Commonwealth v. Haughwout
| Docket Number | 1366 MDA 2022,J-S12040-23 |
| Decision Date | 28 August 2023 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. GUY C. HAUGHWOUT, SR. Appellant |
| Court | Superior Court of Pennsylvania |
1
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
v.
GUY C. HAUGHWOUT, SR. Appellant
No. 1366 MDA 2022
No. J-S12040-23
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
August 28, 2023
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered September 15, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0001537-2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 15, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0003790-2013
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J. [*]
MEMORANDUM
COLINS, J.:
Appellant, Guy C. Haughwout, Sr., appeals pro se from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County that dismissed his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541, et seq. He previously entered guilty pleas to failing to comply with registration
requirements and failing to provide accurate registration information under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(1), (3).[1] He now challenges the legality of his sentence, the constitutionality of his convictions, and the effectiveness of his prior counsel. After careful consideration, we agree that Appellant's convictions violate the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions and, as a result, Appellant is serving an illegal sentence. We vacate the PCRA court's order, reverse Appellant's convictions, vacate his judgments of sentence, and remand with instructions.
On February 15, 2002, Appellant was determined to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) pursuant to Megan's Law II, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-99, in cases docketed at CP-40-CR-0003884-2000 and CP-40-CR-0001199-2001, in which Appellant had entered guilty pleas to, inter alia, two counts of indecent
assault.[2] Commonwealth v. Haughwout, 837 A.2d 480, 482 (Pa. Super. 2003). The indecent assault charges were based on "incidents involving his five-year-old daughter in the Fall of 2000 and a ten-year-old girl during the Fall of 1996." Id. As a sexually violent predator under Megan's Law II, Appellant was subject to lifetime registration requirements. Id. at 487, citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1(b)(3).
On September 17, 2015, Appellant entered a guilty plea to single counts of failure to provide accurate registration information and failing to comply with registration requirements at CP-40-CR-0001537-2014, and two counts of failing to provide accurate registration information at CP-40-CR-0003790-2014. N.T. 9/17/15, 2-3, 8. With respect to the former case, Appellant failed to "provide accurate information and, in fact, provided false information when registering," and, in the latter case, he "failed to report that he owned a vehicle both on March 8th, 2013, and May 6th, 2013." Id. at 6-7. At a deferred sentencing hearing, the plea court imposed an aggregate term of eleven to twenty-two years' imprisonment.[3] N.T. 9/17/15, 8; N.T. 10/26/15, 12-14;
Sentencing Order, 10/26/15, 1. Appellant appealed. This Court vacated the judgments of sentence and remanded for resentencing. Commonwealth v. Haughwout, 161 A.3d 376 (Pa. Super. 2017) (table).
On remand, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea that the plea court denied. On October 6, 2017, the plea court resentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of ten to twenty years' imprisonment.[4] N.T. 10/6/17, 10-11. A subsequent appeal was dismissed due to Appellant's failure to file a docketing statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 3517. PCRA Petition, 2/20/18, ¶¶ 6-7. After Appellant filed a PCRA petition, the lower court reinstated his direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. Order, 2/20/18, 1. On direct review, Appellant argued that our Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (2017) (plurality), rendered the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA I"), the former 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41, unconstitutional in its entirety and that the prior law under which Appellant was deemed a lifetime registrant could not be revived.[5]
Commonwealth v. Haughwout, 198 A.3d 403, 405 (Pa. Super. 2018). On October 30, 2018, this Court affirmed the judgments of sentence. Id. On April 30, 2019, our Supreme Court denied allocatur. Commonwealth v. Haughwout, 207 A.3d 905 (Pa. 2019) (table).
Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition in which he asserted that his plea counsel had provided ineffective assistance by: (1) not interviewing witnesses; (2) not gathering "electronic evidence;" (3) not petitioning for relief based on Muniz; (4) inducing his plea by leading him to believe that he would be sentenced to a term of "5 to 10;" (5) refusing to request the withdrawal of his guilty plea "while at his formal arraignment;" and (6) "conspiring with law enforcement and … court officials to attempt to manufacture evidence … in the event [Appellant] would be granted his request to withdraw his plea of guilty prior to being resentenced." PCRA Petition, 2/21/20, § 6(A). He also asserted in the petition that direct appeal counsel provided ineffective assistance by: (1) "making multiple factual errors [about Appellant's] length of sentence, which version of Megan's Law [he] was sentenced under, and the dates of [his] predicate offense;" (2) failing to demonstrate that SORNA I "violated the ex post facto clauses of both the Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutions and how [he] was disadvantaged by the retroactive application and enhanced reporting requirements of said act;" and (3) failing to challenge the legality of his sentence "for his predicate offense" which subjected him to lifetime
registration requirements as an SVP. Id. He lastly raised an ex post facto challenge to his sentences in the instant cases. Id. at § 15 ("whether (SORNA I) as applied to [Appellant] is an ex post facto violation under Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017)[,] and its progeny").
The PCRA court appointed counsel. Order, 3/13/20, 1. On May 29, 2020, PCRA counsel filed a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc), along with a petition to withdraw as counsel.[6] After the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss, Appellant filed a pro se response to counsel's Finley letter in which he asserted, inter alia, that PCRA counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a requested amended PCRA petition and abandoning Appellant by filing the Finley letter and the withdrawal motion. Pro Se Response to Finley Letter, 11/3/20, ¶ 6. In a supplemental pro se filing, Appellant argued that his convictions under § 4915.1 were illegal and could not be based on his indecent assault convictions which predated the effective date of SORNA I. Pro Se Motion for Relief Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(a), 1/19/21, 1-6.
On May 17, 2021, the PCRA court presided over a video-conference hearing during which Appellant restated his objections to counsel's Finley letter. N.T. 5/17/21, 3, 10-22. The court took the matter "under advisement" at the end of the hearing. Id. at 28; Order, 5/17/21, 1. While a decision
remained pending, Appellant filed a petition for leave to file an amended PCRA petition that the PCRA court denied because the new claim that Appellant wanted to raise in the proposed petition was based on a decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that had been vacated in the meantime. Pro Se Petition for Leave to Amend, 10/22/21; Order Regarding Petition to Amend, 12/30/21, 1. On December 30, 2021, the PCRA court issued an opinion setting forth reasons for its intent to dismiss Appellant's petition and granted counsel's withdrawal motion. Rule 907 Dismissal Notice, 12/30/21, 1. Appellant untimely filed a pro se response restating his illegal sentence and ineffective assistance of counsel claims.[7] Pro Se Response to Rule 907 Notice, 2/3/22, 1-2; Order 12/30/21, 1 (permitting Appellant twenty days to file a response). On September 15, 2022, the PCRA court docketed an order dismissing Appellant's petition. Order, 9/15/22, 1-2. Appellant filed timely notices of appeal.[8] Notices of Appeal, 9/26/22, 1. We sua sponte consolidated the resulting appeals. Order, 10/12/22, 1.
Appellant presents the following questions for our review:
1. In considering issues presented in the context of the PCRA, do the previous litigated requirements of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3) invalidate the provisions of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 which specifically provide for an action by which persons serving an illegal sentence may obtain collateral relief and the PCRA's time limits are satisfied?
2. In considering issues presented in the context of the PCRA, do the previous litigated requirements of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a) apply t[o] the instant case where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has since ruled contrary t[o] their decision in Commonwealth v. Haughwout, 198 A.3d 403,[ ]404 (Pa[.] Super[ 2018]), creating or clarifying a new substantive rule of law where the retroactive application of the Sex Offenders Registration and Notification Act (SORNA I) runs afoul of the Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto [laws] which are not distinguished by the length of an offender[']s registration requirements?
3. Did [the] PCRA court err[ ] when it denied Appellant's PCRA [petition] given his sentence for violations of 18 Pa.C.S. §
4915.1(a)(1) and (3) (SORNA I) are illegal pursuant to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decisions in Commonwealth v. Muniz, [164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017)], and [its p]rogeny?
4. Did [the] PCRA court commit a legal error when it denied Appellant's PCRA [petition] given Appellant could not lawfully be made subject to the requirements of [SORNA I] retroactively after the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Commonwealth v. Wilson, [910 A.2d 10 (Pa. 2006)]?
5. Whether trial counsel … was in[eff]ective for recommending guilty pleas to 18...
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