as then in effect.2 For present purposes it suffices to say that in mid-March of 1974, the defendant, then nineteen years old, and one Donald Haynes had a dispute involving a purchase of heroin, of which both were users. See Harris, supra at 203, 380 N.E.2d 642. On that occasion, Haynes forcibly took heroin from the defendant. See id. Whether Haynes used a knife to do so, and whether Haynes's friend Mack Clark, the eventual homicide victim, was present at the time, were disputed.
The fatal incident occurred a few days later, on March 22, 1974, on a street corner in Boston, when the defendant and a friend encountered a group that included Haynes and Clark. Words were exchanged. Id. at 203, 380 N.E.2d 642. According to Haynes and other prosecution witnesses, the defendant drew a gun, lunged at Haynes, and fired a shot that passed through Haynes's coat without hitting him. Id. at 204, 380 N.E.2d 642. The defendant then turned to Clark, who was seven or eight feet away, and fired a single shot at him, causing his death. See id. The defendant then fled. Id.
The defendant and other defense witnesses, in contrast, testified that Haynes approached the defendant from behind, demanded drugs, held a knife to the defendant's neck, tried to stab him, and cut his ear. See id. at 205-206, 380 N.E.2d 642. In the ensuing scuffle, the defendant fell down, saw Haynes coming at him with the knife, pulled a gun out of his pocket, and fired at Haynes. The defendant, still on the ground, then saw Clark coming at him with a knife and so shot Clark, fatally, before fleeing. See id.
The defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree of Clark and armed assault with intent to murder Haynes.3 Id. at 201, 380 N.E.2d 642. At the trial in March of 1975, the Commonwealth's theory was that the defendant went to the street corner to attack Haynes, in retaliation for Haynes previously having robbed the defendant of heroin, and then shot Clark. The defendant's theory was self-defense: he went to the street corner with no intention of hurting anyone;4 when Haynes demanded drugs and attacked him with a knife, he shot at Haynes; and when Clark came " ‘over’ him with a knife," he shot Clark in self-defense. Id. at 205, 380 N.E.2d 642.
On the murder charge, the judge instructed the jury on murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, murder in the second degree, manslaughter on theories of excessive force in self-defense and by heat of passion on reasonable provocation or on sudden combat, and self-defense. The judge's instructions on malice included the statement, "Malice, as I have said, is implied to every cruel act," but did not define or explain the word "cruel." The jury returned verdicts of guilty of murder in the second degree as to Clark and armed assault with intent to murder as to Haynes. The defendant was sentenced to life in prison, with a concurrent sentence of not more than ten years or less than eight years for the armed assault conviction.
In 1989, the defendant was paroled; he remained at liberty for twenty-nine years. He was returned to custody in August of 2018 based on alleged parole violations and in 2019 was convicted of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen, for which he received a two-year house of correction sentence. On appeal, that conviction was affirmed. Commonwealth v. Harris, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1123, 2022 WL 319880 (2022).
Also in 2019, the defendant filed his first motion for a new trial in this case, directed only to the murder charge. He asserted that the jury instructions included an unconstitutional mandatory presumption of malice, misdescribed the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, and shifted the burden to him to prove reasonable provocation as a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter. He also asserted that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to argue reasonable provocation.
A motion judge, who was not the trial judge, denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing.5 She concluded that the defendant's various challenges to the jury instructions were barred by estoppel based on the decision on his direct appeal. She rejected his ineffective assistance claim, concluding that trial counsel's strategy was not manifestly unreasonable. This appeal followed.
Discussion. A judge "may grant a new trial at any time if it appears that justice may not have been done." Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). On appeal of a ruling on a motion for a new trial, we review for "a significant error of law or other abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307, 491 N.E.2d 246 (1986). The passage of many years, even decades, between a trial and a motion for a new trial "does not invalidate" the motion, although "[t]he desirability of finality in the adjudication of cases and the Commonwealth's interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice are factors to be considered along with the ever-present concern that justice not miscarry for the defendant."
Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 631, 636-637, 756 N.E.2d 1 (2001), quoting Commonwealth v. Curtis, 417 Mass. 619, 623, 632 N.E.2d 821 (1994). "Although the public's interest in the finality of criminal convictions is weighty, it is not always paramount." Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 294, 780 N.E.2d 58 (2002). "In our system the motion for a new trial, which can be made at any time even decades after the initial adjudication, responds to this need." Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 637, 677 N.E.2d 652 (1997). See Commonwealth v. Watkins (No. 1), 486 Mass. 801, 805 n.7, 162 N.E.3d 638 (2021) ().
1. Mandatory presumption of malice. The defendant argues that the trial judge, by instructing the jury that "[m]alice ... is implied to every cruel act,"6 established a mandatory presumption of malice in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as construed in Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523-524, 99 S.Ct. 2450.7 "A mandatory presumption instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed fact if the State proves certain predicate facts." Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985). "It is well established that language in jury instructions of any presumption, whether conclusive or rebuttable, that has the effect of shifting from the prosecution to a defendant the burden of proof on an essential element of the crime charged offends the defendant's Federal constitutional right to due process." Commonwealth v. Medina, 430 Mass. 800, 802, 723 N.E.2d 986 (2000), citing Sandstrom, supra at 519-520, 523-524, 99 S.Ct. 2450.
It would thus be error to instruct the jury that malice is "presumed" from particular facts, because such an instruction shifts the burden to the defendant of disproving malice, an element of murder.8 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Repoza, 400 Mass. 516, 521, 510 N.E.2d 755, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935, 108 S.Ct. 311, 98 L.Ed.2d 270 (1987) ; Commonwealth v. Zezima, 387 Mass. 748, 751-752, 443 N.E.2d 1282 (1982) ; Commonwealth v. Callahan, 380 Mass. 821, 822-823, 406 N.E.2d 385 (1980), S.C., 386 Mass. 784, 438 N.E.2d 45 (1982), S.C., 401 Mass. 627, 519 N.E.2d 245 (1988). The question here is whether the challenged instruction, "malice is implied to every cruel act," had the effect of telling the jury that malice is presumed from every cruel act.
If it did, it would be error, because an act may be cruel without being done with malice. "[A] cruel act may be defined simply as an extremely painful one, see Webster's Third New International Dictionary 546 (1961), and proof of a cruel act therefore does not necessarily prove the depraved state of mind that constitutes malice." Hill v. Maloney, 927 F.2d 646, 653 (1st Cir. 1990). Indeed, model instructions in some murder cases recognize that there is "cruelty inherent in any taking of a human life." Commonwealth v. Sok, 439 Mass. 428, 437, 788 N.E.2d 941 (2003). See Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485 Mass. 852, 864, 153 N.E.3d 1210 (2020), quoting Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 54-55 (2018) (same). The judge here did not give the jury any definition or explanation of the word "cruel" -- saying only that "[e]very murder is cruel" -- and thus left the jury free to apply either or both of the foregoing understandings of the word. We must therefore determine whether the instruction mandated a presumption of malice from a "cruel" act and, if so, whether this error entitles the defendant to a new trial.
a. Standard of review. Sandstrom is applied retroactively. See Commonwealth v. White, 392 Mass. 282, 285, 467 N.E.2d...
To continue reading
Request your trial